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A NOTE ON SOURCES 
This work has been based mainly on primary sources gained from institutions in 
Britain and the United States. British government documents held at the Public 
Records Office at Kew and United States government and Presidential documents held 
in the State Depa11ment archives, the Eisenhower Library and the Kennedy Library 
were subjected to quantitative and qualitative analysis. The Federation of British 
Industry flies and British Petroleum records were also analysed at the Modem Records 
Centre and the BP archives held at Warwick University. Other primary sources 
referred to included British government official publications, Hansard and Foreign 
Relations of the United States. Empirical data on trade, oil and fmances was taken 
from the BP archives, Warwick University Library, the Public Records Office, and the 
State Depa11ment Archives in Washington D.C. This data was collated and then 
anal ysed for use in the thesis. 
Substantial secondary literature was consulted and reviewed to build on the 
extensive primary sources. The focus of this literature was on Middle East politics, 
International Relations theory, international studies and British foreign policy. Various 
libraries were used to conduct this secondary literature study, and they included: the 
British Library, the School of Oriental and African Studies, St. Antony's Library and 
the Bodleian Library in Oxford, Warwick University Library, Birmingham University 
Library, the Library of Congress and the Middle East Institute in Washington D.C., the 
Kennedy Library in Boston, and the Eisenhower Library in Abilene. 
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ABSTRACT 
Relations between Britain and Kuwait, 1957-1963 
This thesis examines Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relations between 1957-1963 
using substantial archival material from Britain and the United States. The thesis has 
contributed to the literature of Anglo-Kuwaiti relations and to the theory of 
intelnational clientelism. The theoretical model was applied to both primary and 
secondary source material linked to Anglo-Kuwaiti relations. This combined with a 
traditional diplomatic historical approach to the thesis, produced a number of 
conclusions and highlighted a number of themes that dominated Anglo-Kuwaiti 
relations. 
The themes that dominated the actors in this period included the increased 
intelnationalisation of the Gulf, the importance of Kuwaiti oil and sterling deposits to 
Britain, Arab nationalism and the influence of Nasser, the problem of over-flying 
rights, strategic concelns, Cold War tensions, the decline in British power and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Another important theme explored throughout the thesis is 
Kuwait's emerging statehood, implemented by the al-Sabah by the joining of Kuwait to 
various international organisations. 
Insecurity often evoked foreseeable policy responses from the client, and many 
actions of other states produced likely, if not always predictable, reactions of both 
patron and client. The model of clientelism gave substance to these decisions. In the 
case of the client, Kuwait, goals of intelnal autonomy with external security were both 
expected and observed. The c1ientelist model depicted clearly Anglo-Kuwaiti relations. 
The principle argument of the thesis developed from the contention that 
patrons facing a decline in power in the international system use clientelism to bolster 
their economic position. But a reduction in asymmetry of power with the client ensures 
that the relationship declines. In the case of Britain and Kuwait, as British power 
declined, its interests in Kuwait became more economic and [mancial than political and 
strategic. In a broader context a transformation of this s011 is generally to be looked 
for as a great power declines. 
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Chapter 1: The Model, the Themes and the Case Study 
1.1 Introduction 
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces on August 2, 1990, and the subsequent 
Second Gulf War focused world attention on the area of the Gulf. The survival of 
Kuwait as an independent state had only been salvaged by the power of the world's 
remaining superpower supported by a united international community through the 
United Nations and by a majority of the Arab League. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
represented a failure of Kuwaiti and Western security policy in the region. In July 1961 
Kuwait had faced a similar threat from Iraq, but at that time British troops had been 
sent into the Sheikhdom forestalling any Iraqi military action. 
This thesis has taken advantage of recently declassified British documents to 
study and analyse the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship during the period when the security 
of Kuwait was successfully defended. The detailed period chosen extends from the 
beginning of Macmillan's term of office in January 1957 to Kuwait's acceptance into 
the United Nations in 1963. The study will help to remedy two weaknesses in the 
academic literature: the first in Anglo-Kuwaiti relations and the second in the theory of 
international patron-client relations. 
It is the contention of the thesis that Anglo-Kuwaiti relations in this period 
illustrate the fundamental shift in British preoccupations from security to economic 
interests in the Middle East. The most important security objective of the British 
government was the protection of Gulf oil for Western consumption at reasonable 
prices. The political framework for the protection of this resource was the patron-
client relationship between Britain and Kuwait. The military framework was the two 
British military bases located at Bahrain and Sharjah supported by bases at Aden and 
Kenya. 
British policy in the northern Gulf foreshadowed American policy in the region. 
The major objective of the United States in the Gulf during the 1980s and 1990s was 
the same as that of Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. 
Ever since the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1980, the security of oil supplies in the Gulf had become the most 
important national security interest [of the United States] outside of containing 
Soviet expansion in Europe. To protect this vital interest, massive military 
resources had been directed towards the formation of the Rapid Deployment 
Joint Task Force in 1980, which later became the Central Command in 1983.1 
There is, therefore, a closer analogy between the British position in the 1950s and 60s 
and that of the United States more recently than is commonly to be found, and the 
thesis, though primarily concerned to contribute to modem international history and 
international relations theory, can therefore claim some policy relevance. 
The literature on Anglo-Kuwaiti relations is of limited extent, and generally 
lacks theoretical sophistication. Despite these limitations there are some excellent 
works, most notably those of Richard Schofield and David Finnie.2Both these authors 
used British public records, and adopted the traditional methodology of the diplomatic 
historian. This thesis has built on the foundations provided by such investigations while 
attempting to add a more theoretical dimension to the analysis of events as suggested 
by the work of Mary Tetreault on Kuwaiti relations.30f these three works none is 
exclusively concerned with Anglo-Kuwaiti relations though each touches on this topic. 
Of the studies primarily concerned with Anglo-Kuwaiti relations the most prominent is 
that of Mustafa Alani. 4 Although comprehensive, his work suffers from a lack of 
primary research in the British archives which is not compensated for by any distinctive 
1 Roland Dannreuther, "The Gulf Conflict: A Political and Strategic Analysis", Adelphi Papers 264 
(Winter 1991192), 24. 
2 Richard N. Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes (London: RIIA, 
1991); Iraq-Kuwait Dispute vI. : Evolution of the Iraq-Kuwait International Boundary on Land and 
Sea, Pt. 1: 1830-1994 (London: Archive Edns, 1994); Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States 
(London: SOAS, GRC Geopolitics Series, 1994); David H. Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: 
Kuwait's Elusive Frontier with Iraq (London: Tauris, 1992). 
3 Mary Ann Tetreault, "Autonomy, Necessity and the small state: Ruling Kuwait in the Twentieth 
Century" , International Organisation 45 (Autumn 1991),565-591. 
4 Mustafa M Alani, Operation Vantage, British Military intervention in Kuwait 1961 (Surbiton: 
LAAM, 1990). 
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theoretical framework. Its general conclusions are unsound and will be contested in 
this dissertation. 
Other writers have touched on British relations with Kuwait as part of some 
more general survey. 5 Arguing from a dependency perspective, Jill Crystal's work on 
Kuwait is notable for its attention to social change in Kuwait. Less comprehensive as 
Crystal's work, but adopting a similar theoretical approach are the works of Lienhardt 
and Siddiq al-Salih.6Arguing from a realist diplomatic perspective the works of Kelly, 
Bulloch and Morris, and Monroe adds a great deal to the understanding of Anglo-
Kuwaiti relations.? 
This thesis has applied the patron-client model to Anglo-Kuwaiti relations 
rather than one of the other International Relations approaches, because this model 
best highlights the general features which fonn the basis of relations between small and 
large powers. 8 Although it could be argued that clientelism is a special case of 
dependency, it actually differs fundamentally from dependency theory and clearly fits 
more easily into the overall framework of realism. Clientelism differs from the 
dependency school fundamentally by recognising the state, rather than class, as the 
most important actor in the system. It also assumes that states are unitary rational 
actors seeking power and or security, thereby implicitly placing the balance of power 
rather than the world economy at the heart of its analysis. Clientelism also sees force as 
a major means of influence and that the issues of peace, power and security are the 
issues on which states most readily interact. International clientelism has been utilised 
because it is closely linked to neorealism. As such it can fall under the same criticism 
which is levelled at the realist and neorealist models. The major problem with 
5 Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transfonnation of an Oil State (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992); Jacab 
Abadi, Britain's Withdrawal from the Middle East. 1947-1971: The Economic and Strategic 
Imperatives (Princton, NJ: Kingston Press, 1982). 
6 Peter Lienhardt ed., Disorientations, a Society in Flux, Kuwait in the 1950s (Reading: Ithaca, 1993); 
Siddiq al-SaIih et al., Oil Driven MacroEconomic Model of Kuwait (Helsinki, Finland: Wider, 1990). 
7 John B Kelly, Arabia, The Gulf and the West (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1980); John 
Bulloch and Harvey Morris, Saddams War (London: Faber and Faber, 1991); Elizabeth Monroe, 
"Kuwait and Aden: A Contrast in British Policies", Middle East Journal 18 (1) (Winter 1964),63-74. 
8 Jacob Bercovitch, and Moshe Efrat, Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The 
Imbalance of Influence (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 16. 
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clientelism is that, because of its emphasis on international systemic factors such as 
power differentials and polarity a lack of analysis is given to the decision-making 
process. This thesis accepts these shortcomings but tries to compensate for the 
notoriously static quality of realist analysis by merging this abstract approach with the 
more traditional approach of diplomatic history. 
The first part of this chapter provides a summary of the narrative and a general 
discussion of the thesis. The second part is devoted to a study of the middle range 
concerns and preoccupations of the major actors and with such secondary literature as 
reflect these concerns. The third part is of a more abstract nature, presenting the main 
argument of this thesis and explaining how it relates to patron-client theory. The fourth 
and fmal part to this chapter recognises that the ability to sustain the arguments 
depends on the primary material. This section therefore introduces the primary sources 
used in the remaining chapters and discusses the constraints imposed by them. 
1.1.1 The structure of the thesis 
This introductory chapter is followed by five chronological chapters. The first 
of these, chapter two, covers the period from the start of the Macmillan government in 
January 1957 to the beginning of 1958. This chapter covers three areas affecting the 
position of Britain in the region: first, the reconfiguration of the Anglo-American 
alliance at Bermuda; second, the implications for British strategies East of Suez after 
the collapse of British power in the Eastern Mediterranean and withdrawal to the Gulf; 
third, the changing nature of the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship after an increased 
dependence on Kuwaiti oil developed. The British, in this period, attempted to rectify 
and recover whatever they could of their position in the Middle East. The main 
argument of the thesis is introduced at this point: that the decline in the position of 
Britain led the Macmillan government from a mixture of strategic and economic 
concerns to basic economic interests. These economic interests were centred at this 
time in Iraq and Kuwait. 
4 
Chapter three covers the period January to August 1958, which saw the last 
throes of British strategic intervention in the Levant and the removal of its closest ally 
in the region, Iraq. There are four major parts to this chapter, two of which treat the 
concerns of political actors of the time, while the other two develop the main argument 
of the thesis. The fonnation of the UAR and the Arab Union precipitated a rise in 
tensions in the region. The UAR acted, first, as a vessel for Nasser's brand of Arab 
nationalism and a tool to be used to continue his undermining of the British position in 
the Middle East and, second, as a means to complete the strategic encirclement of 
Israel. This first part of the chapter permits discussion of two of the middle range 
concerns affecting the British: the rise of Arab nationalism and the Arab-Israeli 
question. The confused British policy over Kuwaiti adherence to the Arab Union and 
the subsequent revolution in Iraq in July 1958 is covered in the next two parts. These 
supplement the main argument of the thesis surrounding the patron-client relationship 
of Britain and Kuwait and the eventual privileging of oil and economics over broader 
strategic considerations. The fmal part of this chapter focuses on the short tenn effects 
of the Iraqi revolution for the British, namely, intervention in Jordan and heightened 
concern over the security of Kuwait. The concerns and preoccupations of the major 
actors developed here include the problems of the air barrier, the use of rapid 
deployment forces and the need for a co-ordinated Anglo-American policy. 
In chapter four the principal arguments of the thesis are further developed. The 
period covered extends from September 1958 to May 1961. During this time it became 
clear that the major concern of the British in the Middle East and the Gulf was with 
Kuwait. This interest centred upon the free flow of Kuwaiti oil on reasonable tenns, 
the security of investments and the economic interests of British oil companies. British 
interests in the Gulf as a whole were dictated by the paramount importance of Kuwait. 
The changing nature of the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship lies at the heart of 
this chapter. The fonnation of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in 1960, in which Kuwait was a key player, indicated the new power of the oil 
states of the Middle East. The formation of OPEC also demonstrated the development 
5 
of Kuwait in the international system and in its relationship with Britain. The declining 
position of Britain in the world and the Middle East prompted a change in the patron-
client relationship. The rise of Arab nationalism and the political cost for any Middle 
East state of being too closely associated with Britain pushed Kuwait into seeking 
greater autonomy in its external relations, distancing itself from the outmoded pax-
Britannica. However the nature of Kuwaiti security remained paradoxical because it 
was still dependent upon British protection from Iraq and the need to balance internal 
autonomy with external security. 
The independence of Kuwait and the subsequent intervention of British troops 
in Kuwait, described in chapter five, provided the great test of Anglo-Kuwaiti relations 
and displayed the paradoxes of security in the relationship. The period covered by this 
chapter extends from June to December 1961. The limitation to a short period of time 
in this chapter enables a more detailed and wider ranging analysis of events. This 
analysis covers many of the concerns of the actors at the time as well as the 
development of the main argument. The crisis is covered from the military, diplomatic 
and political points of view. The strategic problems and concerns affecting the Anglo-
Kuwaiti relationship are discussed as too are British preoccupations with the air 
barrier, the strategic projection of power and the internationalisation of the Gulf. The 
intervention of British troops showed that the patron-client relationship was still intact, 
but the pursuit of membership of the Arab League and the United Nations by Kuwait 
exposed the desire of the Kuwaitis to replace the British military security with an 
indigenous political security. 
The fmal narrative chapter covers three maIn developments of the period 
January 1962 to December 1963. The first of these was the British policy debate. The 
main argument was whether the economic benefits provided by Kuwait still justified 
protection by continued deployment of British military forces in the Gulf. In essence 
this was a cost-benefit analysis of the patron-client relationship that Britain had with 
Kuwait. The second development was the outbreak of the Yemeni war. This is 
analysed for its effects on Anglo-Kuwaiti relations and developments in the Gulf. The 
6 
extension of American interest and influence into Saudi Arabia and into the Yemeni 
conflict is discussed in this chapter, and the preoccupation of the Macmillan 
government with the Anglo-American alliance is further examined. The increased 
interest of America in the Gulf was encouraged and appreciated by the British. Indeed, 
an additional argument of the thesis is that the position of Britain in the Gulf was being 
preserved by the Anglo-American alliance. The third development was the overthrow 
of Qassim and the partial recognition of Kuwait by Iraq. This paved the way for the 
admission of Kuwait into the United Nations. These developments also changed the 
nature of Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relations. This fmal phase of the narrative 
section of the thesis anticipates the withdrawal of the British from the Gulf and the 
ending of the patron-client relationship with Kuwait. 
1.2 The preoccupations and concerns of the actors 
A number of problems and concerns dominated and shaped the policies of the 
actors at this time, and these themes form the structure of this thesis. They fall into two 
broad categories. The ftrst concerns the international politics of the region and the 
other major actors, and includes the Anglo-American alliance, the internationalisation 
of the Gulf, the problem of Nasser and Arab nationalism for the West, and the Arab-
Israeli question. The second group relates to British policy, and can hardly be 
understood without a grasp of the bureaucratic structure of the policy-making 
machine. Political, military and economic concerns all played a part in determining 
British strategy in the region. Section 1.2.2 therefore provides an outline of the main 
ministries, departments and divisions involved in the policy-making process before 
sketching their chief preoccupation: the reduction and change in British power and 
position. 
1.2.1 Themes relating to the international relations of the region 
The ftrst theme in this group is the Anglo-American alliance and the increasing 
influence that this bilateral relationship exercised on British foreign policy. The so 
7 
called 'special relationship' and its place in British policy in the Middle East, the Gulf 
and towards Kuwait, is carefully examined. Substantial use is made of primary source 
material held in the United States. The secondary literature provides a useful context 
for additional analysis.90ther material relating to the 'special relationship' in the Middle 
East has supplemented the investigations. lOA number of other secondary sources have 
also been drawn upon to provide a detailed analysis of the Bennuda conference and the 
Kennedy-Macmillan relationship. I I 
This thesis develops the argument that one of the primary objectives of the 
Macmillan government was to entangle the United States in the web of Middle East 
and Gulf regional politics in an effort to help insure British interests. This confonns 
with the position adopted by Paul Kennedy who contends that the Anglo-American 
alliance encouraged the British to retain commitments that were really beyond their 
capability .12The Suez conflict demonstrated to the British government that to be 
successful in the region they would have to enlist American support for their policies. 
The deepening relationship of America with Iran and Saudi Arabia during the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations predated Nixon's 'twin pillar policy' of the 
1970s. These relations also created an environment which was supportive of British 
9 Harry C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations 1783-
1952 (London: Oldham Press, 1954)~ William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States 
and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)~ William 
Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, eds., The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)~ Christopher J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: A Political 
History of Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (London: Longman, 1992); John Baylis, Anglo-
American Defence Relations 1945-1984 (London: Macmillan 1984); Alan P. Dobson, The Politics of 
the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship 1940-87 (Brighton: St Martin's Press, 1988). 
1000enry L. Roberts and Paul A. Wilson, Britain and the United States: Problems in Co-operation 
(London: Broadwater Press, RIIA, 1953); Alistair Home, Macmillan, 1894-1956 (London: 
Macmillan, 1988); Keith Kyle, Suez (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1991); Donald Neff, Warriors 
at Suez (Battleboro, Vennont: Amana Books, 1988)~ William Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds., 
Suez 1956, The Crisis and its Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); William Roger Louis, 
The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), and "The 'Special 
Relationship' and British Decolonization", International Affairs 61 (Summer 1985), 395-420. 
11 Baylis, Anglo-American Defence; David G. Nunnerly, President Kennedy and Britain (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1972), and "The Anglo-American Alliance in the Kennedy-Macmillan Years, 
1961-1963: A Case Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kent, 1971-72). 
12Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Allen Lane, 1976)~ The Rise 
and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Macmillan, 1988). 
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foreign policy interests in the area. The primary sources show that whenever a major 
policy decision was implemented by the Macmillan government in the Middle East, 
political and diplomatic support was first sought from the United States government. 
The second theme is internationalisation of the Gulf. During this period a 
greater number of external actors were becoming involved in the Gulf, including the 
superpowers and the UAR. Also, it was at this time that the orientation of the conflicts 
of the Cold War moved progressively from Europe to the Middle East. This 
internationalisation theme had an important bearing upon British policy and Anglo-
Kuwaiti relations. Developments that led to a greater focus by external global actors 
on the Gulf region included the Eisenhower doctrine, the Iraqi revolution, the Kuwaiti 
crisis and the outbreak of the Yemeni war. A number of secondary sources have helped 
to contextualise these developments. t 3 
The third theme is the problem of Nasser and Arab nationalism for the West. 
Underlying this is the Arab-Israeli conflict and the problems incurred by the West in 
trying to pursue an alignment with both Israel and the Arab states. Nasser and the rise 
of Arab nationalism had a large bearing on most of the developments in the region 
during this period. His commitment to the ejection of Britain and Israel from the 
Middle East placed Egypt and the UAR fmnly on a collision course with Britain. 
Following the Suez affair, the position of Britain and those of its Arab allies were 
under heavy strain from the attacks of the Arab nationalists. In the Gulf region, 
Nasser's policy towards Britain proved to be somewhat ambiguous as shown by the 
Kuwaiti crisis in July 1961 where the UAR took the side of Britain against Iraq. 
13Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens (London: Westview Press, 1983); Carl L. Brown, International 
Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (London: Tauris, 1984); Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (London: Heinemann, 1965); Galia Golan, Soviet Policies in 
the Middle East from World War Two to Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East: The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 1958-1968 
(London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1969); Fais S. Abu-Jaber, "Soviet Attitude Toward Arab Revolutions: 
Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq and Palestine", Middle East Forum 46, 4 (1970),41-65; Peter Mangold, 
Superpower Intervention in the Middle East (London: Croom Helm, 1978); Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, 
"The Arabian Peninsula and the adjacent islands" in Alvin J. Cottrell and R.M. Burrell, ed., The 
Indian Ocean: Its Political and Economic and Military Importance (New Yark: Praeger, 1972). 
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1.2.2 Themes relating to British political, military, and economic strategies in the 
region 
The fourth theme, which underlies the whole thesis, is the diminution of British 
power and the consequent transfonnation of the position of Britain in the Middle East. 
The decline of British power in the Levant and the eastern Mediterranean is contrasted 
with a clear detennination by the British government to maintain a strong hold in the 
Gulf. The thesis demonstrates that Britain was not finished as a Middle East power 
after the Suez affair, but continued to play an important role in regional international 
politics, especially in the Gulf. This contention finds support from Keith Kyle, who 
wrote: 
Britain's role in the Middle East enjoyed a brief Indian summer, when 
British troops returned to Amman at the urgent request of King Hussein to 
protect his throne at the time of the Baghdad Coup of 1958 .... In the Gulf British 
influence lasted for a further decade. 14 
However, the reduction in British power shaped the foreign policy behaviour 
and position of the Macmillan government, leading to a greatly enhanced concern to 
retain the support of allies and world opinion. This was expressed in closer alignment 
of policies with the United States, the courting of general diplomatic support for its 
policies amongst Commonwealth and European states, and a far more reactive policy 
stance. This theme was taken up by Lord Beloff who wrote that there was a "general 
acceptance in the Conservative party of the fact that the dominance of the United 
States in world affairs could not be challenged and that the path of safety was at almost 
any cost to align British policy with that of the United States."15The changing nature of 
the patron-client relationship between Britain and Kuwait was also affected by this 
reduction in British power. 
The reorientation of the British position from the eastern Mediterranean to the 
Gulf fonns part of this fourth theme and supports the overall contention of this thesis 
14Kyle, Suez, pp. 560-561. 
15 Lord Beloff, ''The Crisis and its Consequences for the British Conservative Party" in Louis and 
Owen, Suez 1956, pp. 333-334. 
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that oil was now the overriding interest for Britain in the region. This shift in focus 
from the Levant to the Gulf was forced on the Macmillan government. As Donald 
Maclean put it: "The shifting of the main focus of Middle Eastern policy to the Arabian 
peninsula was not of London's choosing, but came about as the result of the sharp 
decline in British influence and near paralysis of British diplomacy in the rest of the 
area. "16 
The fifth theme comprises problems of defence and strategy. The symbiotic 
relationship between British defence and foreign policy ensured that the aims and 
objectives of foreign policy shaped the strategies of defence. Contrary to the view of 
Sir Harold Beeley, this thesis contends that the British government still believed in its 
capacity for effective military action and had reason to do so.17Conversely, the 
limitations of and problems with military power shaped foreign policy. This is clearly 
demonstrated throughout the thesis when force and the military enter the equation of 
British Middle East policies. The air barrier and the problems of the strategic 
projection of force hampered the British in their security efforts in the Gulf and the 
Levant. The conclusion that military logistics played a crucial part in the policy of 
Britain in the region is endorsed by Abadi and Darby.18The thesis differs from Abadi 
and Darby over the weighting given to the role of the balance of power in the Gulf in 
the success or failure of British policy. It is argued that British Gulf policies were as 
much reliant upon the balance of power of the three major Gulf states, Saudi Arabia, 
Iran and Iraq, as on British military presence. The vital role of Britain as 'balancer' and 
neutraliser of the Gulf region is examined at this point. 
The fmal theme of the thesis is concerned with the importance of economics in 
the policy and political position of Britain in the area. Kuwait was a crucial part of 
16 Donald Maclean, British Foreign Policy: The Years Since Suez 1956-1968 (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1970), p. 179. 
17 Sir Harold Beeley, The 'Special Relationship': Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, ed. William 
Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 290. 
18Jacob Abadi, Britain's Withdrawal From the Middle East, 1947-1971: The Economic and Strategic 
Imperatives (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1982); Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez: 
1947-1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
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British Gulf and Middle East policy from 1957 onwards and more especially after the 
revolution in Iraq in July 1958. There were three reasons for this. First, Kuwait had 
become the largest source of oil for Britain and Western Europe. Second, British oil 
companies controlled an important stake in this oil production. This earned massive 
revenue for the British economy, bolstering the balance of payments position. Third, 
the al-Sabah ruling family kept a large proportion of its oil royalties in sterling. This 
was an important investment in the British economy and a key prop to the value of 
sterling. It is this theme, pursued through most of the narrative chapters, that supports 
the main argument of the thesis, that the major external interests of Britain, following a 
decline in power, had become more economic and financial than political and strategic, 
(and that, more broadly, a transformation of this sort is generally to be looked for as a 
great power declines). 
A recurring feature throughout the thesis, but not an underlying theme, is the 
complexity of a British foreign policy process characterised by bureaucratic horse 
trading. Britain's goals were not as clear cut as the patron-client model might suggest. 
Britain had many interests in many states. The bureaucratic complexity of the British 
foreign policy process also did not always make for clear cut policy positions. A 
number of Ministries and government departments contributed to the foreign policy 
making process, competing, accommodating, and working together over issues, 
policies and agendas. The most influential of these was the Foreign Office. This 
Ministry, second in overall government influence, power and status only to the 
Treasury, represented interests bound up with the status quo. These centred on 
fostering and keeping 'traditional' relations with 'traditional' allies. In the Foreign Office 
there had been a general horror over the Suez adventure. Concern centred on the 
particular policy to be undertaken, but also on the reduction in its general power and 
position in the foreign policy decision making process that had taken place over the 
affair. During the Suez War the Prime Minister's office and the Treasury were more 
important in the policy process than the Foreign Office. 
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Within the Foreign Office there were a number of competing departmental 
interests. The Arabian, Eastern, and the Levant Departments each had differing 
traditions, rationales, and interests. The Eastern Department was more interested in the 
larger Middle East power politics and the Cold War. Its direct concerns were with 
Iraq, Iran, the Baghdad Pact (later becoming Central Treaty Organisation, CENTO), 
and economic and social development in the Middle East. The Arabian Department 
focused on the Gulf, and the problems of Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms. It was 
directly concerned with the Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Muscat and Oman. The 
Levant Department was directly concerned with Egypt and Syria (later the United 
Arab Republic, UAR), Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and British forces in the Middle East 
region. The neutralisation of Nasser was a major concern for all three Departments. 
The differing positions of the Departments and the varying policy advice caused 
problems, particularly over issue relating to the Arab Union and arms to Iraq after the 
fall of Nuri. More generally, problems arose when issues crossed over the departments 
and priority had to be given either to one of the three departmental areas or to the 
general British Middle East position. 
The Treasury was perhaps the most powerful Whitehall Department. Its 
interests in British policy in the Middle East were with Sterling, profits of the oil 
companies, reduction in government costs and therefore the limiting of commitments, 
and the cutting back of the power of the Services. The Treasury attitude towards the 
Gulf changed during this period. The opinion of the Foreign Office, initially supported 
by the Treasury, was that Britain's position in the area was vital to the safeguarding of 
oil, sterling and Britain's strategic Cold War concerns. By the beginning of the 1960s 
the Treasury took a more circumspect stand. The Treasury view was that British forces 
did not actually help the oil companies nor were they needed to keep the oil flowing. 
The rise of OPEC had an important bearing on this policy change. The organisation 
removed much of the influence that Britain had over "reasonable prices", and at the 
same time the peculiar investment habits of Sheikh Abdullah were beginning to change 
to more dollar directed diplomacy. Kuwait's overseas investment was now being 
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directed across the board into a wide range of foreign currencies particularly American 
dollars. The rationale with Sterling deposits therefore was changing. 
The Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office was also a very powerful 
influence over foreign policy. Over certain issues and at certain times the Prime 
Minister's views were paramount in the policy process. The Prime Minister's main 
interest was the overview of Britain's position and prestige, but also the costs of 
maintaining this. Macmillan, Home and Wilson generally held a belief that Britain still 
had a major role to play on the world stage. Macmillan particularly felt that, despite 
Suez, Britain was still a major power in certain areas of the world and that these areas 
should be fostered and supported, as long as it was politically and fmancially prudent. 
As long as Britain was still wanted by the states concerned and that its position was 
not being undermined by the anti-colonial or anti-imperial feelings sweeping the third 
world, Macmillan wanted to play the world role. An indication of Macmillan's belief in 
Britain keeping its great power status is his attempt to mediate between Khrushchev 
and Kennedy. Wilson also took Britain's world position seriously. He declared publicly 
in November 1964 that "We are a world power and a world influence, or we are 
nothing."19The influence of the Prime Minister came particularly through proactive 
foreign policy or general policy moves. The Prime Minister needed to lead the Cabinet 
over military intervention or important policy decisions. The tactics and the style of 
implementing these policies was then a matter of compromises between the various 
departments and Ministries concerned. 
The Minister of Defence took an increasingly important role in the shaping of 
foreign policy. The changes to British defence strategy had a profound impact on 
foreign policy. Rejection of large military bases for smaller more manoeuvrable forces 
was once such example. The three Services were at the same time .playing a less 
important role as force levels were reduced. Traditionally the most powerful of these 
was the Navy. Its priorities centred on ensuring the need for a surface fleet and 
19 Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy (London: Fontana Press, 1981), p. 376. 
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maintaining as much of its traditional role in areas of the world such as the Gulf in , 
order to keep the rationale for a fleet. It had lost much of its power in this era, but it 
still had an important voice with its traditional links through the Monarchy and 
Parliament. The Air Force was the growing power amongst the Service Ministries. Its 
aim was to replace the Navy as Britain's main tool for force projection. It therefore 
desired a role with nuclear bombers and fighters. This service resisted as far as possible 
the pressure to increase its transport command as it did not want to develop into mere 
transport for the Army. The Army at this time was focused on the removal of 
conscription. With this it hoped would come the need to foster and keep as many of 
the traditional regiments as possible. The army was dominated by the traditional 
Cavalry and Infantry regiments. It was therefore not very well disposed to the new 
concepts of "teeth regiments" or "rapid reaction forces", but tended to hanker after 
large military bases. Its role in the Gulf was quite different to its role in Western 
Europe. The use of small units in 'fire-fighting' roles to help put down local internal 
problems, such as in Oman, came from the newer traditions of guerrilla warfare 
developed in the Second W orId War by David Sterling. 
All these Departmental and Service interests fed into the development and 
implementation of British foreign policy in this period. Differences in objectives and 
outlook go some way to explaining British policy. Yet it can be argued that these 
institutional rivalries were merely symptomatic of the conflicting imperatives that 
governed the strategic thinking of Britain in its decline. 
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1.3 Theory and the arl!uments 
The theoretical framework for analysis of the main arguments and themes of 
the thesis is provided by the abstract model of international patron-client relations. This 
model helps explain the decisions taken by the two states and the constraints and goals 
of their respective policies towards one another. This section will be split into two 
parts. The first part will refer to the theory of international patron-client relations in the 
purely theoretical form. The second part will relate the theory to the themes and the 
arguments of the thesis. 
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1.3.1 International patron-client relations; the theory 
The theory of clientelism originated in studies of behaviour of peasant 
communities. It was then adapted to explain certain behaviour at the domestic political 
level. 2O'"fhis thesis will use the patron-client relationship at the interstate level as was 
frrst done by Christopher Shoemaker and John Spanier, to provide the conceptual 
framework for analysis of Anglo-Kuwaiti relations.2lThere are two reasons for using 
this analytical model. First, the patron-client theory elegantly explains the relationship 
between Britain and Kuwait. Second, it is an underdeveloped area of theory in 
international relations. A few scholars have developed and added to the analytical 
framework devised by Shoemaker and Spanier.22What has emerged are a number of 
core characteristics of interstate patron-client relationships. The first characteristic is 
that the relationship is dyadic and particularistic. It relates to specific relations between 
two actors. Second, the association is hierarchical as the patron is clearly the senior 
partner in an unequal relationship. Third, the association is informed by diffuse 
relations because, as well as being particularistic, the relationship covers a host of 
general areas between the two actors. Fourth, -the association has, as a core 
characteristic, the flow and exchange of resources. Linked with this is the fifth 
characteristic, that the flow of resources is a reciprocal exchange. The linkage is 
mutually beneficial with both patron and client reviewing continuously the costs and 
2Opor a comprehensive coverage by political scientists of patron-client relations see: Rene 
Lemarchand and Keith Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis", 
Comparative Politics 4 (January 1972), 149-178; James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political 
Change in Southeast Asia", American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972),91-114; Shmuel N. 
Eisenstadt and Rene Lemarchand, Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development (London: Sage, 
1981); Steffon W. Scmidt et aI., Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism 
(California: University of California Press, 1977). 
21Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crisis 
in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984). 
22Ali Ghassemi, "United States-Iranian Relationships, 1953-1978: A Case Study of Patron-Client 
State Relationships" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma, 1988); Christopher P. Carney, 
"International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework", Studies in Comparative 
International Development 24 (Summer 1989),42-55; Tetreault, "Autonomy"; Lawrence G. Timpe, 
"British Foreign Policy Toward the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 1954-1959" (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Exeter, 1991); Bercovitch, Superpowers and Client States; John RavenhilI, Collective 
Clientelism, the Lome Convention and North South Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985); Thomas A. Bryson, American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East 1784-1975: A 
Survey (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarcrow Press, 1977), p. 234. 
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benefits of the relationship to ensure that this remains the case. Sixth, the association is 
asymmetrical in resources and power. The patron is the senior partner because of this 
asymmetry in power. Seventh, the relationship is one of compliance characterised by 
affinity and loyalty, but is voluntary. 
Shoemaker and Spanier denoted four specific elements inherent in patron-client 
relations to distinguish it from other forms of relationships in international relations. 
First, clientelism is defined by asymmetry of military resources. The major motivation 
behind the relationship for the client is its lack of security. Writing on collective 
clientelism, John Ravenhill takes up a similar position to Shoemaker and Spanier. He 
writes: "Like all forms of clientelism, the collective variant typified by the ACP 
strategy in the Lome Convention has its origins in scarcity and insecurity: the struggle 
of the weak to survive in an unpredictable world in which they are unable to compete 
on equal terms. "23Clients do not have the capability of remaining militarily self-reliant; 
the client state's autonomy and security can only be secured through the patron-client 
bond. ''The client cannot, by itself, become a major military power in the international 
community; nor can it, by itself, guarantee its own security."24Second, the bond is part 
of wider interstate relations because part of the motivation of the patron arises from 
the supporting role that the client can play in patronal competition. The client must be 
of great benefit to the patron and, correspondingly, represent a significant loss to other 
prospective patrons.25Tetreault characterises part of the patronal motivation as being 
"defensive cliency": "the acquisition of a client to keep it out of other hands."26Third, 
the perception of the relationship by other states is an important element of the patron-
client relationship. It has to be clear to other actors that the patron and the client are 
bound tightly together. This usually occurs when the dyadic relationship continues over 
a lengthy period of time. Fourth, the relationship is particularised in that the 
23 Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism, p. 23. 
24Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p. 13. 
25Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p. 13; Carney, "International", p. 46. 
26Tetreault, "Autonomy", p. 567. 
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interactions, far from being rigid and concrete, remain fluid and non-defined. The 
exception being during crisis periods when the relationship becomes defined. The 
patron-client relationship is therefore particularised to the event or issue at hand.27 
1.3.1a Patron goals 
The nature of the patron-client bond ensures that there are definite limits on the 
relationship, particularly on the goals sought and the ways used to attain them. 
Shoemaker and Spanier characterise patronal goals as ideological alignment, 
international solidarity, and strategic advantage. 28 A patron may pursue one, two or all 
of these objectives at the same time. Also the objectives of the patron may change over 
time. 
The ideological goals described by Shoemaker and Spanier can be represented 
as ideological convergence.29The patron pressures the client to mould itself in the 
image of the patron as a way of reinforcing patron legitimacy. This goal is especially 
important in an adversarial international system, such as prevailed during the Cold 
War, where the patron seeks to promote its system as being superior. The client is 
encouraged to bring its governmental and institutional systems as well as its policy 
orientations into closer conformity with those of the patron. The Soviet Union and the 
United States during the Cold War placed the ideological convergence of client states 
high on their respective policy agendas. Conversely, the relationship that client states 
had with earlier great powers was not so ideologically determined, although, even 
during the period of the classical balance of power, ideology or system legitimacy 
played an important part in patronal policies. United States demands on clients to 
respect human rights and democracy could be juxtaposed with Britain's equally 
inconsistent nineteenth-century demands that its client states support the antislavery 
movement, free trade and freedom of the seas. 
27Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p. 16; Carney, "International", p. 47. 
28Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, pp. 18-19. 
29Carney, "International", p. 49. 
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The second patronal goal - international solidarity - is the attempt by the patron 
to make the client appear to the international community to be part of its coalition. The 
patron attempts to make the "impression to the world that the client is a member of its 
bloc, or at least is not a member of an opponent bloc. "30Patron-client solidarity can be 
achieved by treaty obligations, security pacts, signing of international agreements, 
voting concurrence in the United Nations on issues key to the patron, client 
proclamation of support for patron, and by cognitive liaison of the client and patron. 
The third patronal goal of strategic advantage is the policy by the patron of 
seeking control of either territory or resources or both. The desire of the patron for 
control of these is linked with the need for military and strategic bases and the 
maintenance of economic advantage over its opponents. Strategic advantage for the 
patron could be gained by co-operation on military matters with the client. This might 
be extended at times to direct military presence of patron forces in the client state to 
guarantee security and to stop either adversarial attack or take-over)l 
30Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p. 19. 
31Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p. 19. 
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Figure 1.1 shows the relationship between the three patronal goals and the 
degree of control of the patron over the client. If the goal is strategic advantage then 
the control that the patron exerts over the client is weak. Conversely, if the patronal 
goal is ideological then the degree of control that the patron exerts in the patron-client 
relationship is high. The patronal goal of international solidarity is located midway on 
the spectrum of patron control over the client between ideological goals and strategic 
advantage. 
Fig. 1.1 Relationship between patron's goal and its control over the client 
Strong 
Patron Control 
Ideological 
Goals 
International 
Solidarity 
Weak 
Patron Control 
Strategic 
Advantage 
Source: Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p.17. 
Figure 1.2 indicates the degree of control that the client has over the patron. The 
variable in this figure is the threat environment that the client faces. When the threat to 
the security of the client is low (low threat environment) the client has a strong control 
over the patron-client relationship. When the threat to the security of the client state is 
high (high threat environment) the client has a weak control over the patron-client 
relationship. 
Fig. 1.2 Client's threat environment and its control over the relationship 
Strong 
Client Control 
Low-threat 
Environment 
Weak 
Client Control 
High-threat 
Environment 
Source: Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p.17. 
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Table 1.1 shows factors influencing the degree of affectivity between client and 
patron, affectivity being defined as the level of congeniality in the relationship. One or 
all four of the variables in the table might be found to influence the degree of affectivity 
between patron and client. 
Table 1.1 
Elements Influencing Affectivity of Client and Patron 
Aspect of Patron-Client Low level of affectivity High level of affectivity 
relations 
1. International status Low difference in status- High difference in status-
politically, diplomatically politically, diplomatically 
2. Stability/ threat High level of stability, low Low level of stability, high 
threat environment threat environment 
3. Resources and power Approaching parity of Wide gap in resources and 
resources and power power 
4. Orientation of client's Hostile Indifferent 
domestic populace toward 
patron 
John Ravenhill characterises affectivity in patron-client relationships as being 
the product of the "personalised 'face to face' nature ?f the relationship." He goes on to 
say that "affective ties are contrasted with the instrumental dealings of the marketplace 
and are perceived as giving rise to diffuse mutual obligations and to a certain element 
of unconditionality in the relationship."32Affectivity played an important role in the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship and policy behaviour was often influenced by the close 
personal relationships built up between the various Political Agents and the Political 
Residents with the al-Sabah ruling family. 
32 Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism, p. 31. 
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1.3.1b Client goals 
The patron may seek clearly defined goals with its client, but its ability to reach 
these goals are not so clear or straightforward. The patron-client relationship also 
remains fluid and undefined. Over specific issues the patron can expect a certain degree 
of compliance from the client. However, this will only come about if certain core 
objectives of the client are met. The client state has two fundamental objectives: first, 
the security of the state and its independence from other adversarial actors, and 
second, internal political autonomy. The perception of the threat to the client will 
influence the client's compliance with the patron. At times when the client feels 
particularly insecure and threatened it will become more compliant with the patron; 
when the perceived threat is reduced the client becomes much less compliant. Political 
autonomy is linked to regime and governmental legitimacy. The level of compliance 
that the client adopts changes the level of autonomy. The client state is in a constant 
battle to balance autonomy and security. A reduction in autonomy due to the need to 
be more compliant to the patron could cause a loss of legitimacy and support from the 
domestic population and, therefore, threaten regime security. The most important 
priority for the client is regime security and survival. 
A third fundamental objective of economic growth could be added to the client 
goals. Clients have long term objectives that are vital to state survival and regime 
political autonomy. A client may also desire a greater role in its local region and also in 
the international system of states. The degree to which a client has to rely on the 
patron in achieving these aims will have a bearing on the affectivity of the relationship. 
Table 1.2 relates the economic well-being of the client to its desired level of 
interaction with the patron. It also shows the choices that a state has when pursuing 
economic prosperity and political autonomy. This simple matrix is based on the 
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assumption that an increase in relations between the client and the patron will result in 
greater economic well-being, but a reduction in the political autonomy of the c1ient.33 
Table 1.2 
Economic Well-being of the Client Related 
to the Desired Level of Interaction with the Patron 
ST ATE OF ECONOMY RELATIVELY HIGH RELATIVELY LOW 
OF CLIENT STATE INTERACTION (more INTERACTION (less 
emphasis on autonomy emphasis on autonomy 
goal) goal) 
Relatively strong (less REGULATION MAINTENANCE 
emphasis on econonuc 
well being goal) 
Relatively weak (more ACCOMMODATION REINFORCEMENT 
emphasis on econonuc 
well being goal) 
Source: Adapted from: Michael B. Bolan and Britan W. Tomlin, ''Foreign Policy in 
Asymmetrical Dyads: Theoretical Reformulation and Empirical Analysis, Canada-
United States Relations, 1963-1972", International Studies Ouruterly 28 (1984), 349-
368, Figure 1. 
33Michael B. Bolan and Britan W. Tomlin. "Foreign Policy in Asymmetrical Dyads: Theoretical 
Reformulation and Empirical Analysis. Canada-United States Relations, 1963-1972". International 
Studies Quarterly 28 (1984),351. 
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Explaining the four different outcomes of the matrix Bolan and Tomlin wrote that: 
In asymmetrical dyads, there are two categories of foreign policy 
objectives, one reflecting a desire for change and the other for no change. The 
change category predominates and can be conceived on a single continuum with 
reinforcen,ent and regulation objectives as the poles, the former defined as a 
desire to increase relations with the superordinate country [the patron], the 
latter as a desire to decrease or restrict relations. An accommodation objective, 
reflecting a desire to reconcile the competing aims of increasing and restricting 
relations, is located somewhere along the continuum as a mixture of 
reinforcement and regulation. The second category, representing the absence of a 
desire for change, is manifested in a maintenance objective, reflecting a desire to 
preserve the status quo in relations with the superordinate country.34 
This model can be adapted to incorporate state security and political autonomy. 
The security of the state, analysed from its threat environment, can be substituted for 
the health of the economy of the client state. This produces a similar outcome of 
choices, laid out in Table 1.3. This thesis assumes a hierarchy of interests for the client, 
with military security and not economic prosperity as the primary motivation. 
Table 1.3 
Security of the Client Related to the Desired Level of Interaction with the Patron 
ST ATE OF SECURITY RELATIVELY HIGH RELATIVELY LOW 
OF CLIENT STATE INTERACTION (more INTERACTION (less 
emphasis on autonomy emphasis on autonomy 
goal) goal) 
Relatively strong (less REGULATION MAINTENANCE 
emphasis on security well 
being goal) 
Relatively weak (more ACCOMMODATION REINFORCEMENT 
emphasis on security well 
being goal) 
. . 
" Source: Adapted from: Bolan and Tomlin, ''ForeIgn Policy ill Asymmetncal Dyads, 
figure 1. 
34Bolan and Tomlin, "Foreign Policy", p. 351. 
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1.3.2 Theory, themes and the main areument 
International patron-cliency is an ideal conceptual model for analysing the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. First, Anglo-Kuwaiti relations fit into the patron-client 
model. Second, the patron and client goals and problems identified by the formal 
model coincide at many points with the intuitively derived themes and main arguments 
of the thesis. The most crucial aspect of patron-client relationships for the patron is 
compliance. For the client it is internal autonomy. The degree to which the client 
complies with the patron and the extent of the client's autonomy are indicators of the 
success of the clientelistic relationship. This compliance has to be evaluated to see if it 
is predicted by the links that define patron-cliency. Changes in the values of the key 
variables of the relationship are associated with the institution of, and subsequent 
changes in, patron-client relationships.35These are governed by the variables of threat, 
security, economic growth and levels of interaction. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 indicate both 
the interaction and the outcome of these variables on patron-client relations. 
The model shapes the historical detail by acting as a heuristic aid to 
explanation. Although an aid to clearer comprehension it is not a fully operation ali sable 
theory. A criticism of the model is that it simply highlights the obvious in dyadic 
asymmetrical relations. Yet it fulfils, to differing extents, the functions of a theory in 
international relations; the tasks of explanation, prediction and prescription.36The 
theory also address motivation, in a way that structural realism does not, by offering a 
set of policy objectives that the patron and the client may be pursuing. 
As with any theory when applied to actual reality the analysis shows many 
disparities. For example those involved in policy-making ignore the underlying goals 
that motivate a patron into seeking or sustaining a client in a relationship. Cliente1ism is 
a tool of theorists, not a model for policy makers. This could be viewed as much a 
problem of methodological explanation as that of understanding or empathy. More 
35 Carney, "International Patron-Client", p. 52. 
36 Charles W. Kegley, Controversies in International Relations Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1995), p. 8. 
26 
realistically it is because policy decisions cannot be fed into a simple two dimensional 
matrix constituted by the variables of threat, economic well-being, and the level of 
political interaction. Also, the model does not cater sufficiently for the international 
political context in which such relationships occur. This tends to make analysis rigid 
and sterile. Additionally, transforming the patron-client model from an individual level 
of analysis to an inter-state level of analysis has been problematic. Bonds of affectivity 
are more plausible between individuals than states. 
Despite these problems, this thesis shows that with a few adaptations, relations 
between Kuwait and Britain fit extremely well into the model of clientelism. The 
secretive nature of the relationship throughout most of the years from 1899-1971, 
which is not a characteristic of clientelism, was a policy that was in the interest of both 
the client and patron. The huge wealth of the client and the financial weakness of the 
patron in the later stages of its relationship was another aspect somewhat peculiar to 
British-Kuwait relations. It ensured that the value of the client to the patron was that 
much greater. Finally, in this case the role of Sheikh Abdullah somewhat modifies the 
usefulness of the model. Sheikh Abdullah was a crucial figure in the history of Kuwait 
and its relationship with Britain. He defined the process and extent of Kuwait's 
development as a state. His influence on Kuwait's financial situation, bilateral relations, 
internal politics and international status was overwhelming. He was a truly remarkable 
man and his impact on the relationship has to be acknowledged when assessing the 
British-Kuwaiti case study. 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship is only one of a number of case studies that 
clearly demonstrate the usefulness of international clientelism as a heuristic device for 
better explanation of relations between states of unequal power. Other cases could 
have been used. British-Omani relations in the 1950s is one such example. Similar to 
the British-Kuwaiti relationship, this association developed and went through a number 
of stages. Initially, the British used the relationship for the goals of strategic advantage 
and economic control of Oman. In 1899 the British forced Sultan Faisal ibn Turki to 
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break off a coaling concession he had made with France.37 This was a quid pro quo for 
British support of the ruling family. Just as the British relationship with the al-Sabah 
ruling family had helped to establish and maintain their position in Kuwaiti society, so 
in Oman the British relationship with the al-Bu Said family secured the ruling family's 
position. In return Oman became a British client, therefore helping to preclude French 
and other potential great power dominance of the region. 
Between 1932 and 1954 another stage in the British-Omani patron-client 
relationship developed. Sultan Said ibn Taimur pursued the objective of internal 
autonomy. The need to remove the financial debts incurred by his father was important 
because it had become a control mechanism for the British government. From Table 
1.2 it can be seen that Sultan Said pursued at this time an Accommodation objective. 
The next stage of the relationship, similar to that with Britain and Kuwait, was 
caused by the reduction in power of the patron. The patron-client power relationship 
changed to the extent that the Sultan was manipulating the British rather than the other 
way round. He sought what could be described from Table 1.2 and 1.3 as a 
Regulation objective; a decrease and restriction of relations with the patron. His 
policy was based on a desire for a more independent relationship with the British 
government. As the British declined in power and influence in the world and in the 
region, their client states were able to, and indeed needed to, modify their relationships 
with Britain. The British at this stage had three objectives for Oman. First, to keep the 
RAF base at Masirah and the overflight rights. Second, to be on hand to exploit the 
possibility of Omani oil. Third, to have an ally astride the strategically important Straits 
of Honnuz. The means of attaining these objectives was by the use of the patron-client 
relationship. There are numerous other examples of patron-client relationships in the 
history of international relations. As with the British-Omani and the British-Kuwaiti 
case studies few of them completely fit into the model of clientelism. Some of them 
have characteristics not readily recognisable in the theoretical model. But, on the 
37Lawrence G. Timpe, "British Foreign Policy Toward the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, 1954-
1959", p. 316. 
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whole they tend to show that the theory is useful for understanding international 
relations between dyadic asymmetrical states. 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti case study showed that a declining patron put economic 
goals as the primary motivation with its clients. Strategic planning, which had always 
been a means to an end, for Britain in the 1950s and 1960s became increasingly an 
economic end. Clearly a patron policy dictated by economic concerns will only be 
successful if the patron is able to economically exploit the client. Although a somewhat 
peculiar type of c1ientelism, Britain's relations with many of its colonial powers in the 
1940s and 1950s fits the pattern of patron's in decline. The colonies became 
increasingly important economically to Britain at this time because they could provide 
sources of food and raw materials that could be purchased in sterling rather than 
dollars. Their importance increased dramatically following the convertibility crisis of 
1947. The crisis had highlighted not only the weakness of sterling against the dollar, 
but also the likelihood of a sharp decrease in living standards in Britain. The British 
government gave strong encouragement to the production of colonial commodities 
that could be sold for dollars. This was then used- to pay for essential imports into 
Britain from the United States. The dollar deficit in the sterling area was chiefly 
fmanced by the equity raised from West African and Malayan exports. Bulk purchase 
schemes were devised for the commodities and crops produced by the colonies at 
considerably below world market prices. As British officials also controlled the 
marketing of these export crops the British government was able to control the 
proceeds from the sales. As John Darwin writes: 
It is at first sight a curious paradox that as Britain's power declined her 
economic grip on her imperial system seemed to tighten; that as her economic 
strength waned the old distaste for turning the empire into a trading bloc made 
way for the Sterling Area cooperation and discriminatory controls. Likewise it 
seems strange that at a period of maximum economic strain at home policy 
makers in London should have contemplated with greater enthusiasm than ever 
before the economic uplift of the tropical colonies. 38 
38John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation; The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World 
(London: MacMillan, 1992), p. 140. 
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Similar to Britain, United States decline precipitated economic exploitation of 
its client states. With a blow to its power caused by the Vietnam war the United States 
began to economically exploit its client states. In the 1970s as the United States 
became more dependent on oil imports from the Gulf its policies began to mirror 
British 1950s and 1960s policy for the region. Taking over the role from Britain, the 
United States sought to prevent any encroachment by any other external or regional 
power on the weak Gulf Sheikhdoms. More interestingly, the United States pressured 
these new client states into transferring the huge equity surpluses into American banks, 
financial markets, and export markets. As Kubursi and Mansur write: 
It was worked out between the two partners that the excess revenue 
earned by Saudi Arabia would be "recycled" through America's financial 
institutions and military industry. In 1971 President Richard Nixon had taken 
America off gold convertibility, bringing about rapid devaluation of the dollar as 
inDation induced by the Vietnam War further eroded the value of the American 
currency. In this context the new relationship between the two countries, and its 
pattern subsequently emulated by other major Middle East producers, 
principally Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, becomes significant in 
explaining American Middle East policy as part of the larger strategic policy of 
maintaining U.S. economic primacy over its industrial rivals.39 
These surplus oil revenues in the 1970s amounted to vast amounts of equity. A large 
amount of which went back into the American economy. 
The end of the Cold War has brought increased motivation by patrons for 
economic exploitation. Yet few weak powers fit into the category of being financially 
wealthy. The exception again has been the Gulf oil states. United States relations with 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have been facilitated by their economic wealth. Although not 
a declining power in the sense of Britain or the Soviet Union, the United States has 
been preoccupied in the 1990s with reducing its Federal deficit. As resources have 
been cut so have overseas commitments, and these have been determined in the 1990s 
mainly by America's economic interest. American policy over Bosnia has been slow, 
hesitant and irresolute. In contrast, action was swift and decisive by America in 
39 A. A. Kubursi and S. Mansur, '''The Political Economy of Middle Eastern Oil"in Stubbs and 
Underhill, eds, Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1994),p.318. 
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secunng Saudi Arabia in August 1990, and liberating Kuwait in January 1991 
following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Importantly the Gulf War, fought over 
reasons of international law and oil, was substantially financed by Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. Since then, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have sought to cement their respective 
client-patron relations with the United States. Similarly to the 1970s, political and 
security ties for the Gulf states have been bolstered by lucrative arms deals with the 
American defence industry, and through heavy financial investment in Wall Street. 
United States and Soviet relations with the Hom of Africa in the 1960s and 
1970s provide further examples of patron-client relations. In this case the two rival 
patron states (United States and the Soviet Union) fonned relationships with weak 
client states (Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia). United States support for Ethiopia in the 
1960s and early 1970s was countered by Soviet support for Sudan and Somalia. 
Curiously in 1977, the Soviet Union switched its patronage to Ethiopia which caused 
the United States to switch its support to Somalia and Sudan. The patron-client model 
fits only partly the relations between theses countries. For example bonds of loyalty 
and affectivity were certainly not a characteristic of-these relationships. The complete 
changeover of client relations after 1977 demonstrates this. However, as in other 
clientelistic relationships, the need of Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia to form relations 
with outside patrons was linked with their perception of external threats. The increase 
in threat for the client states caused by their regional neighbours pursuing exterior 
power support caused a decrease in security and was countered by a policy as can be 
seen from Table 1.3 of Reinforcement with their own potential patronal ally. 
As has already been argued, patrons declining in power seek economic 
advantage from their client states if able to. The demise of the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s parallels the decline of Britain in the 1950s and 1960s. The difference being that 
the Soviet Union was unable to exploit, to the level that Britain could, its clients for 
economic advantage. For example no residual economic advantage could be gained by 
the Soviet Union from the impoverished area of the Hom of Africa. Therefore the 
Soviet Union correspondingly lost interest in securing clients in this area in the late 
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1980s and early 1990s.4o The Soviet patron goals of alliance support and strategic 
advantage took second place to economic concerns. Soviet oil and Coal was sold to its 
client states at Western market rates and not at the previous subsidised rate. 
In the area of the Hom of Africa, with the withdrawal of the Soviet Union as a 
player, the United States switched its patronal goals away from alliance support to the 
pursuit of conflict resolution, democracy and human rights. This represented a higher 
degree of patronal interference and therefore interaction with the internal politics of the 
client state. The client states of Sudan and Somalia, intent on pursuing economic well-
being and therefore in need of their patron's economic support, pursued, as can be seen 
from Table 1.2, an Accommodation goal. This objective was pursued because there 
was a desire to reconcile the competing aims of increasing and restricting relations. 
Another example of a patron-client relationship is that between the United 
States and the Republic of Korea. In this relationship the patron is given wide access to 
military bases, intelligence gathering, and other facilities. In return the client keeps 
autonomy in its domestic political arena. The relationship has been marked by the 
characteristics of clientelism in that the relations are -dyadic, particularistic, diffuse, and 
the association is definitely hierarchical with an asymmetry in power and resources. 
Also there is a reciprocal exchange of resources between the two states. South Korean 
and United States relations are based on compliance in that they are voluntary. Due to 
the constantly high threat emanating from North Korea the client state of South Korea 
has pursued either a Maintenance or a Reinforcement objective with its patron, the 
United States. 
4O'ferrence P. Lyons, "The Hom of Africa Regional Politics: A Hobbesian World", in Wriggins, 
Dynamics, p. 184. 
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1.3.2a Anglo-Kuwaiti relations defined by the patron-client model 
Between 1899 and 1971 Britain and Kuwait demonstrated classic 
characteristics of international patron-client relationships. British relations with Kuwait 
were moulded by wider concerns and interests that included the Gulf, the Middle East 
and the Cold War. However, many of the issues relating to Kuwait were treated as 
particularistic and part of a dyadic relationship. Relations between the two were clearly 
hierarchical, with Britain as the senior partner or patron and Kuwait as the junior 
partner or the client. Issues covered in the relationship were widespread and changed 
over time, ranging from the security of Kuwait through oil exploration and 
telecommunications to consular representation. Within this relationship there was a 
reciprocal flow and exchange of resources. Britain had been perceived as a great 
power, up until Suez, that could offer political, military and diplomatic protection from 
other great powers to certain small states in its strategic orbit. In return for this 
protection Britain sought one or all of the three patronal goals from its clients: 
ideological convergence, international solidarity and strategic advantage. 
In Kuwait, the British government sought strategic advantage, which it gained 
by acquiring responsibility for Kuwait's external relations. Britain could not so easily 
pursue ideological convergence because it exercised no fonnal control over the internal 
affairs of Kuwait (although its infonnal influence was quite extensive). The cultural and 
political heritage of the two states was also so different that voluntary convergence 
was impossible. International solidarity between the two states could only be pursued 
to a very limited extent. Kuwait would never have desired to become or even have 
benefited from being part of a Western bloc. Its desires for international solidarity lay 
more with the Arab world. 
The British government was primarily interested in excluding other powers 
from the areas surrounding the route to India. The Gulf and the shores of Arabia 
formed part of the strategic defence of this route along with the Indian Ocean, the 
Suez Canal, Egypt and East Africa, the Mediterranean and the Straits of Gibraltar. The 
disposition of British forces during the Second World War has been taken by many, 
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including the United States government at the time, as evidence of British commitment 
to empire and relative indifference to the fate of north-west Europe. The Americans 
"were convinced that the British approach was above all political and aimed at 
maintaining its long term influence in the Mediterranean."4IIndia's independence in 
1947 meant that the route to India was no longer the underlying strategic rationale for 
British interests in the Gulf. But trade routes to the oil fields and the Far East, coupled 
with containment of the Soviet Union provided fresh justification for the traditional 
strategy. 
The al-Sabah ruling family negotiated Kuwait into a patron-client relationship 
with Britain, at the end of the nineteenth century in order to safeguard Kuwait's 
security and autonomy from an external power, the Ottoman Empire. One of the side 
effects of this development was that it helped the al-Sabah family to control domestic 
political groups.42Imperial and client relations often change the distribution of social 
power. Tetreault wrote that the relationship with Britain insulated the ruler from 
domestic political pressures. Tetreault went on to say: 
Such changes in the social bases of colonies and clients persist after 
independence and may impair the state's ability to exercise social control. 
Kuwait is an example of the opposite effect, a state that gained in relative power 
with respect to domestic social groups as the result of imperialism.43 
This reciprocal flow of resources was the key to understanding the changing 
nature of the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. As British power declined in the Middle 
East, the security that it could offer Kuwait was reduced. Rather than securing the al-
Sabah regime, the relationship at times was a liability. The Anglo-Kuwaiti association 
was for the first fifty-five years asymmetrical in resources and power. However, with 
the increased dependence of Britain on Kuwaiti oil and sterling deposits and the 
reduction in British power after the Suez debacle, this began to change. The revolution 
41 Clive Ponting, Churchill (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1994) p. 599. 
42 Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Persian Gulf and United States Policy: A Guide to issues and References 
(Claremont, California: Regina Books, 1984), p. 12. 
43 Tetreault, "Autonomy", p. 566. 
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in Iraq in July 1958 and the resulting fonnation of a hostile regime on Kuwait's 
northern border realigned the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. It also fmished 
off any integrated security planning that Britain might have had for the region, and 
struck another blow against British power in the Gulf and the Middle East. The British 
government was left pursuing economic interests in Kuwait rather than any strategic 
ones in the whole area. 
Despite the power political problems the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship was 
characterised by affinity and loyalty. The relations of the Political Residents at Bahrain 
and the Political Agents in Kuwait with the various rulers of Kuwait were always close 
and personal. This historical loyalty, a characteristic of client-patron relations, helped 
cement the union. 
The bond also maps neatly the four specific elements identified by Shoemaker 
and Spanier as inherent in patron-client relations. First, the relationship was defined by 
the asymmetry of military resources. Second, client motivation was lack of security, 
stemming from an inability to be militarily self reliant. Third, the bond was a part of the 
patron's wider concerns and interstate relations, and-the perception of other actors was 
that Kuwait was closely bound to Britain. Fourth, the relationship was fluid and not 
well defined, the exception to this only coming during crisis periods. 
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1.3.2b The themes and the main ar2ument defined by c1ientelism 
The general themes and the main argument of the thesis tally with the 
theoretical goals and problems of the patron-client theory. The themes connected with 
the international politics of the region and the other major actors (the Anglo-American 
alliance, internationalisation of the Gulf, Nasser and Arab nationalism) are partly 
defmed and explained by clientelist theory. The Anglo-American alliance, itself a partial 
client-patron relationship, was deemed crucial by the Macmillan government to British 
security and foreign policy interests. These interests included the power needed by 
Britain to maintain its patron-client relationships. The alliance gave Britain the vital 
additional strength in perception and reality that was needed to sustain its position in 
the Gulf and in its relationship with Kuwait. The Macmillan government sought 
support from both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations for any possible use of 
military force in Kuwait to limit the threats of other actors in the region. This was vital 
for the effective continued provision of security by Britain to Kuwait that was so 
essential to the relationship. The other three themes (internationalisation of the Gulf, 
Nasser and Arab nationalism, and the Arab-Israeli question) all had influence on 
Britain's ability to guarantee Kuwait's security and on the shape of the patron-client 
relationship. The British government was unable to shape the views of the Kuwaitis on 
Nasser, Arab nationalism, or the Arab-Israeli question. The changing pattern of the 
patron-client relationship saw the take-over, by the Kuwaitis, of their external policies 
for the Arab world. Propaganda attacks on Britain's role in region from Radio Cairo 
also weakened its position. Rather than being a security asset for Kuwait the British 
were becoming a liability. At this time the Kuwaitis were pursuing a Regulation 
strategy. From Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 it can be seen that the decisions taken by the 
Kuwaitis fit into the theoretical framework of patron-client relations.44 The increased 
economic prosperity of Kuwait coinciding with the declining power of Britain resulted 
in a desire by the client to decrease or restrict the relatively high interactions between 
44See p. 25 of this thesis. 
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the two states. However, the threat environment for Kuwait tempered this behaviour. 
The relative weakness of its security position caused the al-Sabah regime to pursue an 
Accommodation strategy. 45 This strategy was a mixture of increasing and restricting 
relations. The client pursued other ways of guaranteeing its security, but still under the 
shield of the clientelistic bond. 
British problems with Nasser, Arab nationalism and the Cold War, were 
compounded by their inability to use their client states as instruments of general policy 
in the area. Britain was not alone in being unable to control its client states in 
supporting its overall policy objectives. Bercovitch writes that it "is probably true that 
powers are simply unable to use client states as the instruments of any general policies 
in the international arena."46He went on to say that the United States could not use 
Iran, even though it fully supported the Nixon Doctrine, to shape its relations with 
other states in the Gulf region. This is supported by Wriggins, who contends that: 
Superpower involvement increased the military capabilities of the 
regional states but did not cause the conflicts. Even though each of these patron-
client relationships has been highly asymmetrical, the external power has shown 
only a limited ability to affect either domestic reforms or the direction of foreign 
policies if the local regime opposed them.47 
Examination of the main themes of this dissertation in the context of the patron-client 
model shows that after the Suez affair Britain could no longer exert consistent and 
decisive leverage on the general conduct of Kuwait's relations, yet its patronal 
influence continued to be strong at particular moments and conjunctures. Bercovitch 
argues that it is the "disjunction between the general conduct and the particular 
moments which make it very difficult to define the nature of the relationship. 1148 
The other set of themes, relating to Britain's political, military and economic 
strategies in the region, can also be partly explained by the patron-client theory. The 
reduction and change in British power and position in the Gulf region can be fed into 
45See p. 25 of this thesis. 
46Efrat and Bercovitch, Superpowers and Client States, p. 48. 
47Howard W. Wriggins et a1., Dynamics of Regional Politics: Four systems on the Indian Ocean Rim 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 197. 
48Wriggins, Dynamics, p. 51. 
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the patron-client model. Depending upon whether Kuwait was experiencing either a 
high or low threat environment the relationship was one of either parity in influence or 
client prevalence. This theme, connected with the air barrier and the strategic 
projection of power, forms part of the need and the problem of Britain's patronal 
commitment to sustain Kuwait's independence. During the crisis of 1961 Kuwait 
sought a Reinforcement of the client-patron relationship. Military and diplomatic 
relations were increased and these themes took on greater significance for both patron 
and client. 
The economic theme is bound up in the patron-client relationship. Oil, sterling 
balances held by the Emir of Kuwait, and the profits made by the British oil companies 
in Kuwait were the vital benefits that outweighed the costs for the British in the 
relationship. The increased dependency on Kuwaiti oil caused a change in the bond. 
The rationale behind Britain's wider Gulf stance became linked to the economic 
benefits flowing from Kuwait to Britain. The absolute minimum of compliance that the 
British government could accept from the Kuwaiti regime was the continued flow of 
its oil to the West on reasonable terms. Any threat Jo this minimum requirement was 
likely to lead to an ending of the reciprocal relationship and the possibility of military 
intervention by the patron. 
Despite the possible frictions, the relationship had broad areas of policy 
agreement and few examples of discord. On the broad objectives Britain and Kuwait 
achieved a policy consensus. These objectives included guaranteeing the independence 
of Kuwait, maintaining regional stability, and the continued flow of oil and the 
economic prosperity derived from that oil. The areas of disagreement centred upon the 
tactics employed to achieve these objectives. This was caused by the divergences in the 
general perspectives of the two actors and, in what political scientists would term 'the 
overall policy environment'. Britain had broader concerns linked in with its world-wide 
commitments, the Anglo-American alliance, the British economy and the Cold War 
confrontation. Kuwait's perspective was much narrower and conditioned more by its 
local environment, with the primary objective of state survival. Secondary aims 
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included the security of its oil, defence of Islam and domestic autonomy. Divergences 
therefore appeared over issues related to the Arab-Israeli question, Nasser and Arab 
nationalism, the Cold War and the Baghdad Pact. 
1.4.1 Documents; the problems of the evidence 
The primary documents were approached with a certain level of scepticism and 
detachment, as records of any kind have distortions and problems. First, not all of the 
evidence is at the disposal of the researcher. Some files remain closed for periods 
longer than the statutory thirty years, either being retained by Departments for 
continued use or deemed to be too sensitive to open. Files that refer to or contain 
comments on individuals that could be distressing to first generation relatives fall into 
this category. Evidence that could still be damaging to British relations with other 
states is also kept closed. This undermines the credibility of the British archives and of 
research based on such records. Not all the evidence relating to Kuwait has been 
opened to the public. A number of documents referring to a variety of subjects on oil 
policy, sterling balances, arms sales and security hav~ been retained. 
The second problem of the primary evidence is the quantity. The researcher has 
to be careful not to miss the wood for the trees. There are vast quantities of 
information held regarding Kuwait in the state records. These include files from the 
Foreign Office, the Treasury, the War Office, the Cabinet Office, the Prime Minister's 
Office and the Board of Trade. The number of different types of information proves 
that relations between Kuwait and Britain were diffuse. Researchers develop an agenda 
to distinguish the trifling from the momentous, and a way to prioritise the files to fit the 
objectives set in the research. This very determination can be problematic and leads to 
the third issue: the assessment of the importance or relevance of the files. Should 
greater weight be attached to files from some Departments over others? Should the 
files be placed according to the hierarchy of the decision making process? What 
appears to be a low level policy document may actually be of critical importance. 
Given limited time, the researcher cannot avoid being influenced by the order in which 
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files are read and knowledge is acquired, though there is a measure of arbitrariness in 
deciding that order. The weighting of the documents will also be influenced by the 
notions of the researcher and the theories and arguments to be tested. The chosen 
theoretical lens defines the picture. Look for evidence to confirm an argument and it 
will almost certainly be found. The trap of making the evidence fit the theory is hard to 
avoid in a field where the crucial falsifying experiment is not available. A certain 
detachment from the sources is also important in weighing the specific Anglo-Kuwaiti 
relationship. Britain's relationship with Kuwait, while important during this period, was 
only one of many such foreign relations. Anglo-Kuwaiti relations fonned only one 
small part of the picture of British exterior relations, even in the Middle East. But to 
officials directly concerned in them they will have seemed of paramount concern, and 
this is reflected in the documents. 
Finally, the researcher should reflect that the files only express a sanitised 
version of the state's views. These views, often presented as an agreed whole, hide the 
arguments and disagreements below the surface. The analyst can take for granted what 
the decision makers do because non-issues leave few traces in the official papers. 
Robert Skidelsky effectively argues this point. 
On any but the most resolute historians, all these memoranda have the 
same effect that they had on the Ministers for whom they were first produced: to 
show that nothing different could possibly have been done. A historian who 
comes, naked, to the corridors of power is almost as likely to write conservative 
history as is the politician who arrives in the same condition to make 
conservative history ...• It is almost as if the 20th Century historians have been 
coopted into the Establishment via the Public Records Office.49 
1.4.2 What the evidence reveals 
The most infonnative class of British Public Records relating to Kuwait derives 
from the Foreign Office, and consists mainly of reports from British diplomats in 
Kuwait and Bahrain. The most important of these are the annual reports produced by 
49 Robert Ski del sky , "Going to War with Germany: Between Revisionism and Orthodoxy", Encounter 
39 (July 1972), p. 58. 
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the Political Agent in Kuwait. These set out in detail the previous year's events and 
major developments in Kuwait as well as characterising the state of relations between 
Kuwait and Britain.5OThe Political Resident in Bahrain also produced annual reports 
that covered all of the Gulf Sheikhdoms. These reports combined with monthly 
reviews from the various Sheikhdoms give a comprehensive account of British 
diplomatic views of events in the region. 
A number of key documents have shaped the major arguments of this thesis. 
These are mainly Foreign Office files but also include files from the Cabinet Office, the 
Prime Minister's Papers, the War Office and the Treasury. Files on British policy in the 
Middle East are located predominantly in the Foreign Office classes.51 A number of 
conclusions can be drawn from these files about British policy-making towards the 
Middle East, the Gulf and Kuwait. First, the reports, memoranda and minutes were 
written by a handful of individuals, mostly of Ambassadorial rank, working in either 
London, Washington or the Middle East. The files clearly show that, within this small 
policy-making apparatus, an inner circle existed that governed the direction and 
shaping of policy in the region. The key players included Sir William Luce, Sir Roger 
Stevens, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and his two 
Foreign Secretaries Selwyn Lloyd and Lord Home. 
The second general conclusion to be drawn from the official records is that 
changes in policy were undertaken slowly and deliberately. In essence British policy 
was 'change in order to keep things the same' as befitted the power in the region that 
had most to gain from maintaining the status quo. The documents indicate that the 
5(}ynree examples of these reports include: PRO: FO 3711 140064: Persian Gulf States: annual review 
for 1958; PRO: FO 3711 148896: Persian Gulf: Annual Review for 1959; PRO: FO 3711156823: 
Kuwait: Annual Review for 1960. 
51These include: PRO: FO 3711126845: UK policy in Middle East; PRO: FO 3711132507: UK 
Policy on Middle East; PRO: FO 3711132502: Effects of events in Iraq on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran 
and Aden; PRO: FO 3711132779: UK policy towards and influence in Kuwait; PRO: FO 3711 
141831: UK policy towards the Middle East; PRO: FO 3711141830: US policy towards Middle East; 
PRO: FO 3711150857: UK policy on situation in Middle East; PRO: FO 3711156670: UK policy in 
Persian Gulf; PRO: FO 3711157392: Anglo-American talks on policy in Middle East; PRO: FO 3711 
163972: UK policy in Middle East; PRO: FO 3711 168632: Political Relations between Persian Gulf 
States and UK: Anglo-US Talks on Policy in Persian Gulf; PRO: FO 3711170165: UK policy in the 
Middle East. 
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underlying assumptions upon which British, policy was made remained relatively 
unchanged. The Foreign Office view was that Britain could retain its position in the 
Gulf for the foreseeable future. This analysis complements the position adopted by 
Bruce Kuniholm who asserts that Whitehall was preoccupied with events elsewhere. 
He also contends that "Britain's unchallenged position in the Gulf left its purposes East 
of Suez undefined and its military presence unquestioned."52British documents show 
this to be only partly true, as indicated by the next observation. 
Third, the documents show that this status quo position ill the Gulf was 
supported by the majority of the Whitehall Departments interested in this area. The 
Cabinet and the Prime Minister were keen for Britain to remain a global player in the 
international system. The Gulf was a region in which Britain was welcomed by many of 
the actors who wanted Britain to continue its protectorate role. The Foreign Office 
was a strong defender of the position of Britain in the region, because of the prestige 
and status that such commitments offered Britain. The three services viewed 
commitments in the Gulf as a vital part to their arguments for maintaining force levels 
and budgets. The documents even show the Treasury supportive at certain times of the 
British commitment in the Gulf because of the sterling balances held by the Gulf states, 
and especially by the al-Sabah ruling family in Kuwait. This support by the various 
Departments for Britain's position in this area remained consistent and continued 
throughout the period, except from the Treasury, which was the only Ministry that had 
both the power and the departmental agenda to force through a proper cost-benefit 
analysis of the relationship between Britain and the Gulf Sheikhdoms. 53 
Fourth, the documents show that British policy was, more often than not, 
shaped by rather than shaping events. The decline in power had made British policy 
reactive rather than proactive, with crises and upheavals prompting the major changes 
in policy. The documents also show that once a crisis presented itself the Prime 
52 Kuniholm, The Persian Gulf, p. 13. 
53 PRO: FO 3711156892: Defence Against Iraq: Future policy on Kuwait: Comment by Treasury 
September 15, 1961: Peck to Stevens. 
Minister, the Cabinet and the Foreign Office were very successful in producing and 
delivering a coherent responsive strategy. After each of the major upheavals in the 
Middle East in this period, the Macmillan government appeared to produce a policy 
response that was successful if judged by the criteria of maintaining the maximum 
amount of British influence with the resources available. The evidence shows that, 
considering the constraints, difficulties and risks involved in the area, the policy-
making during crises was incisive. In contrast to this the policies pursued during 
periods of relative calm lacked coherence. 
Information on the Anglo-American relationship in the Gulf is less abundant 
than material on British policy-making. However, there is evidence of United States 
support for military moves deemed necessary by Britain for the security of the West 
and its allies.54The United States government files are the best source of infonnation 
on the Anglo-American relationship. They reveal the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations being supportive of the Macmillan government in the Gulf. They also 
show that the Americans deferred to the British in the Gulf, except over issues of vital 
concern to themselves.55The documents also indiGate the Americans to have been 
much more realistic than the British about the position and capabilities of Britain in the 
Gulf and the Middle East. 56 
54 PRO: FO 3711156874: Defence Against Iraq: The possibility of assistance from the United States 
in Defending Kuwait, June 27, 1961: Walmsley. 
55 ELAK: Eisenhower Records, Records as the President, White House Files. Box No.9. Summary 
Briefing Paper. General Concept of the Anglo-American Alliance; Papers of the President, 
International Series. Box No.3. Memorandum of Conversation, United States Delegation to Bermuda, 
March 21-23, 1957. 
56SDA: Department of State, Box No. 76. NND 911018. Intelligence Report: Prospects for the British 
Position in the Middle East During the Next Decade: Causes and Consequences of Decline, September 
17,1956. 
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Chapter 2: Buildine the Patron-Client Relationship 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter two is the first of the chapters devoted to the chronological 
developments of the thesis and covers the first year of the Macmillan premiership. The 
early part of the chapter provides an overview of British policy in the region since 
1945 before examining the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship prior to 1957. The middle part 
of the chapter examines three major events of 1957 that have a bearing on this 
relationship: the pronouncement of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the Bermuda Conference 
and the Sandys Defence Act. British defence policy is examined over the period from 
the Second World War until 1957 in order to place the Sandys White Paper in context. 
The later part to the chapter deals directly with developments in the patron-client 
relationship of Britain and Kuwait during 1957. 
2.2.1 Overview of British policy in the Middle East and the Gulf since 1945 
British policy in the Middle East underwent a change following the Second 
World War. This consisted much more in style and method of implementing policy 
than in its substance. The objective of the new techniques was to attempt to preserve 
the strategic, economic and political position of Britain in the region, by 
accommodation and by amelioration of conditions in various local states. Gone were 
the days when ministers in London could impose boundaries and settlements, make 
Kings and Princes and control the large regional powers. The reasons for this included 
not only the financial weakness of Britain but also the new realities of a changing 
world. Colonialism was discredited and resented. States and peoples were demanding 
self-detennination and independence. 
The new policy style could not prevent but only disguise a deteriorating British 
position in the Middle East during the two decades after the war. This reduction in 
power ultimately forced a change in the substance of policy, but not before the Eden 
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government had attempted a recovery at Suez. The process of change was accelerated 
by the inability of successive British governments to meet the large financial and 
political costs of maintaining a dominant military position in an increasingly hostile 
region. The rise of Arab nationalism undermined the position and the support that 
Britain had traditionally enjoyed in the area. Yet, up until the decision taken in 1968 by 
the Wilson government to withdraw British forces east of Suez, British governments 
remained committed to a major role in the Middle East. Bearing in mind all the forces 
ranged against them it was remarkable that the British managed to continue to exert 
significant power in the region for so long. 
Britain was able to retain its influential position for many reasons. The three 
most important of these were the support extended by the United States, the 
incapability or unwillingness of other powers to supplant Britain, and the mutually 
beneficial nature of British relations with many states in the region. Other factors, such 
as the general perception that Britain was more powerful than it really was and the 
adroitness of government policy, also played a part. 
The United States defended Britain's position by the extension of its support to 
states in the Middle East that aligned with the West. Its policy was implemented with 
varying levels of diplomatic, military and financial assistance. This helped Britain 
because it secured the position of many regimes that underpinned its position. In the 
Western alliance, during the fIrst phase of the Cold War, Britain was given the role of 
ensuring the security of this region. The United States, up until the announcement of 
the Eisenhower doctrine in January 1957 and excluding the Suez affair, was prepared 
to take a secondary position and to be supportive of its partner's Cold War role. While 
the United States was unwilling the Soviet Union remained unable to project power 
into the region until it made the diplomatic breakthrough with Nasser and Egypt by 
way of the Czechoslovakian arms deal of 1955. 
The underlying aim of British policy was to maintain the status quo at a 
reduced level of expenditure. The Foreign Secretary in Attlee' s Labour government, 
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Ernest Bevin, attempted to create new and equal partnerships with the Arab states by 
removing British troops from their permanent base facilities while retaining the right of 
re-entry during periods of war.1This was 'imperialism on the cheap' with base facilities 
available when Britain would most need them, but without the economic and political 
costs of direct imperial contro1.2This policy met with little success: the attempted 
treaty with Egypt ended in deadlock over the issue of the Sudan, and the 1948 
Portsmouth Treaty with Iraq was not ratified by the Iraqi parliament. 
Despite the efforts of the Attlee government, British prestige and influence in 
the Middle East continued to decline. The ignominious withdrawal from Palestine in 
1948 and the failure of the Iraqi parliament to ratify the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1948 
were indications of the changed position of Britain. The Free Officers' coup in Egypt 
in 1952 and the subsequent Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 defming the British 
withdrawal from the Suez Canal base were clear indications of British weakness. The 
nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran in 1951 and the dismissal of 
Glubb Pasha in Jordan on March 1, 1956, put British influence in the Levant and the 
Gulf further in question. 
Following the independence of India in 1947, part of Britain's strategic 
rationale for Britain being in the Gulf had effectively ended. At the same time, new 
objectives had emerged with the start of the Cold War. Policy was now directed to 
ensuring the continuation of cheap oil supplies to the West and containing Soviet 
expansionism. Yet these developments did not prompt a reappraisal of strategic 
doctrine. As David Reynolds writes: "The [British] Government did not pull out of 
Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Egypt, which henceforth became the new 
foci for British power. "3 
1 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1985), 
p. 113. 
2 Gallagher, The Decline. 
3 David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British policy & World Power in the 20th Century (London: 
Longman, 1992), p. 169. 
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As Sir William Luce was to point out in 1967, this was because oil and containment 
acted virtually as substitutes for India. 
If our interest in the Gulf and South Arabia was so closely linked with our 
interests and policies in India, it might well be asked why our disengagement 
from those areas did not follow our withdrawal from India in 1947. But by then 
two new factors had emerged and had to be taken into account in deciding 
future policy in the Gulf: the onset of the cold war and the discovery of great oil 
resources in the Gulf area.4 
The nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, under the direction of 
Mossadeq in 1951, led to a lessening of the dependence of Western Europe on Iranian 
oil. The demand was taken up by the meteoric rise in the production of oil in Kuwait. 
This oil together with the massive sterling deposits held by the al-Sabah ruling family 
suddenly gave the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship an unprecedented salience 
in the British official mind at a moment when a precisely opposite tendency might have 
been expected. 
4 William Luce, "Britain in the Persian Gulf: Mistaken Timing over Aden", The Round Table 227 
(July 1967),227-283. 
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2.2.2 The historical Setting of the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship 
The links between Britain and the Gulf dated back to the eighteenth-century 
victories of Clive that had led to British dominance in India, the Indian Ocean and 
much of Asia. The lower Gulf area, the Arabian peninsula and east Africa formed part 
of the 'sacred' trade routes to India, giving the British a strategic justification for 
interest in the area.5The upper Gulf remained a relative backwater for the British and it 
was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that Britain extended formal 
protection to these sheikhdoms. 
The British government signed an agreement in 1899 with the de facto leader 
of Kuwait, Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah. This secret treaty, known as 'the bond', 
contained a number of promises by both parties. Sheikh Mubarak and his successors 
promised neither to receive any agent of a foreign power nor to cede any part of their 
territory to any outside power without the prior consent of the British government. In 
return, for this agreement being observed and kept secret, the British promised to 
extend their "good offices" along with a cash payment of 15,000 rupees.6A number of 
other agreements were made between Kuwait and Britain over the next sixty-two 
years. 
The treaty of 1899 was the beginning of the patron-client relationship between 
Britain and Kuwait or, more accurately at this stage, between Britain and the al-Sabah 
ruling family. First the relationship was mutually beneficial. Faced with a highly 
threatening environment, Sheikh Mubarak found the only way to retain a measure of 
internal autonomy coupled with external security was to develop a relationship with 
Britain. The agreement known as the 'bond' between Britain and Sheikh Mubarak and 
his successors legitimised a move from ruling family to royal family.7From the tribal 
5 Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of Modem Gulf States (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 7; 
Brown, International Politics, p. 110. 
6J.C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: 1535-1914, 1 (London: Yale 
University Press, 1975), 475; David H. Finnie, Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait's Elusive Frontier 
with Iraq (London: Tauris, 1992), pp. 15-18. 
7 Finnie, Shifting Lines, p. 18. 
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system of mercantile consensus, Kuwait moved to hereditary monarchy. The monetary 
gains that the al-Sabah family made from clientelism allowed them to be fmancially 
independent of the mercantile class. It also allowed the ruler to hire a bodyguard, and 
this helped safeguard his position. 
The British, with their Royal Navy, gained by keeping other powers out. This 
command of the waters of the Gulf was of prime importance, as was indicated in a 
United States special report on the implications of British withdrawal from the Gulf 
some years later: 
The waters of the Gulf have a fundamentally simple military and strategic 
aspect. Twenty-six miles of island-studded water separate Arabia from Iran at its 
entrance at the Straits of Hormuz; to seal that entrance, or to deny free 
movement of shipping within it, is relatively easy. The Gulf could thus be made 
into a lake having no communication with the outside world. In this sense, 
command of the Gulf waters implies command of the entire Iittoral.8 
Kuwait was strategically important to Britain at this time for three reasons. 
First, it had been nominated as the terminus for the controversial Berlin to Baghdad 
railway. Second, as a natural sea port at the northern most part of the Gulf it could 
provide a base from which to control Gulf waters. Third, its geographical location 
made it an ideal base for the projection of force into Mesopotamia by way of the Tigris 
and Euphrates basin. 
British policy towards Kuwait, from 1899 up to the First World War, was 
governed by the desire to keep the region stable and out of Ottoman control. The 
relationship with Kuwait had been made primarily to halt the European powers' 
challenge to the British position in the Gulf and to control the route to India. 
8 Special Report Series No.8: The Gulf: Implications of British Withdrawal (Georgetown University, 
Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1969), p. 68. 
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So began what Robert Litwak has described as: 
[An] era of British paramountcy and protection which saw an outside 
power playing the role of manager, guardian and arbiter of the region. 
Intervention by outside powers [he continues] was deterred, piracy and 
smuggling were suppressed, interstate conflict were frozen, and coups were either 
vetoed or encouraged pre-emptively. As a result of the UK's presence, disruptive 
forces were contained and their manipulation by outside forces prevented.9 
An understanding was reached between the British and the Ottomans over the 
jurisdiction in Kuwait. This understanding, that was known as the 'status quo', was 
formalised at the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of July 29, 1913. Finnie characterises the 
parts of the 'status quo' agreement as: "1. Great Britain recognises Ottoman 
'Suzerainty' (a word carefully chosen) over Kuwait. 2. The Turks will keep hands off 
Mubarak and refrain from interference in the affairs of the Sheikhdom. 3. Britain will 
not establish a 'protectorate' in Kuwait."lOThis agreement was entirely ambiguous. 
Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, viewed the 'status quo' agreement as nonsensical: "It 
seems to me that we are now in the quaint situation of having admitted and denied the 
suzerainty of the Sultan, both accepted and repudiated his sovereignty, and both 
asserted and given away the independence of the Sheikh. "llThis ambiguity in Anglo-
Kuwaiti relations was, however, a common characteristic of patron-client relations, 
captured by Shoemaker and Spenser as their fourth characteristic of clientelism - where 
the relationship remains fluid and non-defined. 12 
The outbreak of world war in 1914 prevented ratification of the 1913 treaty. 
Mubarak declared loyalty and allegiance to Britain on August 21, 1914, promising the 
support of Kuwaiti forces. This went against the wishes of the majority of Kuwaitis as 
it signified a pledge of support for Christian Britain over Muslim Turkey. The Political 
Resident in the Gulf, Sir Percy Cox, responded to the declaration by Mubarak with a 
letter. Cox requested Mubarak to attack and occupy Umm Qasr, Safwan and the Island 
9Shahram Chubin, Robert Litwak and Avi Plascow, Security in the Gulf (Aldershot: IISS, Gower, 
1982), p. 111. 
10 Finnie, Shifting Lines, p. 20. 
11 Finnie, Shifting Lines, p. 20. 
12 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p. 16. 
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of Bubiyan. Three promises were made by the British to Mubarak in exchange for this 
support. 
The date gardens situated between Fao and Qurnah shall remain in your 
possession and in possession of your descendants without being subject to the 
payment of revenue or taxes ... lf you attack Safwan, Umm Qasr and Bubiyan and 
occupy them the British Government will protect you from any consequences 
arising from that action ... The British Government does recognise and admit that 
the Sheikhdom of Kuwait is an independent Government under British 
protection. 13 
This was the continuation of the reciprocal nature of the patron-client relationship with 
security being offered in return for alliance alignment. Importantly, Britain for the first 
time had recognised the independence of Kuwait. 
A number of other agreements were made between Britain and Kuwait between 
the signing of 'the bond' and the letter from Cox to Mubarak in 1914. The most 
important of these was an agreement, signed in 1913, that outlawed the award of any 
oil concession without the consent of Britain. There was also a secret 1907 agreement 
that enabled Britain to lease a large area of land where the proposed plan for the 
Berlin-Baghdad rail terminus was situated. All the agreements entered into with Britain 
during this period signified that the client regime of Mubarak was following a policy, 
(consistent with Table 1.2 and Table 1.3) of Reinforcement with Britain.14 The 
economic and security weaknesses of the al-Sabah regime, during a period of a 
heightened external threat, left Mubarak desiring a closer relationship with Britain. 
By the end of the First World War, Britain and France had replaced the 
Ottoman Empire as the dominant power in Mesopotamia and the Levant. The Sykes-
Picot agreement between Britain and France split the Levant into two spheres of 
influence. The British sphere was Palestine, Trans-Jordan and Mesopotamia, while 
France controlled Syria and Lebanon. Britain now had a preponderance of power in 
the Levant to supplement its hegemony in the Gulf. However, the external threats to 
13Jacob C. Hurewitz, The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: 1914-1945,2 (London: 
Yale University Press, 1979),6-7. 
14See p. 25 of this thesis. 
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Kuwait had not disappeared. The rise of the Kingdom of Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia 
posed a threat to all the Gulf Sheikhdoms and Kuwaiti forces were defeated twice in 
1920 by the forces of Ibn Saud. Sheikh Salim requested British assistance, and a 
subsequent show of British military strength succeeded in driving the Wahhabi forces 
out of southern Kuwait. 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship was not all smooth at this time. 
Britain acted on occasion against the interests of Kuwait in its dealings with the wider 
area of the Gulf. An example of this was over the border issue. The British League of 
Nations Mandate for Iraq allowed Britain to attempt to delineate the various borders in 
the region. At the Uqair Conference of November 27 to December 3, 1922, boundaries 
were drawn between Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. This process was supervised by 
the British High Commissioner for Iraq, Sir Percy Cox. At this conference two thirds 
of Kuwaiti territory was given to Saudi Arabia by Cox in exchange for acceptance by 
Ibn Saud of the boundary line between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait had been badly 
let down by its patron, but the power politics of the situation meant that the then ruler 
of Kuwait, Sheikh Ahmad al-Jabir, had little choice but to accept the agreement. 
On July 24, 1923, in the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey formally renounced all 
her rights to territories and titles that came outside those laid down in the treaty. It was 
also agreed that the Arab areas should be split into separate territories. 15Kuwait would 
no longer be threatened by Ottoman expansion, and during the 1920s the threat to 
Kuwait emanated instead from its southern border with Saudi Arabia. Between 1923 
to 1937 Ibn Saud enforced a blockade against Kuwait. This blockade was directed 
"against Kuwait's refusal to collect customs and transit duties for Ibn Saud's account, 
on traffic bound for the interior."16The patron-client relations suffered from this 
blockade because Britain was unable to get it lifted and there were suspicions on the 
Kuwaiti side that Britain was actually behind the damaging blockade. 
15 Hurewitz, The Middle East, 2, 325. 
16 Finnie, Shifting Lines, p. 86. 
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The al-Sabah regime pursued, in the terms of Tables 1.2 and 1.3, a 
Reinforcement of the patron-client relationship in February 1928.17 The threat posed 
by forces in the south resulted in British forces being sent into Kuwait. John Bagot 
Glubb, who at this time was a British officer with the task of policing the Iraqi-Saudi 
border, wrote that on February 17, 1928, authority had been given for "the RAP to 
operate in Kuwaiti territory, and one flight of aircraft and one section of armoured cars 
were based in Kuwait town. H.M.S. Emerald arrived in the bay of Kuwait."18 
Without the support of Britain, Kuwait would certainly have been absorbed by 
the Kingdom of Ibn Saud. During the last decade before the Second W orId War one of 
the perennial questions in London was the 'status of Kuwait'. Concern was expressed, 
following the independence of Iraq after the end of the mandate, about ensuring the 
territorial integrity of Kuwait. Just prior to the independence of Iraq, in 1932, the 
western and northern boundaries with Kuwait were semi-officially recognised by the 
Iraqi Prime Minister, Nuri Said, in the Iraq-Kuwait Convention of Boundaries. 
However, following independence, Iraq laid historical claim to Kuwait, and throughout 
the 1930s Sheikh Ahmad was faced with pressures from annexationist quarters in Iraq 
under the colourful leadership of King Ghazi. 
Discussions were held in the Foreign Office in 1933. Kuwait was viewed by 
Britain as important because of uncertainties about British relations with Iraq after the 
end of the mandate. Kuwait was also significant as a link in the air route from Britain 
to Asia and Australia. The oil issue did not figure in the considerations over Kuwait by 
the British. Finnie writes that "oil was certainly not on the minds of the officials who 
met in October 1933 to consider British policy toward Kuwait; in fact oil seems to 
have played no great part in British policy anywhere in the Gulf in the 1930s."19 
17 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
18 John Bagot Glubb, War in the Desert (New York: Newton, 1961), p. 198. 
19 Finnie, Shifting Lines, p. 88; Alvin J. Cottrell, ed., The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1980), p. 89. 
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The period of 1899 to 1939 can be regarded as one of success for the patron-
client relationship of Britain and Kuwait. The identical policy objective of the al-Sabah 
ruling family and Britain, of keeping Kuwait an independent and distinct entity, had 
been achieved. The patron-client relationship gave Britain a semi-colonial control over 
the Sheikhdom without the full cost of colonialism. This effective and quiet control 
was achieved with no drain on military resources and with limited financial costs. 
British policy in Kuwait, motivated by strategic objectives, was bound to be successful 
considering the poor security and financial position of Kuwait. 
For the al-Sabah ruling family the patron-client relationship was of vital 
importance as it gave them internal political authority and external security. The 
economic weakness of the al-Sabah regime during this period meant that there was a 
consistent emphasis on the goal of economic well-being. Deals made with the British 
by the Kuwaitis always had an element of financial benefit for Kuwait written into 
them. The policy goals of the al-Sabah regime because of this position were therefore, 
(in the terms of Tables 1.2 and 1.3), either Accommodation or Reinforcement 
goals.20 
One unfortunate side effect of the bond was the limitation that it placed on the 
social and political evolution within Kuwait. The financial independence that the 
relationship gave to the al-Sabah family led to an exclusion of the wider mercantile 
elements in the governing process. 21 As Mary Tetreault writes "in the case of Kuwait, 
the instrumental power of the state vis a vis domestic society was extensive, at least in 
part as a result of British intervention favouring a strong ruling family over a more 
democratic organisation of the state and the regime." She goes on to say that "cliency 
affects political development in the client state by increasing the autonomy of the state 
with respect to domestic social groups. "22This phenomenon of internal political 
20 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
21 Jill Crystal, "Coalitions in Oil Monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar", Comparative Politics 21 (July 
1989),427-43. 
22 Tetreault, "Autonomy", pp. 568-569. 
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relationships within cHency reflects a general characteristic of cHency at the domestic 
and state level of analysis; that cHentelist relations are dominated by vertical over 
horizontal ties.23British patron-client relations had legitimised and perpetuated the 
fragmented Sheikhly political system in the Gulf region.24 
In 1934 the oil concession was awarded for the entirety of Kuwait to the 
Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), jointly owned by American and British oil companies. 
Oil would change the patron-client relationship in the post war period. In the pre-war 
period the signing of the oil concession enhanced the need to demarcate the Iraq-
Kuwait border, because this now had important commercial implications for KOC. 
Unfortunately this border, though described in words in 1913, 1923 and 1932 had 
never been demarcated. Despite consistent British pressure on Iraq between 1938 and 
1956 the issue was never resolved. 
The growing fmancial strength of the al-Sabah regIme, derived from oil 
royalties in the post war period, was both a blessing and a burden to the security of 
Kuwait. It made Kuwait a more important client for the British, as they became 
increasingly dependent on Kuwaiti oil after the problems in Iran between 1951-1953. 
Ironically, its increased wealth made Kuwait an even more tempting prize for Iraq. 
2.3 Britain's position in the Middle East at the beginning of 1957 
The events of Suez have been well documented in the academic literature. A 
close analysis of this crisis is not called for here. However to place the thesis in context 
a bare outline of events is needed. In September 1955 Nasser made an agreement with 
the Czechoslovakian government to provide Egypt with modem weaponry. This move 
broke the Western monopoly on arms in the Middle East region. It also confirmed to 
the British government the need to remove Nasser from power. The next precipitative 
23 Ravenhill, Collective Clientelism, p. 43. 
24 Glen Balfour Paul, "Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: Political and Social Evolution" 
in Richard Ian Netton, ed., Arabia and the Gulf from Traditional Society to Modem States, essays in 
honour of M.A. Shaban's 60th birthday (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 157. 
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event took place in July 1956 when, mainly for financial reasons, Washington abruptly 
withdrew funds from the Aswan Dam venture. Angered by this move, but also by the 
need to raise the necessary capital for the Aswan Dam project, Nasser nationalised the 
Suez canal on July 26, 1956. In an emergency Cabinet meeting the next day the British 
government determined that the Suez canal was of vital importance to Britain and the 
West, and that if economic and political pressure failed then the military option would 
have to be used. 
Following a number of top level meetings a secret agreement was reached 
between Britain, France and Israel. It was agreed that Israel would attack Egypt, and 
this would be used as justification by Britain and France to occupy the canal zone. In 
the process it was hoped that Nasser would be destroyed. Unfortunately the 
Eisenhower administration, preoccupied with the forthcoming presidential election, 
publicly and privately opposed the use of the military option. Despite this opposition, 
Israeli troops entered the Sinai on October 29, 1956, and secured the Straits of Tiran. 
A week later in accordance with the secret agreement British and French troops 
-
entered Egypt. However, within twenty four hours Britain had been forced to halt its 
operations by pressure exerted by the United States and the international community. 
Eisenhower and George Humphrey, United States Treasury Secretary, put together a 
number of economic sanctions against Britain. These included the American Federal 
Reserve selling large quantities of sterling, the holding up of emergency oil supplies to 
Europe, and the blocking of Britain's drawing rights on the International Monetary 
Fund. These acts forced the British government to halt military operations before its 
forces had achieved their objective of securing both ends of the Canal. The parity of 
sterling was considered too important by the Cabinet. A face-saving solution of 
intervention with United Nations peace-keeping troops was found for Britain and 
France by the Canadian government. Suez had became a political disaster for the Eden 
government with a split in the Commonwealth and damage to the 'special relationship' 
between Britain and the United States. 
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British paramountcy in the Middle East was over before Suez. The war had 
been an attempt to reassert it. Suez did not force a retreat from Empire, but merely 
emphasised that this was already under way. Neither did the Suez crisis force Britain to 
tum to Europe. The effect of the war on Britain was to bring down the Eden 
government and severely damage its international standing, because the failure at Suez 
had clearly demonstrated the financial weakness of Britain, and its second rate power 
status. 
Despite Suez the British were still key players in the Middle East region. The 
new Macmillan government set out a number of general aims for its Middle East 
policy. The importance of the Middle East region's oil, finances, and trade to the West 
made stability a central concern. British policy, therefore, had the reduction in tension 
between Israel and the Arab world as a primary aim, and if this was not possible then 
at least a policy of perceived neutrality on the issue. The accusations of collusion with 
Israel had been one of the most damaging aspects of the Suez affair for the British. The 
security and integrity of Jordan and Kuwait were essential to the broader British aim of 
Middle East stability. These states were viewed as the linchpins of stability in the 
Levant and the Gulf, respectively. The independence of these states therefore remained 
a consistent aim of the British government. 
British security concerns were still bound up in the Cold War conflict. The 
Middle East, because of its strategic importance in any global conflict, remained a 
crucial theatre of the East-West confrontation. This was an import reason for 
maintaining bases that could be used to support an attack on the Soviet Union and 
defence of the region. 
The increasing oil-dependence of the British economy and its increasingly 
precarious financial position ensured that reliable supply of Middle East oil at 
reasonable prices and the stability of foreign-held Sterling deposits were important 
British policy aims. British policy towards the Middle East region was therefore 
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tempered by the need to keep the vast financial holdings of the Gulf Sheikhdoms and 
Iraq in Sterling 
Following the loss of the Suez base the military position in Aden and the Gulf 
had become even more important to the British government. At the beginning of 1957 
Britain had a number of small military bases dotted up and down the Gulf. It also had 
large military bases in Iraq and in Aden. These bases were central to Britain's position 
in the area. The Middle East was also an important strategic and military link with the 
Indian Ocean and therefore the majority of the Commonwealth countries. British 
foreign policy was still ordered by Churchill's three circles of interest: Europe, the 
Commonwealth and the Atlantic alliance. Although the Macmillan government during 
its period of office was to implement a shift of emphasis from the Commonwealth 
circle to the European circle, at the beginning of 1957 the Commonwealth was still of 
vital concern to Whitehall. 
The threats at the beginning of 1957 to Britain's position in the Middle East 
came largely from four directions. First was the threat from Nasser. Political triumph at 
-
Suez had made the Egyptian leader the dominant political force in the region. His 
brand of pan-Arabist socialism combined with an anti-imperialist policy made him the 
symbolic leader of a majority of the Arab people. Britain was one of his main targets. 
Radio Cairo was used to make vitriolic propaganda attacks on Britain's position in the 
area. The second threat came from the Soviet Union and Communism within the 
region itself. The Tudeh party had been a worrying element in Mossadegh's Iran. There 
were now other Communist elements in Iraq and Aden. These groups supported by 
Moscow, reduced the stability of the region and therefore represented a threat to 
Britain and the West. The third threat (at this time) came from the United States. The 
position of the Eisenhower administration over Suez had caused grave problems for 
the Eden government. The split with Britain's most important ally was a considerable 
concern for the new Macmillan government. It had become clear that the British 
position in the Middle East as well as in Europe was crucially dependent on the Anglo-
58 
American special relationship. The fourth threat at the beginning of 1957, and 
throughout the period, was financial. The Suez war had highlighted and exacerbated 
the depth of Britain's financial predicament. Domestic financial pressures put into 
question the use of costly armed forces in areas such as the Gulf. Besides these four 
major concerns the possibility of a revolution in Saudi Arabia that could radicalise the 
whole area was a constant concern for the Foreign Office. So too was the prospect of 
a union of Egypt and Iraq that could squeeze Britain out of the region. 
British alliances with Iraq and the Gulf Sheikhdoms were the key to dealing 
with most of these issues. In political and strategic terms Iraq was the most important 
British ally in the area. British bases at Habbanniya and Shaiba would be a key element 
in any East-West military confrontation. This was outlined in a report on future 
defence arrangements with Iraq written in 1954. 
The revised concept of a forward strategy for the defense of the Middle 
East in a major war is based on the power of the United Kingdom and its allies 
to inflict upon the enemy at the outset of hostilities such damage by air attack as 
would reduce the land threat to Iraq to manageable proportions. Our intention is 
to deploy North-eastwards with the object of holding the enemy land forces as 
far forwards as practicable, if possible in the passes leading from Persia to Iraq.25 
Iraq was also a bulwark against Egypt and Nasser, and this was important because 
Cairo was proving to be a more substantial threat to the West than even the Soviet 
Union. Division of labour between the two Western allies was also important. The 
United States was fostering close relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, while Britain 
concentrated on Iraq and Kuwait. 
Bilateral treaties between Britain and the Gulf Sheikhdoms remained intact. 
The most important of these was the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. Its importance 
derived from the huge quantities of oil now being extracted from the Sheikhdom in the 
wake of the British-Iranian problems over Mossadeq and the oil nationalisation of 
1951-1953. Kuwait had become the major supplier of British and West European oil. 
25pRO~ FO: 3711115751: View on Future Defence Arrangements with Iraq: May 31, 1954. 
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Kuwait was also the major holder of sterling amongst the Middle East countries. This 
is why Kuwait had become Britain's most important relationship after Iraq in the 
Middle East by the beginning of 1957. 
From 1957 onwards the importance of Kuwait for Britain increased. The Suez 
adventure had undermined Britain's position in the Levant and finished for good any 
influence over Egypt. Britain could no longer play a great power role in the Middle 
East and as a declining power its concerns were increasingly defmed and shaped by 
economic interests. A clear break with Britain's past position had taken place after 
Suez. Major change in its relationships with states in the regions was now inevitable. 
Kuwait was one such state. It now played a major role in British thinking partly 
because Britain was now limited in its power and therefore in its concerns and 
interests. British attention was now closely though not yet exclusively directed towards 
oil and Sterling and since Kuwait held the key to both it now became the focus of 
British policy in the Gulf. 
British influence in the Middle East had been unmistakably damaged by military 
intervention in Egypt. The perception of Britain as a-great Middle East power had been 
shattered. Many of the alliances that Britain had in the region had been impaired as it 
became politically difficult for these states to remain close to Britain. There were a 
number of major developments that resulted from the Suez affair. These included: the 
State of the Union Address by President Eisenhower (the Eisenhower Doctrine) 
delivered on January 5 the Bermuda Conference of March 21-23, and the Sandys 
Defence White Paper presented to Parliament on April 4. 
The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Bermuda Conference helped repair the 
West's position in the Middle East and bolster up the position of Britain. All three 
developments had a bearing on the position of Britain in the region and therefore upon 
Anglo-Kuwaiti relations. 
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2.3.1 The Eisenhower Doctrine 
The State of the Union Address of President Eisenhower set out what became 
known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. In response to the growing perceived and real 
threat of international Communism in the Middle East, President Eisenhower proposed 
three specific actions. The first was a commitment by the United States to help the 
states of the Middle East develop "economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of 
national independence. "26Second came a pledge to offer help in the area of military 
programs and assistance to any state desiring such aid. Third, the United States 
government offered an assurance that it would extend the deployment of its military 
forces for the protection of the political independence and or territorial integrity of any 
state requesting such assistance "against overt armed aggression from any nation 
controlled by international Communism. "27 
This statement became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. By it, the United 
States effectively took over responsibility for the Western interests in the Levant. 
While the announcement of the Doctrine, followed by the reconciliation of Britain and 
-
the United States at Bermuda, strengthened the British position in the Gulf region. The 
West was now presenting a united front from which Britain could derive much needed 
political and diplomatic strength. 
United States interest and influence in the Gulf increased as well. This influence 
was still secondary to Britain. The contention of Moiara Ruehsen that the United 
States had become the dominant exterior power in the Gulf by 1956, does not 
withstand scrutiny.28The comments of the United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 
paint a different picture. Hermann Eilts interestingly stated that "the United States, in 
its desire to continue to permit the British to exercise whatever responsibility they 
26ELAK: Eisenhower Records, Central File, Official File, Box No 584, Address of The President of 
the United States delivered before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
Relative to the Middle East Situation, January 5, 1957. p. 5. 
27 ELAK: Box No 584, p. 6. 
28 Moiara de Moraes Ruehsen, '''The Advent of American Hegemony in the Persian Gulf; 1953-1956" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 1992), pp. 22-23. The contrary case, in favour of 
continued British primacy, is argued throughout the present dissertation. 
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could in those areas of the world where the British were still prepared to do so, 
preferred to allow the British to retain control." He went on to say: 
There was of course, an American policy relationship with Iran, with the 
Shah of Iran, and with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. But American policy in the Gulf 
area, or lack of policy really, was to a considerable extent the result of deference 
to the British. I recall so well that even as liberal an administration as that of 
President Kennedy - which came into office holding the strong belief that what 
we needed in the Middle East, as in the Arabian Peninsula, was significant 
political, social, and economic reform and which instructed its representatives in 
the field to press for such reform - did not really care to make much of an effort 
with the British on this very point.29 
Britain was still the dominant political and military force in the Gulf up until at least 
1962. Elizabeth Monroe takes a similar view. 
In the coastal belt of southern Arabia that consisted of Aden colony and 
its dependencies, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and the small Arab 
principalities of the Persian Gulf, British dominance survived. Unchallenged by 
other powers, it rendered the area a replica in miniature of the one time British 
position in the Middle East as a whole.30 
The United States signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia on April 2, 1957. 
-
This agreement was the continuation of an American-Saudi patron-client relationship 
similar to the one between Britain and Kuwait. In exchange for a five year lease of an 
air base in Saudi Arabia the United States promised to develop Saudi Arabia's military 
forces. Equipment over $110 million was sold to Saudi Arabia covering military 
hardware, training and base constructions.31This move was important as it backed up 
the position of Britain in the area, because the stability of Saudi Arabia was of key 
importance in the maintenance of the status quo for the Gulf. 
One political ramification of the greater involvement of the United States in the 
region was increasingly to isolate Egypt. The Eisenhower Doctrine effectively split the 
Arab world in two halves. Elie Podeh wrote that "one included Egypt and Syria, who 
29 A Conversation with Ambassador Hennann F. Eilts; The Dilemma in the Persian Gulf (Chicago: 
The Chicago University Oral History Program, 1980), p. 5. 
30 Monroe, Britain's moment, p. 213. 
31ELAK: Box No 584, January 5,1957. p. 198. 
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rejected Western support, being more inclined towards neutralism; while the other 
consisted of the rulers who feared Communist penetration and were convinced that 
their future was tied up with the West, both ideologically and economically."32What 
transpired was the temporary formation of a royalist axis, with a rapprochement 
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia when the Iraqi crown prince met King Saud in 
Washington. The grouping of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon effectively 
isolated Egypt, while Syria faced Western sponsored coup attempts in 1957. The 
isolation of Egypt up until the formation of the DAR gave Britain the much needed 
breathing space to re-establish some sort of position in the region. The Eisenhower 
Doctrine was therefore an important element in the recovery, albeit temporary, of 
Britain's position. 
2.3.2 The Bermuda Conference 
The weakness of the British position in the Middle East had been accentuated 
by the problems that had developed in the 'special relationship' during the Suez crisis. 
Britain clearly no longer had the power economically or politically to maintain its 
traditional position in the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. The situation for 
Britain in early 1957 in the Levant closely resembled its position in Greece and Turkey 
in 1947. Then America had taken over the burden of fmancial and economic aid 
necessary for the continued independence of Greece and Turkey. The Eisenhower 
Doctrine was continuing in the traditions of the Truman Doctrine, and filling the power 
void created by the British. What was needed for its success was a united Western 
bloc. 
Anglo-American relations had been badly damaged during the Suez affair. The 
dangers to the Western world of a rift between America and Britain placed pressure on 
the Eisenhower administration and the new Macmillan government to patch up their 
differences. Sir Winston Churchill, in a letter to President Eisenhower shortly after the 
32Elie Pobeh, "The Struggle over Arab hegemony after the Suez Crisis", Middle Eastern Studies 29 
(1) (January 93), 101. 
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Suez affair, wrote: "Now, whatever the arguments adduced here and in the United 
States for or against Anthony's action in Egypt, to let events in the Middle East 
become a gulf between us would be an act of folly, on which our whole civilisation 
may founder. "33 A month before Macmillan became Prime Minister he met the 
American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in Paris. At this meeting Macmillan 
indicated that he himself had been: 
Unhappy with the way in which the matter was handled and the timing, 
but that Eden had taken this entirely to himself and he, Macmillan, had no real 
choice except to back Eden. Macmillan did not disguise the fact that he had 
always favoured strong action, but the point was that he did not like the manner 
and the timing, particularly vis-a-vis the United States.34 
Macmillan went on to say that: "The British Action was the last gasp of a declining 
power and that perhaps in two hundred years the United States 'would know how we 
felt'. "35 
It was agreed that the two leaders should meet at Bermuda to patch up the 
tensions in the relationship. The rapid growth in power of the United States coinciding 
with the relative decline in power of Britain formed the structural tension of the 
relationship. Combined with the United States being the natural successor to the 
British role as world leader, this was cause for some public and official dissension. The 
underlying problem for the British was summed up in a briefing paper prepared for the 
President prior to Bermuda. 
As the British have weakened, their policies in defence of Western 
positions have become less positive in areas where they judge their own interests 
to be less involved and, at the same time, they have become extremely sensitive to 
the threat of change in areas which they still believe vital to their national 
existence.36 
33 Letter from Sir Winston Churchill to President Eisenhower, November 23, 1956, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 9, 1955-57, (Washington D.C.: United States Government), 667. 
34 United States, Memorandum for the Record by the Secretary of State, Paris December 12, 1956, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 9, 1955-57, (Washington D.C.: United States Government), 
667. 
35 FRUS, 9, 1955-57,667. 
36ELAK: Eisenhower Records, Records as President, White House Files, Secret Summary Briefing 
Paper General Background: Traditional Concept of the Anglo-American Alliance, January, 1957. p. 
1. 
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The British government had assessed its interests in the Middle East to be so 
important that military intervention in Egypt during the Suez crisis had been warranted. 
The threat of Arab nationalism supported by Communist subversion was judged to be a 
serious menace to the supply of oil to the West. The British governments of both Eden 
and Macmillan were critical of the policies pursued by the United States government 
towards Egypt and this belligerent Arab nationalism. One of the first discussions at 
Bermuda between Eisenhower and Macmillan was on this subject. John Foster Dulles 
wrote: "In discussing the problem of relations with Egypt, Mr. Macmillan raised what 
he called the "$64 thousand question", ... namely, were we going to wage political and 
economic warfare against Nasser or seek some arrangement with him in relation to 
Israel and the Canal... "37There remained differences in opinion between Britain and the 
United States over Nasser, but it was agreed that a joint policy of working towards the 
opening of the Canal should be pursued. Over Gaza and Aqaba there were large 
measures of agreement between the two sides. The need for stability and prevention of 
-
extreme action was agreed as being a joint objective. 
A significant proportion of the talks on the Middle East was given over to the 
access to and production of oil in the Middle East. The protection of Kuwait was the 
key part to this problem. 
Harold Macmillan pointed out that Kuwait was really the key to a 
satisfactory answer. This is for the reason that even in a region where many 
areas are great producers of oil, Kuwait is by far the greatest of these and in 
itself can produce oil enough for all Western Europe for years to come.38 
Other difficulties and problems were brought up by both sides over Buraimi, Aden, 
Jordan, Egypt and Syria. The American delegation surmised that: 
37 United States, Memorandum of a Conversation, Mid-Ocean Club, Bermuda, March 20, 1957 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 17, 1955-57, (Washington D.C.: United States Government), 
705. 
38ELAK: Eisenhower Papers, Papers of the President, International Meetings Series, Box 2, Bermuda 
Conference, March 21, 1957. p. 4. 
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So many different considerations apply in each of these problems that the 
only logical approach was to take our principal purpose or objective and 
subordinate all other purposes to a successful solution of this principal one. 
This principal purpose is, of course, that of retaining access to Kuwait 
and an adequate flow of oil therefrom, for one of the requirements for success in 
this is to achieve better relationships with the surrounding areas, the principal 
one of which would be Arabia.39 
This issue, the maintenance of oil production along with access to it, was 
followed up with lower level talks in London between Deputy Under Secretary 
Henderson and Ambassador Trevelyan. A number of joint recommendations came out 
of these talks. These included measures to try to settle the critical frontier disputes 
between Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms, British and American joint action to 
preserve the British position in the Gulf, steps to support and augment the security of 
Jordan and Lebanon, continuation of discussions on Syria and Egypt, and, most 
importantly, the further examination of strategies needed to ensure the continued 
uninterrupted flow of Middle East oil. 40 
Policy was being directed so that all other objectives were subordinate to the 
principal aim of ensuring the continued flow of oil. Attempts to settle border disputes 
-
such as the Buraimi issue was an example of this subordination of other objectives to 
the principal policy. The need for stability and security in the Gulf and the wider area 
of the Levant, ·in order that oil could be produced and transported, shaped British and 
American policy. The most crucial area of oil production for Western Europe was 
Kuwait. The importance of Kuwait and its place as the key objective in British policy 
towards the Arab Middle East had been made clear at the Bermuda Conference. 
The question was posed of what would be done if there were to be a coup 
d'etat in Kuwait. The British answered that if they were "confronted suddenly with a 
new and dangerous situation in Kuwait, ... [they] would have to take action at once in 
this extremely important area. "41 Security of the Gulf in general and of Kuwait in 
39ELAK: Box 2, Bermuda Conference, March 21, 1957, pp. 4-5. 
~LAK: Box 2, Bermuda Conference, March 21, 1957, Progress Report on United States objectives 
and policies with respect to the Near East, June 27, 1957, p.3. 
41 ELAK: Box 2, Bermuda Conference, March 21, 1957, Memorandum of a conversation, Mid-Ocean 
Club, Bermuda, March 21,1957, 3:45p.m. p. 8. 
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particular was discussed. Macmillan reiterated the need for the United States to foster 
guarantees that maintained security and peace in the region. It was decided that joint 
plans and objectives would be developed for the Gulf region. 
Kuwait as well as now being one of the most important parts of British policy 
in the Middle East remained one of the most secretive areas of British policy. At the 
Bermuda conference the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, "pointed out the 
great importance that no word should leak to the press regarding the discussion of 
Kuwait."42There were three reasons for this secrecy. First, any mention of the security 
problems of Kuwait would increase the insecurity of the Sheikhdom. Second, too close 
an association of Kuwait with the Western powers and in particular Britain would be 
damaging at this time. Third, mention of Kuwait would highlight the importance of this 
mini-state to Britain and the United States and could expose it to Arab nationalist and 
Communist attack. 
The Bermuda Conference was judged to have been highly successful by both 
sides. Eisenhower described it as ''by far the most successful international meeting that 
-
I have attended since the close of W orId War II. "43 The closer alignment of British and 
American policy in the Middle East sought by Eisenhower and Macmillan had been 
achieved. The working relationship between the United States and Britain became 
much closer. As John Baylis puts it the "United States seems to have been genuinely 
prepared to work closely with Britain from August 1957 onwards. "44 
The Bermuda Conference had a significant bearing on Anglo-Kuwaiti relations. 
At the highest levels of policy formulation the flow of Kuwaiti oil was placed as the 
key objective of British policy in the Middle East. The patron-client relationship 
between Britain and Kuwait had taken on its greatest significance following the Suez 
affair. The international status and the power of Britain had been severely damaged and 
reduced by the Suez crisis. This had reduced the Affectivity of the relationship, as may 
42ELAK: Box 2, Bermuda Conference, March 21, 1957, p. 8. 
43ELAK: Box 2, Bermuda Conference, March 21, 1957. p. 1. 
44Baylis, Anglo-American Defence, p. 64. 
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be inferred from Table 1.1, and also fed into the future desires of the al-Sabah regime 
for greater independence from its patron. This it was to pursue through policies of 
Regulation and Maintenance.45 
2.3.3.1 BackKround: British defence policy for the Middle East from 1945-1956 
At the end of the Second World War, British power in the Middle East seemed 
assured. The newly elected Labour government of 1945, presented with the post-war 
picture in the region, attempted a new rubric for imperial relationships. The application 
of this policy, crafted by the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, proved a failure and 
soon old policies and concepts inherited from the pre-war era were reinstated. These 
old policies were based on two key concepts. First, that the sea routes to the Indian 
Ocean and India should be controlled by the British Navy. Second, that no other great 
power should be allowed to interfere in the area either by installing bases or 
commanding ports. This strategic policy was most clearly demonstrated in the Gulf 
where by various means the Arab littoral had come under the dominance of the 
British. 46 
Only retrospectively was it clear that the British position in the Middle East had 
reached its zenith and was on an inevitable path of both relative and absolute decline. 
A commensurate change in British policy towards the region should have taken place. 
Interestingly, it was only the Prime Minister, Attlee, who broached the possibility of a 
structured withdrawal from both Africa and the Middle East. He classed these regions 
as 'areas of liability' and 'deficit areas'. 47 
The views of the Prime Minister were overridden and the policy remained the 
continued defence of this British 'sphere of influence'. The reasons for this included the 
high degree of inertia and institutional conservatism among the policy-making elites 
within Whitehall. Some of the attitudes within the policy bureaucracy towards the 
45 See p. 22 of this thesis. 
46 Darby, British Defence, p. 3. 
47 Kenneth Harris, Attlee (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), p. 299. 
68 
British presence in the Middle East remained based on the old colonial maxim: ''We're 
there because we're there." Two of the most important parts of the bureaucratic 
machinery responsible for defence policy was the Defence Committee and the Chiefs of 
Staff Committee. Having replaced the Imperial Defence Committee in 1946 the 
Defence Committee also became responsible for organising the various Departments 
into a co-ordinated whole in the event of war. The committee brought together all the 
key Cabinet members responsible for the formation of external policy including: the 
Prinle Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Defence 
Minister, the Service Ministers, the Lord President of the Council, the Ministers of 
Supply and Labour, and the Chiefs of Staff.48Derby, outlining the inertia of this 
committee writes: ''To some extent, therefore, it can be argued that the lack of ftrm 
political direction on defence issues was a by product of the committee system and of 
cabinet government... too many vested interests were involved for the defence 
committee to tackle the question of role."49The Chiefs of Staff Committee tended to 
encourage compromises being made between the three service ministries rather than 
action being taken on a specific strategic doctrine. 50 
The problems of this Committee were outlined by Field-Marshal Montgomery, 
who had served as Chief of the Imperial General Staff from 1946-1948.5I He became 
extremely critical of the system that he regarded as full of inter-service jealousies and 
general strategic indecision. The tight budgetary controls, imposed by the Treasury on 
the spending of military funds, intensifted these inter-service rivalries. Each service 
criticised and tried to belittle the strategic importance of the other services, while at the 
same time trying to preserve or increase its share of the military budget. Another 
problem connected with the inter-service rivalry was the negligence of integrated 
48 United Kingdom, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1958 Cmnd. 476, "Statement of 
Defence,tt paragraph 4. 
49 Darby, British Defence, p. 20. 
50 L.W. Martin, "The Market for Strategic Ideas in Britain: The tSandys Erat ", American Political 
Science Review 56 (March 1962),23-41. 
51 Bernard Law Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal; The Viscount Montgomery (London: 
William Collins, 1958). 
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weapons systems. One of the constant arguments between the Royal Air Force (RAP) 
and the Army had been over the question of airlift facilities. The Army was eager to 
acquire sufficient airlift, but the RAF favoured expenditure on fighter aircraft. 
Unfortunately, the inability to resolve this question led to a massive lack of troop 
mobility, which led to a crucial failure during the Suez campaign when the army was 
unable to act quickly during the more favourable political climate of July and August 
1956. 
The problems of allowing the Services to be both the executors of policy and 
the detenninators of that policy are summed up well by Martin. He writes that: 
Many post-war governments were apparently content to set an overall 
financial ceiling on defence, to lay down policy on certain matters of great 
domestic political significance such as National Service, to rule on possible 
applications of force, as at Abadan and Buraimi but to leave the allocation of the 
available funds to the bargaining of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.52 
The "ten year rule" adopted in 1946, unfortunately added to this lack of 
political direction over a strategic reassessment. Attlee instructed the Chiefs of Staff to 
presume that there would be no global or great power war for the next ten years. The 
political rationale behind this move was to constrain the military into using up existing 
stocks left over from the war and not to embark on any expensive re-equipment. The 
side effect of this was to remove the requirement for a fundamental strategic re-think 
which re-equipment and system development would have necessitated. 
External reasons also played a vital part in the rejection of Attlee's view on the 
Middle East. The threat of Communist and Soviet penetration of the region was the 
most significant of these and as the Cold War developed its importance increased. The 
Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Chiefs of Staff strongly opposed the idea of 
withdrawal. They believed that the Middle East was of vital strategic importance to 
Britain and that any abandonment of the region would lead to a power vacuum that the 
Soviet Union would quickly fill. Although the Cold War was not yet at its height, 
Attlee and Bevin had grown cautious and suspicious of the Soviet Union especially 
52 Martin, "Strategic Ideas", pp. 24-25. 
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following the events in Iran in 1946.53The rationale behind this policy of stopping any 
Soviet moves into the region was a continuation of the traditional policy of trying to 
prevent any other great power entering the region. Communist and Soviet activity 
between 1945 and 1947 in Iran, Greece and Turkey and the West's response reinforced 
this view. 
The Middle East was also a perfect strategic region in which to mount a 
counterstrike on the Soviet flank and to serve as a territorial hurdle for any Soviet 
penetration of Africa. The region was a vital communication point linking the three 
continents of Asia, Africa and Europe. The growing importance of oil to the West 
further amplified the critical significance of this area. Neither the importance of nuclear 
weapons nor their impact upon strategy were decisive at this point. The Attlee 
government had set British defence policy fmnly on the route towards the attainment 
of nuclear weapons.54This would change the basis of much of the military doctrine 
adopted in the 1950s, with the logic of nuclear weapons ruling out prolonged global 
war that the old strategies had anticipated. Remarkably, nuclear technology played 
little part in policy orientation in the Middle East at this point. Finally, the Chiefs of 
Staff threatened to resign 'en masse' if any such policy undertaking was pursued by the 
Attlee government. The views of Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff prevailed. For all these 
reasons British policy in the Middle East continued to be based in its pre-war modes. 
A major problem for the British government during this period was the cost of 
defence. Financial reductions were made to the budget but without a commensurate 
reduction in external commitments. The general opinion in Whitehall was that the 
economic recovery of Britain depended upon its trade and investments in the Middle 
East. Strategically the region was felt by many to be of the utmost importance, second 
only to the British Isles. This perception continued up until 1950 when the region was 
53 Montgomery, The Memoirs of Field Marshal, p. 436. 
54 Richard Rosecrance, Defense of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 36. 
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relegated to second place behind Europe with the stationing of a fixed force m 
Germany. 
Up to this point the defence of the Middle East was planned around the 
holding of Egypt and the "inner ring" (Egypt and the geographical areas situated on the 
sea routes from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean). This strategic policy fitted in 
with the retention of large military facilities in Egypt. The "inner ring" strategy was 
based on the hope that the United States would reinforce the "outer ring" (Jordan, 
Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf) areas in time of conflict, especially the crucial oil 
fields in the Gulf. The need for a re-evaluation of policy was prompted by the 
forthcoming closure of the British base in Egypt (1956) and also by the realisation that 
the further development of nuclear weaponry had brought into question any strategy 
reliant on large static bases. 
The change came in 1952 when the Chiefs of Staff set up the basis for British 
defence policy for the rest of the decade.55This global strategy paper attempted to 
address the perpetual problem of too many commitments with too few resources. The 
nuclear deterrent was placed at the heart of the new strategic doctrine.56The weapons 
system was also believed to be cheap and the calculation was that this would allow for 
a cut in defence spending, while at the same time allowing Britain to remain in the 
great power club. In part two of the 1952 paper the manpower estimates for Europe 
and NATO were considerably cut because of the new tactical nuclear weapons. 
The global defence paper still envisaged the need to defend the Middle East in 
war time and to counter any Communist expansion in the region. The nuclear 
deterrent, it was argued, would allow for the reduction of conventional forces in this 
area. With the projected withdrawal of British forces from the base in Egypt it was 
55 Rosecrance, Defence, pp. 159-75. 
56 United Kingdom, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1952, Cmd 8475, "Statement on 
Defence". 
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estimated that conventional forces in the Middle East could be brought down to 160 
aircraft and one division. This figure was further reduced in the 1953 defence review.57 
The new strategic policy shifted the focus of defence to the "outer ring" in the 
Middle East: Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Jordan (the northern tier). This concept 
was promoted by Dulles in 1953, though the United States avoided conspicuous 
participation in the Baghdad Pact because its relations with Nasser would otherwise 
suffer. These "outer ring" states would be defended by small highly mobile forces 
backed up with air support from Cyprus, carrying nuclear weapons. The strategy was 
one of a decisive counter punch against any Soviet military moves in the region, rather 
than the Second World War scenario of a long drawn out conventional war. Large 
fixed bases were no longer desirable. What was needed were flexible and highly mobile 
forces. Although this was the theory, in practice British army units remained highly 
immobile, hampered by the lack of transport planes and the emerging problems of the 
air barrier. British global military demands in the Far East and Africa would further 
reduce the strategic readiness of the British in the Middle East. 
The new strategy for the Middle East took pressure off the negotiations with 
Egypt over the Suez base. It also increased the political importance of the "outer ring" 
"northern tier" states such as Iraq and Jordan. This strategic rationale provided an 
impetus for re-negotiation of the treaty with Iraq and for the formation of a northern 
tier security pact that became the Baghdad Pact and then later the Central Treaty 
Organisation (CENTO). 
The problem remained that Britain had not adapted to its declining position in 
the Middle East either politically or psychologically. World and regional power politics 
had changed and the British needed to envisage a new political as well as military role 
for Britain in the region. Their failure to do so resulted, at Suez in 1956, in an old style 
military manoeuvre to back up an outdated political position. 
57 United Kingdom, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1953, Cmd. 8768, "Statement on 
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The Suez conflict was a political disaster for Britain. It had many repercussions 
on the position of Britain in the world and in the Middle East. The most important of 
which was the exposure of the realities of British decline. Beeley commenting on this 
episode writes: "It might have been possible, as had happened in the history of earlier 
empires, for this decline to remain incompletely perceived for a longer period if its 
reality had it not been nakedly exposed by the failure of the disastrous Suez adventure 
of 1956. "58 
The reaction was to 'batten down the hatches' and wait for the storm to blow 
over. The Whitehall bureaucracy displayed an inability to recognise fully or deal with 
this fall from power. Many policy makers in Whitehall still believed that the special 
position that Britain had had in the region could be retained even if this was only in the 
Gulf. It would take a forceful minister with the full backing of the new Prime Minister, 
Harold Macmillan, to modify these views. 
2.3.3.2 The Sandys 1957 Defence White Paper 
-
Duncan Sandys became Secretary of Defence in January 1957 in the new 
Macmillan government. He had been set a specific policy agenda by Macmillan that 
entailed the implementation of a substantial cut in expenditure and manpower in the 
armed forces. 59Expenditure on defence had been running at an annual level of around 
ten percent of gross national product (GNP) over the preceding five years.601t was 
hoped that this high expenditure could be brought down to a figure of around seven 
percent of GNP by 1962. Sandys set out the basis of the two tasks that the armed 
forces would be expected to perform. "(i) To play their part with the forces of Allied 
countries in deterring and resisting aggression; (ii) To defend British colonies and 
58 Beeley, The 'Special Relationship', pp. 285-286. 
59 Christopher John Bartlett, The Long Retreat. A Short History of British Defence Policy, 1945-1970 
(London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 129. 
60 United Kingdom, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1957, Cmnd. 124, "Outline of 
P I' " Future 0 ICY • 
74 
protected territories against local attack, and undertake limited operations in overseas 
emergencies.' '61 
The 1957 Defence White Paper was not the pivotal change in policy that many 
including the Defence Secretary took it to be. The paper described itself as the "biggest 
change in military policy ever made in nonnal times. "62The reality was that Sandys had 
simply confinned and rationalised many of the tendencies that had been developing 
during the 1950s. The paper was an expression of unspoken assumptions governing 
British defence in the previous decade. In the context of a longer perspective the paper 
seemed insignificant - far less radical than the eventual withdrawal from east of 
Suez.63Sandys reiterated the primacy of nuclear weapons over conventional forces in 
the event of a global war, although priority was given to the prevention of global war 
rather than the preparation for it. This was only a clarification of previous defence 
papers, as were the commitments to NATO, collective defence, and the ability to wage 
limited military operations in the Middle and Far East. The decision to end National 
Service by 1962, because of the need for economies in defence expenditure, was the 
most notable feature of Sandys paper. 
The problem with the 1957 White Paper was that it was again asking the anned 
forces to cut back on expenditure without the equivalent cut back in commitments. 
The specific references to the Middle East region in the Defence White Paper clearly 
showed that the events of 1956 had not had the effect of reducing the commitments of 
Britain in the Gulf. 
26. Apart from its own importance, the Middle East guards the right 
flank of NATO and is the gateway to the African continent. In the Arabian 
Peninsula, Britain must at all times be ready to defend Aden Colony and 
Protectorates and the territories of the Persian Gulf for whose defence she is 
responsible. For this task, land, air and sea forces have to be maintained in that 
area and in East Africa. 27. In addition, Britain has undertaken in the Baghdad 
Pact to co-operate with the other signatory states for security and defence, and 
for the prevention of Communist encroachment and infiltration. In the event of 
61 Cmnd. 124, "Outline of Future Policy". 
62Cmnd. 124, "Outline of Future Policy". 
63Darby, British Defence. 
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emergency, British forces in the Middle East area would be made available to 
support the Alliance. These would include bomber squadrons based in Cyprus 
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.64 
Two observations can be made about this section of the Defence White Paper. 
First, the underlying assumption that the Middle East was of crucial importance to the 
security of Britain and the West remained in place due to its strategic importance, the 
quantities of oil in the region and the danger a loss of any part of this area for the 
general balance of power in the Cold War. Second, the paper envisaged the need to 
prepare for both limited and total warfare in the region. Preparation for limited, so 
called "fire brigade", intervention in the area was crucial for the general defence of the 
Gulf. This approach was vindicated by events in the Oman in 1957 when a limited use 
of British forces queUed an internal revolt in the Kingdom. 
2.4 Developments of the patron-client relationship during 1957 
Writing a short time after Suez, Derek Riches, the Head of the Eastern 
Department of the British Foreign Office commented that "after Iraq, the Persian Gulf 
is both our most exposed and most important position in the Middle East and it would 
seem imprudent to hold no reserve to meet inevitable attempts at encroachment. "65 
The vital importance of Kuwait to Britain became clear during the Suez crisis. 
On November 1, 1956, even though the situation in Kuwait was relatively undisturbed 
by events in Egypt and the Kuwaiti government were confident of their ability to 
control any situation that might arise, British naval units were ordered to proceed 
towards Kuwait. The Political Resident at Bahrain, Sir Bernard Burrows, writing to 
the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, described events stating that "the local Defence 
Committee had taken the precaution of ordering H.M.S. Loch Insh, frigate from Basra, 
H.M.S. Superb, cruiser, with two companies of the Gloucestershire Regiment from the 
Trucial States and another frigate, H.M.S. Loch Fyne, with a military tactical 
64Cmnd. 124, "Outline of Future Policy". 
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headquarters on board, from Bahrain to proceed to within three hours steaming time of 
Kuwait. "66 
The British were concerned about a meeting of Arab leaders being held in 
Beirut. There was apprehension in London that a general Arab boycott of British and 
French goods might be imposed and that if this happened Kuwait could possibly 
introduce restrictions on the consignment of its oil to Britain. Riches set out in a paper 
the problems associated with a military intervention to maintain oil supplies. First, the 
armed forces of Kuwait, although no match for the British forces, were likely to 
respond with force to any such intervention. Second, the Kuwaiti Oil Company would 
suffer from the withdrawal of labour and potential sabotage. Third, intervention would 
ignite a hostile response from the international community. Fourth, relations between 
Britain and the Gulf states of Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Sheikhdoms might 
deteriorate to the point of armed conflict. 67 Another problem was that the Treasury was 
against the idea of freezing Sheikh Abdullah's assets in London. This would be 
necessary to stop the considerable sterling balances held by the ruling family of Kuwait 
-
being withdrawn, causing a run on the pound. A Treasury official, Sir Dennis Rickett, 
"confmned that the Treasury would be strongly opposed to the idea of using the threat 
to freeze the Ruler's sterling balances as a weapon. "68 
The situation for Britain in the Middle East at this time was extremely 
precarious. Sir Bernard Burrows writing to the Foreign Secretary on November 21, 
1956, outlined his misgivings about the situation. In his fmal analysis he came out on 
the side of intervention only if the oil supplies were restricted. 
One clear conclusion of all this is that the consequences either of 
intervening or of not intervening are so bad that in forming our general policy in 
the Middle East more weight than hitherto should be given to avoiding a 
66 PRO: FO 3711120619: Defence Forces in the Persian Gulf: Security Situation in Persian Gulf 
States: Report from Bahrain November 23, 1956: Burrows to Lloyd. 
67 PRO: FO 3711120619: Defence Forces in the Persian Gulf: Security Situation in Persian Gulf 
States: Paper produced in Foreign Office November 15, 1956: Riches. 
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situation in which the Kuwaiti government might be led to restrict oil supplies. 
The method and timing of our intervention in Egypt was such as to impose the 
greatest possible strain on Anglo-Kuwaiti relations. We look like recovering from 
the strain by a fairly narrow margin. If there was another one we might well not 
do so without a major and dangerous operation. 
My final conclusion is that if Kuwait attempted to restrict oil supplies to 
us it would, on balance be better for us to intervene by force if necessary to 
prevent this. It is by no means certain that we could do this without irreparable 
damage to our relations with Kuwait but the consequences of not doing it seem 
worse ... 69 
British military forces were therefore prepared and ready for anned 
intervention in Kuwait if the oil supplies were stopped, although authority was not 
delegated to the diplomats on the ground but retained by the Eden government in 
London.7o 
Whether force would have been used or not will remain an open question. 
What is clear is the extent to which the British were dependent upon Kuwaiti oil and 
sterling balances and their apparent readiness to protect these two interests. It was 
clear though that as long as the oil continued to be exported, intervention would not 
take place. The patron-client relationship between Britain and the al-Sabah family was 
tested in this period. The British sought a Maintenance objective with the al-Sabah 
family during the Suez crisis. They wanted the relationship to remain the same with a 
preservation of the al-Sabah regime and a continued flow of oil. The al-Sabah ruling 
family was faced with pressures from its domestic population and other Arab states to 
pursue what amounted to a Regulation objective in the client-patron relationship,11 On 
November 2, 1956, pamphlets were distributed by clubs in Kuwait. These pamphlets 
attacked the British action and called for strikes and meetings to be held on the 
morning of November 3. The al-Sabah regime reacted swiftly with police notices 
banning any strikes, demonstrations or meetings. 72 A mass meeting held in the bazaar 
69 PRO: FO 3711120619: British Forces in Persian Gulf: Security in the Gulf: Bahrain to Foreign 
Office November 21, 1956: Burrows to Lloyd. 
70 PRO: FO 3711120619: British Forces in the Persian Gulf: Security in the Gulf: Foreign Office to 
Kuwait and Bahrain December 8, 1956: Lloyd to Burrows. 
71 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
72 PRO: FO 3711 120557: Security Situation in Persian Gulf States: Kuwait to Foreign Office 
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mosque the next day was easily dispersed by police and security forces. Further 
pamphlets called for a boycott of British and French goods, more strikes and the 
recruitment of volunteers to fight in Egypt.?3 
The al-Sabah regime also dealt with these problems by pursuIng a 
Maintenance policy. This entailed a strong security policy pushed by Sheikh 
Mubarak, uncle of Sheikh Abdullah, at the same time as accommodation of certain 
activities of the domestic popUlation that did not threaten security of the regime. This 
included a semi-official fund being established for Egypt. The fund was estimated to be 
over £1 million. Much of this money came from the royal family, and in government 
departments it was announced that employees were expected to contribute between a 
month and fifteen days salary to the collection. The boycott of British and French 
goods in shops was also enforced. 
The interests of Britain and the al-Sabah regime were at this point common 
interests rather than identical ones. The overriding concern of the al-Sabah family was 
for the continuation of their domestic autonomy and political absolutism. British 
-
initiatives to promote democratic institutions in Kuwait were a casualty of these 
developments. This would have an important effect on the policy options for Britain 
with Kuwait. The American Consul in Kuwait, William Brewer summed this up by 
stating that Britain had: "lost a freedom of manoeuvre to which British officials were 
looking to preserve their strategic stake in Kuwait for many years to come. 
Henceforth, the chief British reliance must be on their community of interest with the 
paramount Shaykhs (sic) and on force."74 
The Kuwaiti government in the long term reacted to the British action in Egypt 
by pursuing a policy of Regulation. The client-patron relationship during the Suez 
affair rather than reinforcing the security of the al-Sabah regime, was damaging it. The , 
73 PRO: FO 3711120557: Security Situation in Persian Gulf States: Kuwait to Foreign Office 
November 4, 1956: Bell. 
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· 
regIme was still reliant on the relationship with Britain for the maintenance of its 
external security. The new domestic political pressures encouraged the regime to 
distance itself publicly but become privately closer with Britain and to pursue policies 
of greater autonomy in the client-patron relationship. Sir Bernard Burrows 
commenting on these new pressures wrote: 
Kuwait will probably never be quite the same again. Forces were 
unleashed there which are still interacting and which now in one direction and 
now in another raise the lid of Shaikhly control and suggest the possibility of 
greater trouble to come. There is more open resentment at the oppressive 
internal policies of the Shaikhs, more open criticism of the oil company and more 
open sympathy for pan-Arab causes in particular for the boycott of Israel.75 
The actions of the nationalist groups in Kuwait clearly shocked the ruling family and 
tempered their position, although the regime continued to reject calls for the 
cancellation of British projects or the dismissal of British state employees. The regime 
also continued to use its security forces to protect the Political Agency, the oil fields 
and the European quarter of Kuwaiti town. The strength of the nationalist movement 
in Kuwait was a threat to the al-Sabah regime itself, but the loyalty of the Sheikh's 
guards, the Fidawia, and the security forces held fmn during the crisis. During 
December 1956 a frre was deliberately started at the Ahmadi number five oil field. 
Dissemination of information about the sabotage incident was kept to a minimum at 
the request of the Sheikh Abdullah, who was concerned to restrict hostile propaganda 
arising from the continued exportation of Kuwaiti oil to the West. 76 An incident took 
place in the Political Agency on December 30, 1956, when unknown persons 
attempted to set frre to the Residency by pouring kerosene over the Christmas tree, 
sofa and chairs in the main reception room. Fortunately, only the Christmas tree caught 
frre. 77 
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The Regulation aim of the client-patron relationship by the al-Sabah regime 
was anticipated by the Foreign Office. Riches commented that: 
An inevitable progress of events towards a reduction in our influence and 
perhaps the eventual loss of our special position in Kuwait has been accelerated. 
As ever it is unlikely that any action we ourselves take in Kuwait itself can 
radically alter the speed or direction of this process: it is rather external events 
such as the elimination of Nasser or open and effective action against Israel 
which might have some effect. Even if we occupied Kuwait and tried to run it as 
a colony, I do not believe that we should be able to sit on the volcano for long.78 
This Regulation of the client-patron relationship was done at a very slow pace 
and the essentials of the relationship between Britain and Kuwait remained unchanged 
during 1957. In the Spring of 1957 the British government had reviewed its position in 
the Gulf. Concern was expressed over the hostile reaction directed at Britain during 
the Suez crisis and the consequential insecure position that Britain had in the Gulf. The 
question was whether this position should be maintained in its existing form or whether 
any substantial or general modification could be considered. The conclusion of these 
debates was that the Gulf was of such importance to Britain that the policy and the 
position should be maintained in its essential form. -
By late January 1957 the British forces built up in the Gulf during the time of 
the Suez intervention were being scaled down to the normal level and state of 
readiness.79Sir Bernard Burrows, visited Kuwait from March 11 to March 17, 1957 
and undertook substantive talks with Sheikh Abdullah. The main purpose of the visit 
was to re-establish normal and friendly relations between the patron and the client. 
Sheikh Abdullah took the opportunity to emphasise to Burrows the continued 
importance that Kuwait attached to the British connection despite Suez.8oHe had come 
under pressure from domestic political forces during November and December 1956 to 
take actions that would have prejudiced the fundamentals of the Anglo-Kuwaiti 
78 PRO: FO 3711 120557: Security Situation in Persian Gulf States: Memorandum November 15, 
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relationship. These pressures Sheikh Abdullah had resisted. He had called the al-Sabah 
family together, during the British anned intervention in Egypt, and Ilreminded them 
that the regime depended in turn on internal stability and that excesses of pro-Arab 
feeling were therefore to be discouraged. IISt 
The patron-client relationship survived the Suez debacle. It was the most 
difficult few months that the British and the Kuwaitis had experienced in their 
relationship. Although outwardly the patron-client bond seemed intact, relations had 
changed. British influence over Kuwait had been reduced, the patron position being 
even more dependent upon the traditional goodwill and self interest of the ruling elite. 
Relations between Iraq and Kuwait were not affected in the short tenn by the 
Suez War. By March 1957 talks had been resumed by the British over the question of 
the Shatt-al-Arab water scheme and the border question. The Kuwaiti stance was that 
a solution to the frontier question between Kuwait and Iraq should be a prerequisite to 
any settlement of the water and oil pipeline agreements. The Iraqis however wanted to 
use these issues as bargaining chips in the settlement of any border issue. The Dmm 
Qasr problem remained intractable. 
The Iraqis at this point were more concerned with the problems posed by 
Nasser. The Suez crisis had made Nasser the hero of the Arabs in the Middle East and 
the leader of Arab nationalism. In contrast, the Iraqi government was deeply unpopular 
with its domestic population partly because of its close association with Britain. The 
confrontation between Nasser and the British was also a confrontation with the pro-
British Iraqis. The balance of power in the traditional struggle between Baghdad and 
Cairo had tipped dramatically in favour of Nasser and Egypt. The Iraqi government 
was not therefore interested in a settlement of outstanding issues with Kuwait unless 
substantial political or monetary capital could be gained out of it. The British strategic 
position in the Middle East was now even more dependent on the Baghdad Pact and 
81 PRO: FO 3711126869: Annual Reports of Territories in Persian Gulf: Annual Report for Kuwait 
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therefore the British would have to be a lot more supportive and accommodating to 
the Iraqi position. 
Nuri aI-Said continued to call for the adherence of Kuwait to the Baghdad pact, 
bu t Sheikh Abdullah resisted such pressures. His fear was that Iraq was seeking to 
absorb Kuwait. Following the events of 1956 and the effects in Kuwait, Burrows 
cautioned against such a development. In a report commenting on British policy he 
wrote: "My considered view is therefore that any attempt by us to associate the Persian 
Gulf States in any way with the Baghdad Pact would not only be doomed to failure but 
would be the step most calculated to destroy our position and to drive at least Kuwait 
into precisely the opposite camp."82No attempt was made by Britain to persuade 
Kuwait to join the Baghdad Pact. Relations between Britain and Kuwait in 1957 
returned to the traditional quiet diplomacy. It would be external events that would 
upset and change the relationship yet again in 1958. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
By the end of 1957 Britain had transferred the focus of its Middle East interests 
from the Levant and the eastern Mediterranean to Iraq and the Gulf. This process was 
further accelerated by the events of 1958, particularly the revolution in Iraq. Britain's 
policy in the region had undergone some limited success since the Suez War. This 
success was due predominantly to the reinvigoration of the Anglo-American special 
relationship which had helped re-establish Britain's international position. Also as Paul 
Kennedy writes: 
It can be argued that the realities of decline were still disguised - in 
defence matters, by the post-1957 policy of relying upon the nuclear deterrent, 
which was far less expensive than large conventional forces yet suggested a 
continued Great Power status; and in economic matters, by the fact that Britain 
also shared in the general boom of the 1950s and 1960s.83 
The Sandys Defence Act had re-emphasised the role of British forces in the 
Gulf region and paved the way for an increase in the strength of British bases there. 
Overall, British policy could be criticised at this point for failing to adjust to the 
realities of national decline. Macmillan's admission- in December 1956 that Suez had 
been the last gasp of a declining power did not coincide well with the subsequent 
policy of his government. Britain had still failed to devise a coherent and integrated 
strategic doctrine for the region. This was predominantly due to the institutional 
problems in the decision and policy-making process. The strategic objectives in the 
Gulf were still viewed as being the maintenance of stability, keeping the Soviet Union 
ou t of the area, providing a platform for a counterstrike to the Soviet Union in time of 
war and acting as a territorial hurdle to any Soviet penetration of Africa and the Indian 
Ocean. Britain was still attempting to playa great power role. The events of 1958 
would soon tum it to the more realistic aim of securing maximum financial benefit 
from its position in the region. 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship had clearly been changed by the Suez affair. A 
process of change in the client-patron relationship developed. Kuwait sought more 
83 Kennedy, The Rise and Fall, p. 547. 
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autonomy in its external relations especially with other Arab states. The blow to British 
power and credibility caused by the Suez War had reduced the asymmetry between 
Britain and Kuwait and therefore fed into a Regulation drive in the relationship. The 
increased importance of Kuwait to Britain, derived from oil, also meant that the patron 
had less control over its client. Despite Suez, Britain still enjoyed a unique position in 
the Gulf which allowed the bilateral relationships that it had with the Arab littoral 
states including that with Kuwait to continue. 
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Chapter 3: January to August 1958; Patron Control 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter three covers the development of the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship from 
January to August 1958. The chapter is split into three parts. The first deals with the 
formation of the UAR and the Arab Union, and the second covers the revolution in 
Iraq. The third deals with the consequences of the developments of 1958 for the 
patron-client relationship. 
The position of Britain in the Gulf at the beginning of 1958 was determined by 
a combination of past imperial ties and Cold War demands under the shadow of 
shattered prestige and loss of legitimacy following the Suez war. Britain still retained 
important bilateral relationships with Iraq and many of the Sheikhdoms in the Gulf. 
Alongside this imperial legacy stood the Baghdad Pact, which provided the security 
structures required by the Cold War. 
The peace of 1957 was to be contrasted with the disorder and dangers for 
Kuwait of the events of 1958. The problems were call sed by the formation of the UAR 
and the revolution in Iraq, which rocked the internal position of Kuwait and its external 
relations with Britain and the Arab world. 
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3.2 The formation of the United Arab Republic and the Arab Union 
The issue that dominated Anglo-Kuwaiti relations from February to July 1958 
was the possible adherence of Kuwait to the Arab Union. Two rival 'Unions' had been 
created at the beginning of 1958. The UAR was formed between Egypt and Syria and 
the Arab Union between Jordan and Iraq. This development had split the Arab world 
along the lines of the established Baghdad-Cairo (Iraq-Egypt) rivalry.lAny external 
power wishing to dominate the Middle East needed some purchase on these two vital 
states. If this was no longer possible an external power could best attempt to achieve a 
level of stability in the region by maintaining the balance of power between the two 
states. 
As the Macmillan government could no longer dominate or control the area by 
sheer force they instead attempted to ensure the stability of the region by supporting 
the fragile pro-Western Arab Union. The level of support that could and should be 
provided to the Arab Union was a question that troubled the Foreign Office. A number 
of constraints hampered a clear-cut British decision. The Eastern and Arabian 
Departments of the Foreign Office, represented respectively by Sir Michael Wright and 
Sir Bernard Burrows, took opposing views. The problem for Britain consisted in 
reconciling two vital objectives that had become competing institutional interests. 
The two objectives were the strategic security position of Britain in the region 
and the economic necessity of the free flow of oil at market prices. British support for 
Iraq in both the Baghdad Pact and the Arab Union was the necessary price for 
attaining the security objective. The adherence of Kuwait to the Arab Union would 
help in the attainment of the strategic security objective because of the political and 
economic benefit that it would give to Iraq. Conversely, this might lead to the loss of 
the independence of Kuwait, which in tum could potentially have damaged the 
economic security objective by placing too many cards in the hands of the Iraqis. 
1 Ma1coJm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1964 A Study of Ideology in Politics (London: Oxford 
T Tnh/pr~itv Press. 1965). 
Rather than ranking the two objectives the British government attempted to reconcile 
them. 
The British Ambassador in Iraq, Sir Michael Wright, was quick to highlight the 
importance of a British policy of bringing Kuwait and Saudi Arabia or both into close 
co-operation with the Arab Union.2He argued that Kuwait could benefit from 
association with the Union and still technically remain independent. Under Article 2 of 
the founding treaty of the Arab Union each state would keep its international position, 
independence and sovereignty. From this Article it was clear that, even within the 
Union, Kuwait could continue to negotiate the vital border issue and demarcation of 
the frontier with Iraq. Article 3 of the founding treaty of the Arab Union stated that 
each member could keep its existing international treaties. This implied that Kuwait 
could continue to keep its special relationship with Britain as a member of the Union. 
Difficulties did exist though with the federal parts of the agreement: unification 
of customs law, the armed forces and foreign policy. The lack of democratic 
institutions within Kuwait would also have been an impediment to its participation in 
the Federal Legislature. Iraq and Jordan appeared to be prepared to see Kuwait 
associated with the Union through a loose agreement in which Sheikh Abdullah would 
retain full sovereignty and maintain his special relationship with Britain while co-
ordinating economic and financial policies with the Union.3The responses in London to 
the deliberations of Sir Michael Wright were measured and practical. Due to the 
complexities of the situation and the importance of the patron-client relationship with 
Kuwait, policy decisions were postponed to allow for ministerial considerations. The 
preliminary Foreign Office view was that association with the Union would hold little if 
any attraction for Sheikh Abdullah and the al-Sabah ruling family. However, it was 
recognised that endorsement and backing for the Arab Union was crucial to the 
maintenance of the strategic position of Britain in the Levant and the Gulf. 
2 PRO: Prem 1112403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and US 
Support. 
3 PRO: Prem 111 2403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and US 
Support: Baghdad to Foreign Office, February 17, 1958: Wright. 
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The Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir Bernard Burrows, highlighted the 
differing views held in Iraq and Kuwait over the issue. Apart from frontier demarcation 
it was felt that there was nothing in the Union for Kuwait and that as the inclination of 
most Kuwaitis was towards Arab nationalism and the UAR there would be some 
domestic political danger in any imposed confederation of Kuwait within the Arab 
Union. Burrows and the majority of the Arabian Department believed that the best 
interests of Kuwait and Britain were in Kuwait not joining the union.4 
The initial ministerial position taken in London was that it was desirable to 
bring Kuwait into a closer association with the Arab Union, but without damaging the 
relationship between Kuwait and Britain. Diplomats were therefore instructed by 
Ministers to try and help the Iraqis produce propitious conditions for an approach to 
be made to Sheikh Abdullah.5It was also stressed that no pressure was to be put on 
Sheikh Abdullah and that the British government would support him in any decision 
that he took. A contrasting view was held by Wright who believed that the 
maintenance of the Arab Union was so important to the British position in the Gulf and 
the Middle East that Britain should take a more pro:-active policy over the Union and 
place pressure on Sheikh Abdullah.6 
The problem of recommending confederation with the Arab Union to Kuwait 
was that Iraq was still regarded as a threat to the territorial integrity of Kuwait by the 
al-Sabah family. Also, any refusal to join the Arab Union by Kuwait would be blamed 
on Britain by the Iraqi government because they frrmly believed that Britain controlled 
the decisions of Sheikh Abdullah. This was far from the truth. Since the Suez affair, 
British influence over the inter-Arab affairs of Kuwait had been narrow and restricted. 
The tangible benefits for Kuwait also seemed limited in the view of Sheikh Abdullah. 
This, coupled with the fear and suspicion felt towards Iraq by Kuwait, meant that 
4pRO: PREM 11/2403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and 
US Support: Bahrain to Foreign Office, March 5, 1958. 
5 PRO: PREM 111 2403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and 
US Support: Bahrain to Foreign Office, March 5, 1958. 
6 PRO: PREM 111 2403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and 
US Support: Baghdad to Foreign Office, February 28, 1958: Wright. 
success looked unlikely, unless the Iraqis were to conduct their diplomacy with skill. It 
was suggested by the Foreign Office that Iraq should make a grand gesture towards 
Kuwait in order to smooth the ensuing diplomatic manoeuvres.7It was put forward by 
British diplomats that the conciliatory move should be an unconditional offer on the 
demarcation of the border. 
Kuwait was not the only target of Iraq and Jordan for confederation to the 
Arab Union. The Iraqi Foreign Affairs minister, Jamali, visited Riyadh in late February 
to try and secure the association of Saudi Arabia with the Arab Union. King Saud 
replied that he would not be joining the Union at an early date, but that he would give 
the Union his blessing, and if asked for advice by Sheikh Abdullah would recommend 
that Kuwait join the Union.8This left Kuwait and Syria as possible members of the 
Union. Syrian membership was only likely to come about through coercive action by 
Iraq. Concern was developing in both Britain and the United States that the failure of 
the Arab Union to gain the membership of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia would lead to a 
precipitating action of military intervention by Iraq and Jordan on Syria. The stakes 
had therefore been increased over the question of Kuwait joining the Union. 
Further discussions over the Arab Union took place between Macmillan and 
Lloyd. It was agreed that Lloyd would, on a trip to a South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation (SEATO) meeting in Manila, stop off in Baghdad to discuss the issue 
with Nuri. The main preoccupation of this encounter was the membership or 
association of Kuwait with the Arab Union. At this meeting the Iraqis went further 
than they had before: they requested that Britain should grant Kuwait its independence 
in order that it might then join the alliance. Iraq at the same time would allow Kuwait 
to have a defence treaty with Britain guaranteeing Kuwait its independence. The Iraqis 
even offered to guarantee Kuwaiti oil investment in London. Lloyd, without 
committing the government to any course, reacted somewhat negatively to the 
7 PRO: Prem 111 2403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and US 
Support: Baghdad to Foreign Office, February 28, 1958: Wright. 
8 PRO: Prem 11/2403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and US 
Support: Baghdad to Foreign Office, March 1, 1958: Wright. 
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suggestion. In his telegram to Macmillan he pointed out the contradictions in the Iraqi 
requests. 
In any event the case put to me seemed somewhat illogical. We were asked 
to 'declare the independence' of Kuwait and at the same time we were to order 
her into the Iraq/Jordan Union. Jamali [the Iraqi Foreign Minister] had spoken 
of the opinions of the majority of Kuwaitis. If we gave so called independence in 
the sense of allowing or forcing them to determine their international future they 
might well decide to join Egypt. 9 
Confederation for Kuwait with the Arab Union on these terms would have led 
to the extinction of Kuwait as a separate entity. Kuwait would not have retained any 
semblance of 'full sovereignty' if it adhered to a Union with a federal army, a federal 
legislature and a federal foreign policy. Britain could hardly stand by its guarantee if 
the threat to Kuwait came from the federal authorities, since this could too easily be 
presented as interference in the internal affairs of the Union. Lloyd understood these 
ramifications and therefore rejected the proposal. 
In private Nuri admitted to Lloyd that his government was asking for far too 
much. He suggested that Kuwait might do no more than join the Economic Committee 
of the Union, in return for which Iraq would recognise the existing frontiers with the 
small exception of the strip of Umrn Qasr. Lloyd, stressed as clearly as possible that an 
offer on Kuwait's borders and status by Iraq, unconditionally, without any reneging on 
Umm Qasr, would be the best first step towards any sort of Kuwaiti association. 
This suggestion of Kuwait's association with just the Economic Committee of 
the Union was a much more acceptable solution to both Kuwait and Britain. Iraq 
would receive funds from Kuwait. The Kuwaitis would stand outside the foreign policy 
and defence union, but with the security of their territory guaranteed by both Britain 
and Iraq. The border issue would be settled in a manner satisfactory to Kuwait while 
still under British protection. This would add to the security of Kuwait as it would be a 
9 PRO: Prem 111 2403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and US 
Support: Inward telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office: Following for Prime Minister from 
Foreign Secretary, March 8, 1958: Lloyd. 
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legal basis for international objections against any subsequent action by Iraq against 
Kuwait even after the latter became an independent member of the Arab Union. 
Following Lloyd's talks in Baghdad, discussions were held by British Ministers 
in London. A paper was prepared at Cabinet Committee level on Kuwait and the Arab 
Union. Due to the overriding importance that the Iraqis had now placed upon the 
association of Kuwait with the Union, the Cabinet Committee had agreed to review the 
situation. The Iraqis seemed determined to try and offset the latest accession to the 
UAR by Yemen, and at the same time get access to Kuwaiti oil revenues to maintain 
Jordan. Clearly the dangers of pushing Sheikh Abdullah into an agreement that was 
against his own and his people's wishes were too much for the British. It was decided 
that Burrows would be instructed to inform Sheikh Abdullah that it was his decision 
and that no pressure would be placed upon him in the matter. Nevertheless, it remained 
Britain's view that the situation was critical and that unless the Arab Union became a 
going concern, the influence of Nasser and the UAR would extend throughout the 
Arab world. The consequences of this might be that Kuwait would have to choose 
between active protection by British troops or the loss of any separate political 
status. 10 
Sheikh Abdullah adopted a position independent of both the Arab Union and 
the UAR and decided to try and playa mediating role between the two groupings. He 
visited Iraq on May 10, 1958, for the start of a five day tour. At his meetings with the 
government of Iraq great pressure was placed on him to take Kuwait into the Arab 
Union.11These talks were always unlikely to succeed because of the lack of agreement 
between the two sides. The policy of the al-Sabah ruling family had always been 
dominated by the desire for internal autonomy and external security. The proposals of 
Nuri Pasha met neither of these considerations fully. 
IOpRO: Prem III 2403: Federation of Arab Union and Association of Kuwait with Union: UK and US 
Support: Paper of March 12, 1958 on Kuwait and the Arab Union. 
11 PRO: FO 37I1 132751: Internal Political Situation in Kuwait: Events in the Persian Gulf: Wright 
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The issue was of great importance to the West. This was demonstrated when 
the subject of Iraq, Kuwait and the Arab Union came up for discussion at the 
'Macmillan Talks' held between Eisenhower and Macmillan in Washington from June 9 
to June 11, 1958. The two governments recognised the difficulties that Iraq was facing 
both politically and financially. Nuri had infonned the United States Ambassador , 
Gallman, that Iraq must receive substantial financial assistance and secure Kuwaiti 
membership of the Arab Union or he would resign. Eisenhower and Macmillan agreed 
to meet the Arab Union budget deficit. 12Wisely, they would not agree to the request to 
force ,Kuwait into the Union. Macmillan noted that: "Nuri had been difficult for some 
time and was now attempting a Nasser-type operation against Kuwait. The ruler, he 
said, does not want to join the Arab Union and if Nuri attempts to force him it will play 
right into Nasser's hands." He went on further to say that: "It was a great shock to him 
to learn that Nuri ha[d] 'out and out threatened' Kuwait."13 
Such a profound decision could not be rushed into by the Kuwaitis, but had to 
be approached cautiously over time and in the event the revolution in Baghdad swept 
away monarchical Iraq before a decision could be reached. Additional obstacles to the 
proposal included the growing political tensions in the Middle East, the diplomatic 
chicanery of Iraq, the general distrust of Iraq, and the support for Nasser of a majority 
of Kuwaitis. All of these encouraged procrastination by the Kuwaiti regime. The single 
most important reason for Kuwait's rejection of the Arab Union was the continued 
desire of the ruling family to remain independent. The al-Sabah regime did not reject 
the idea of joining the Arab Union on the advice of Britain but of its own accord. This 
position contradicts some of the secondary literature such as Nairn Salem who writes 
that: "Kuwait, on the advice of the British declined to co-operate with Iraq."14Nor is it 
difficult to understand the decision from the point of view of a traditional dynasty in a 
12 United States, "Memorandum of Conversation; Macmil1an Talks Washington, June 9, 1958," 
Foreign Relations of the United States 7, 1958-1960, 301-302. 
13 United States, "Memorandum of Conversation; Macmillan Talks Washington, June 9, 1958," 
Foreign Relations of the United States 7, 1958-1960, 302. 
14 Nairn Joseph Salem, ''The Drama of US-Iraqi Relations: From World War II to the Gulf War" 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1992), p. 75. 
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world beset by modernisation and populism. The increased power of Nasser meant that 
Sheikh Abdullah risked joining the sinking ship of the Hashemite powers only to be 
drowned by the wave of Arab nationalism emanating from Nasser. The extent of 
Nasser's new powers after the formation of the UAR had important repercussions. As 
Elizabeth Monroe writes: "The foreign power to suffer the sharpest set-back from the 
extension of Nasser's power to Syria's eastern frontier was Great Britain, for the move 
precipitated the downfall of the pro-British clique in Iraq."15For the financial efforts 
made by Britain and the United States was not enough to save the Iraqi regime let 
alone the Arab Union. The opportunity for Kuwait and monarchical Iraq to form a 
reciprocal bilateral relationship consistent with Western interests and general Middle 
East stability was about to vanish along with the Baghdad monarchy. It is not clear that 
Sheikh Abdullah anticipated the revolution in Iraq but it is clear that he continued to 
pursue a policy that placed the security of the al-Sabah dynasty at the apex of Kuwait's 
national interests. 
3.3 Middle East Crisis and its effects on Kuwait -
On July 14, 1958 two Iraqi infantry brigades under the command of two Free 
Officers, Abdul Qassim and Abdul Arif, entered Baghdad and took control of the key 
offices of the government and the monarchy. A bloody coup d'etat ensued which set in 
motion a crisis in the Middle East that threatened to spill over into a wider world 
conflict. 
The British Cabinet was called to emergency session in the afternoon of the 
14th to discuss this situation. As the day wore on and the completeness of the 
revolution became apparent the government became aware that its Middle East 
strategy was in ruin. Iraq had been a loyal British and Western ally in the region and 
had acted as a counter-weight to Nasser and Egypt. Britain had important military 
bases on Iraqi territory and counted on Iraqi support in its strategic defence of the 
15 Monroe, Britain's Moment, p. 211. 
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Middle East. Unfortunately, this position, which found Iraq the only Arab state in the 
Baghdad Pact, had left the Nuri government wide open to Arab nationalist attack and 
was part of the reason for the revolution. Phebe Marr rightly contends that: "The coup 
was unquestionably a reflection of deep-seated discontent among officers and among 
civilian politicians with the regime's foreign policy and its slowness to reform. II 1 6The 
loss of Hashemite Iraq was another large reverse for Britain's position in the Middle 
East doubly alarming as it followed so soon after Suez. 17 
The danger of Arab nationalist uprisings spreading throughout the Middle East 
was now the major immediate concern of Britain and the United States. 18The effects of 
the Iraqi revolution on Kuwait and the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship was well 
understood and anticipated in the Foreign Office. Riches writing on July 14 was clearly 
correct in anticipating that Iraq would now prosecute claims to Kuwait with greater 
intensity.19When the coup took place Sheikh Abdullah was on his summer holiday in 
Damascus and his uncle Sheikh Mubarak was in place as the acting ruler. Sheikh 
Mubarak immediately brought the army and the security forces to a state of alert. 
The British at first offered forces to help control any situation in Kuwait, but 
Mubarak refused them. Halford, after receiving instructions from Whitehall, pressed 
Mubarak further on this issue, but to no avai1.2<Yfhe Chiefs of Staff, because of the 
events in Iraq, remained extremely concerned about the protection of Kuwait. Military 
forces could only be sent quickly to the country if a bridgehead was secured in the 
Sheikhdom and the only such bridgehead would have to be the airfield at Ahmadi. 
Serious consideration was given by the British government to overriding the caution of 
Sheikh Mubarak and sending in British troops. Such action against the wishes of the 
16 Phebe Marr, The Modem History of Irag (Oxford: Westview Press, 1985), p. 153. 
17 Robert A Femea and Wil1iam Roger Louis, eds, The Iragi Revolution of 1958, the Old Social Class 
Revisited (London: Tauris, 1991), p. 109. 
18 PRO: CAB 128/32: Part 2. C.C (58) p.324. 1958: Cabinet Conclusions, July 14, 1958. 7.pm. 10 
Downing St. Contents Middle East; Kerr, The Arab Cold War. 
19 PRO: FO 3711 132502: Effects of events in Iraq on Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Aden: Note to 
Sir William Hayter, on July 14, 1958: Riches. 
20 PRO: FO 3711 132757: Internal Political Situation in Kuwait: Persian Gulf Monthly Report for the 
Period July 3 - August 6, 1958: Halford. 
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Kuwaiti government would have been as dangerous as a full-scale operation and, if the 
objective was to keep the oil flowing from the refinery and port at Minat el Ahmedi, 
troops would have been better deployed by the sea than at an inland airport. 
The British diplomats in the region believed that the al-Sabah ruling family had 
no idea of the possible dangers posed to their position in Kuwait. The memories of 
Suez fortunately had a calming effect on any head strong Ministers in London. British 
rights of intervention in Kuwait were not clearly defined, although it could mount a 
limited operation to evacuate or ensure the safety of British citizens. Even though 
many states assumed that Britain controlled Kuwait, the move might have been seen as 
an attempt to mount an operation on Basra. It was also believed that it would be 
almost impossible to operate the oil fields without the concurrence of the Kuwaiti 
government. 21 On July 15, 1958, Macmillan received a report on the legal aspects of 
any intervention in Kuwait. It was the legal view of the Foreign Office that not even a 
breach of the 'Exclusive Agreement' of 1899 by the ruler could justify intervention.22 
The only plausible excuse for intervention would be if Kuwait was threatened by 
invasion from another state. The report stated that: -
If the Ruler was unwilling in the event to afford the facilities or to ensure 
the conditions which HM. Government regarded as necessary to ensure the 
defence of Kuwait against armed attack or the imminent threat of attack, legal 
justification could be found if HM. Government took such measures as were 
necessary to assure these facilities or conditions.23 
The United States government adopted a different position to the one it had 
taken during Suez; it was now completely behind any British move in the Gulf. It was 
assumed in Washington that Britain would if necessary take strong action in Kuwait to 
maintain its position.24The Eisenhower administration was also prepared to act to 
21 PRO: FO 3711 132757: Internal Political Situation in Kuwait: Intervention in the Lebanon. Possible 
Repercussions and effects in Kuwait: Minute of July 18, 1958: Sir Patrick Dean. 
22 PRO: FO 371/ 132779: UK Policy towards and influence in Kuwait: Legal aspects of intervention 
in Kuwait, Eastern Department of Foreign Office, July 15, 1958. 
23 PRO: FO 3711132779: UK Policy towards and influence in Kuwait: Legal aspects of intervention 
in Kuwait, Eastern Department of Foreign Office, July 15, 1958. 
24 PRO: FO 3711132779: UK PoJicy towards and influence in Kuwait: Washington to Foreign Office 
for the attention of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, July 19, 1958: Lord Hood. 
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defend the ARAMCO oil fields at Dhahran if the need arose. The absolute necessity of 
defending the oil fields was acknowledged by both the British and the Americans. 
H.M. Minister to Washington, Lord Hood, wrote to Macmillan stating that: ''TIley 
assume [United States government] that we will also hold Bahrain and Qatar, come 
what may. They argue that at all costs these oil fields must be kept in Western 
hands. I 125 
The view of Lord Hood was that the government should continue its cautious 
policy towards Kuwait, but be prepared at a moment's notice to intervene with military 
force. This would entail placing a battalion in readiness at Bahrain and holding a small 
Royal Naval task force ready in the area. The Ministry of Defence on July 22 
instructed its planning staff to be prepared for three possibilities in Kuwait: instant 
unopposed entry by request, an operation of entry against Kuwaiti opposition within a 
minimum of five days from July 22, and military action to secure Kuwait against Iraqi 
attack following union with the UAR by the Kuwait government.26 
A special Cabinet Committee of the British government met on July 22 to co-
ordinate and produce some sort of short-term policy for the Middle East. Although 
short term policy recommendations were the objective of this committee, consideration 
was given to longer term policies. It was decided that the British government would 
either have to accommodate Arab nationalism or continue opposition to it. In the Gulf 
region, opposition to Arab nationalism might entail permanent British military 
intervention. It was also agreed that everything possible should be done to try and 
ensure that the UAR did not come under Soviet domination. The long term policy 
objective would be to attempt to play the traditional British role of external balancer by 
exploiting the historical tensions and differences between Egypt and Iraq.27 
25 PRO: FO 3711132779: UK Policy towards and influence in Kuwait: Washington to Foreign Office 
for the attention of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, July 19, 1958: Lord Hood. 
26pRO: FO 3711 132779: UK Policy towards and influence in Kuwait: Minutes of Secretary of States 
talks with Mr. Dulles. Alternative courses of action in Kuwait, July 22, 1958: Walmsley. 
27 PRO: CAB 130/ 153: Gen 658. Policy in the Midd]e East: Meeting No.1 Ju]y 22, 1958. 
In terms of the patron-client model, British policy with Kuwait during these 
events continued to be guided by a Maintenance objective. This entailed sitting tight 
and appearing to accept the historically low profile of the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship, 
but at the same time having a force ready at Bahrain to intervene in Kuwait at a 
moment's notice. The decision had been made that Kuwait must remain independent at 
all costs. Invasion by Iraq or the adherence of Kuwait to the UAR would have 
prompted intervention by British forces. The underlying policy of the British 
government remained consistent: the assured flow of oil for the West at current prices. 
The oil fields of the Gulf states must on no account fall into anti-Western hands. 
On his return to Kuwait Sheikh Abdullah proposed a new initiative to the 
British government. He requested Britain to allow Kuwait to join the Arab League. His 
belief was that this was a way in which Kuwait could keep closer to events in the Arab 
world.28This, he stressed, would not change any of the agreements between Kuwait 
and Britain. What Sheikh Abdullah was asking for was full membership of the Arab 
League in order to increase the security of the al-Sabah regime and Kuwait. He was 
becoming increasingly convinced that the only aid that Britain could extend to Kuwait 
was of a military nature, but was of the opinion that such assistance would, in the long 
run, be counter-productive. He was therefore looking around for some other source of . 
reassurance. This request brought the whole question of the status of Kuwait and the 
long tenn policy of Britain towards Kuwait to a head. Sheikh Abdullah in response to 
the revolution in Iraq and the British policy over Kuwait and the Arab Union had been 
moving towards a Regulation objective. The increased geopolitical threat from Iraq 
after the revolution ensured that Kuwaiti policy reverted to an Accommodation line.29 
28 PRO: FO 3711132786: Political Relations between Kuwait and Arab League: Kuwait to Foreign 
Office, July 31, 1958: Halford. 
29See p. 25 of this thesis. 
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3.4 Developments in the patron-client relationship of Britain and Kuwait 
3.4.1 The changin2 nature of the patron-client relationship: Kuwait's moves 
towards a reKulation objective 
Under the 1899 'Bond' Agreement, Kuwait was obligated neither to receive 
foreign representatives nor to alienate territory without the agreement of Britain. A 
number of other agreements had been signed during the long history of the 
relationship.3o In line with patron-client theory the fabric of the Anglo-Kuwaiti 
relationship had been built up by customary and habitual practice. The view in the 
Foreign Office by 1958 was that British control would only last as long as Sheikh 
Abdullah was convinced that it was in his interests to direct his foreign relations 
through Britain. The desire of Sheikh Abdullah to change the relationship was 
therefore of concern to the Foreign Office. 
The British government seemed unclear about the direction of its policy 
towards Kuwait and the Gulf. They wanted policy to remain vague and the position of 
Britain to be unchanging. In tenns of patron-client theory, policy towards Kuwait was 
fluid and ill-defmed.31 The departments concerned with this issue, from the Foreign 
Office through to the Treasury and the Ministry of Power, at this time believed that 
Kuwait was of vital interest to Britain. This tended to reinforce the patron-client 
relationship because of the lack of institutional criticism or censure of it. At the 
ministerial level the position taken over the International Telecommunications Union 
(lTU) issue was viewed as a way of accommodating Arab nationalism, but without 
surrendering the position of Britain in Kuwait or the Gulf.32 
30See pp. 48-53 of this thesis. 
31 See p. 19 of this thesis. 
32 PRO: T 236/ 5180: Persian Gulf: UK Policy: 1957-1960: Paper by the Foreign Secretary on 
Kuwait-International Relations C (58) 228. Lloyd. This episode is described in 3.4.1.d. 
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Concern was expressed by Sir Bernard Burrows over any change in 
relationship between Kuwait and Britain.33He felt that Britain would not be able to 
persuade the Sheikh Abdullah to enter into a new sort of treaty arrangement. In a 
report on British policy he wrote: 
The virtues of the present arrangement for Kuwait are its rather vague 
and flexible character and the fact that no one alive was responsible for entering 
into it. The negotiation of any new arrangement would arouse intense 
controversy and propaganda and I would expect the Ruler to say that if we were 
withdrawing our protection he must seek it somewhere else, e.g. from the Arab 
League or the Egyptian-Syrian Union. 34 
The emphasis on a greater degree of external autonomy for Kuwait was a clear 
Regulation objective for the Kuwaiti regime. Pressure to change the relations of 
Kuwait with Britain and the outside world also came from four directions. First, 
externally from Egypt and Iraq; second, internally from the domestic changes in 
Kuwait; third, from the changing nature of the international economic environment; 
and fourth, from Sheikh Abdullah himself. 
3.4.1.a External pressures from Eeypt and Iraq on the patron-client relationship 
The al-Sabah family were conscious of the support that Arab nationalism 
enjoyed in Kuwait and therefore the deference that had to be shown to some of the 
views of Nasser and Radio Cairo. On Arab issues Sheikh Abdullah wanted Kuwait to 
be viewed as confonning with the majority Arab viewpoint. He was therefore keen that 
Kuwait should be as fully as possible in line with the Arab League on the boycott of 
Israel. The strength that Arab nationalism enjoyed in the region also meant that the al-
Sabah regime was careful not to be seen to be too close to Britain. This situation had 
arisen from the Suez War. Elie Podeh writes: "As a consequence of the Suez War, 
Britain's allies in the Arab world found themselves in an extremely difficult position: 
not only had a Western power attacked a sister Arab state, but the attack was carried 
33 PRO: FO 371/ 132779: UK Policy towards and influence in Kuwait: Bahrain to Foreign Office, 
March 15, 1958: Burrows. 
34 PRO: FO 371/ 132779: UK Policy towards and influence in Kuwait: Bahrain to Foreign Office, 
March 15, 1958: Burrows. 
out in collusion with their arch-enemy - Israel."35This was not to say that the ruling 
family did not share a high degree of loyalty and affinity with their patron, but that this 
relationship was best kept secret. Interestingly, this policy of downplaying the patron 
relationship does not fit in with the theory of patron-client relations of Shoemaker and 
Spanier. They characterise one of the elements of the patron-client relationship as 
being defined by the perception of the other actors and that it has to be clear to the 
other actors that the patron and client are bound tightly together.36Although it was 
clear that Britain and Kuwait were in fact closely bound together, the unpopularity of 
Britain after Suez made any public manifestation of the association dangerous)7 
The contiguity of Iraq and Kuwait and the historical claim made by Iraq on 
Kuwait ensured that political developments in Iraq would have a direct bearing on the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. From January to May 1958 the pressure 
exerted on Kuwait by Iraq to join the Arab Union acted as a regulating force for the 
Kuwaitis on the patron-client relationship. The threat made by Nuri to Sheikh Abdullah 
acted as a force for Reinforcement of the relationship with Britain. The revolution in 
Iraq in July 1958 clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of Kuwait to the regional 
political environment. This reinforced the vulnerability of Kuwait's security and the 
need to remain close to its patron, Britain.38 
3.4.1.b Internal reforms in Kuwait affectin& the patron-client relationship 
During 1958 a number of internal reforms took place that had a bearing on the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. These changes were consistent with pursuit of an 
Accommodation objective of the government, that is, they acted to both increase and 
restrict relations between Kuwait and Britain. These changes included reforms to the 
democratic structures, government organisations, newspapers, the airlines, finance, 
trade and investment. 
35 Pobeh, ''The Struggle", p. 97. 
36 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p. 13. 
37 See p. 67 of this thesis. 
38 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
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The formation of a number of advisory councils to government departments 
took place during 1958. These councils went some way to accommodate the 
aspirations of the people of Kuwait for participation in local government. These 
measures still did not satisfy the so-called 'politically conscious', who called for free 
elections to the Councils and demanded that the Sheikhs running the departments 
should be bound by the views of the majority on the advisory councils. Sheikh 
Abdullah nominated a body of responsible citizens to the electoral college that on 
March 28 elected fifty-six full and eighteen alternative candidates for seats on the 
governmental committees. On May 3 he struck two names off the list. In protest at this 
move the rest of the elected committee stood down and the scheme was abandoned. 
The lack of internal political development in Kuwait was partly due to the historical 
nature of the client-patron relationship.39This tie had given the al-Sabah family a high 
degree of political autonomy because they had not had to rely on internal political 
groupings for their position. The massive rise in oil wealth had further increased the 
independence of the ruling family. 40 
During the Suez crisis, Sheikh Abdullah had -promised to give greater freedom 
to the press. At the beginning of the year The Dawn joined The People as a new 
newspaper. This paper followed the themes of Arab nationalism and anti-Westemism 
throughout the year. The Kuwait Oil Company came in for particular criticism from the 
new liberal press. The verbal and written attacks never amounted to much in Kuwait 
for, as Halford pointed out in his annual report: "Kuwaitis are still too busy making 
money to have much time for local politics."41The press still acted in the interests of 
the al-Sabah family. Little criticism of the ruling family appeared in the papers, but the 
adverse comment against the British by the papers was a useful way for the ruling 
family to indirectly express criticism of their patron ally. 
39 Tetreault, "Autonomy", pp. 568-569. 
40 Tetreault, "Autonomy", p. 578; Crystal, "Coalitions in Oil Monarchies", pp. 427-43. 
41 PRO: Fa 3711140064: Persian Gulf States: annual review: Kuwait, January 6, 1959: Halford. 
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Kuwait also sought a measure of autonomy by establishing an official national 
airline that would eventually fly long haul flights to London and Bombay. A civil 
aviation agreement between Kuwait and Britain had been reached in 1956. The United 
Kingdom-Kuwait Air Agreement of 1956, in line with the general position of Britain 
being responsible for Kuwait's external relations, allowed for Britain to conduct the 
bulk of the air traffic of Kuwait.42After some considerable negotiation an eventual 
agreement was signed between the Board of Kuwait Airways and the British Overseas 
Airways Corporation (BOAC). This agreement gave BOAC commercial and 
operational control of a new Kuwait Airways in return for which BOAC agreed to 
guarantee an annual payment to Kuwait Airways of Rs.300,OOO, with any profits after 
this being shared. BOAC would also supply the first plane to Kuwait Airways, a 
Viscount, and in time a second one. It was seen by both the British and the Kuwaitis 
that the success of the civil aviation plan would add a great deal to the general British 
position in Kuwait 43This agreement therefore met an Accommodation objective 
because it reinforced the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship as well as increasing the 
independence of Kuwait. 
3.4.1.c The affect of the changine; nature of the economic environment of Kuwait 
on the patron-client relationship 
The wealth of Kuwait was rapidly increasing during this time. The British 
government had mixed reactions towards this particular development. Sheikh Abdullah 
continued to pursue a policy of investing a large proportion of his oil royalties in 
sterling deposits. Officials at the Treasury were anxious that these sterling deposits 
should not be put in jeopardy and were therefore concerned at any development that 
might knock Sheikh Abdullah's confidence in the advice or support of Britain. The 
effect of the increase in wealth for Kuwait on the client-patron relationship was to 
42 PRO: FO 3711 140064: Persian Gulf States: annual review: Kuwait, January 6, 1959: Halford. 
43 PRO: FO 3711 132751 : Events in Persian Gulf: Kuwait: Dial]:' No.5 April 29 to May 18, 1958: 
Civil Aviation. 
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increase their independence and room for manoeuvre. From Table 1.2 it is clear that a 
client can pursue either a Regulation or a Maintenance objective when its economy is 
relatively strong. These objectives will be modified in accordance with the degree of 
security of the client. 44 
Sheikh Abdullah had set up an investment board in London in 1953 to deal 
with his finances. The chainnan of this board was a Mr. Kemp with Lord Percy and 
Lord Kennet as the other members. Fonnal procedural rules were set out for the 
investment of funds. These stipulated that the investment could only be in securities 
guaranteed by the British government, had to attain a higher return than was available 
from fixed deposits, and should be readily realisable. These procedures were changed 
somewhat to allow the investment board to buy a few equities. Despite this, the main 
policy remained the maintenance of so called 'maximum liquidity'.45This high level of 
liquidity ensured that the ruling family had maximum flexibility and manoeuvre with the 
funds that could in the event of crisis be moved quickly. However, this was seen as a 
short-tenn liability by both the Bank of England and the Treasury. 
The effects of Kuwait either leaving the Sterling Area, or converting its income 
into dollars when sterling was made convertible had already concerned the Treasury as 
long ago as July 1955.46The Sterling Area membership of Kuwait and Qatar was even 
more important to the Treasury than that of Iraq. Sir Anthony Parsons writes that at 
the time of the British intervention in Kuwait in 1961: "The Emir of Kuwait held one-
third of the total sterling reserves. "47 
The problem for the Treasury was that as long as the balances attained such a 
high degree of liquidity they constituted a clear threat to the stability of sterling. 
Throughout the late 1950s and 1960s devaluation was the real fear of British 
44 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
45 PRO: T 236/4293: Persian Gulf: Financial and Economic Problems Arising from Increased Oil 
Revenues: Note Treasury, July 19, 1956: Cobbold; Special Report Series No.8, p. 66. 
46pRO: T 236/3893: Sterling area membership of certain Middle East Countries following 
convertibility of Sterling. 
47 Sir Anthony Parsons, "Gulf Withdrawal: British Withdrawal from the Gulf 1965-1971", 
Contemporary Record, (Summer, 1988), p. 41. 
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governments.48The advantage of the large Kuwaiti deposits held in London was that it 
helped to offset any withdrawals of sterling funds by other states. Any large scale 
withdrawal would undennine the stability of sterling and could lead to an increase in 
domestic interest rates. The Treasury viewed retention of Sheikh Abdullah's sterling 
deposits as an important British policy. A collateral aim of the Treasury was that these 
funds should be invested in such a way as not to excite criticism of Kuwait from other 
Middle East states. 
Both governments were sensitive to criticism that 'the wealth of Sheikh 
Alxlullah was being used for the benefit of Britain and not the Arab world'. 49Concern 
was expressed by the Eden government, following cancellation of the finance for the 
Aswan Dam, that Egypt might place pressure on Kuwait to help fund the 
development. 50The Macmillan government believed that one of the objectives of 
Nasser was to obtain access to the oil money of the Gulf oil states. Care was therefore 
taken to try and deflect any criticism of these deposits by promoting a certain amount 
of investment in the Gulf area. To this end, the government developed a policy on 
investment and trade in the Gulf and the Middle East with the Federation of British 
Industry (F.B.I.). 
Kuwait was an important area for trade and investment by British business. In 
1954 import figures for Kuwait showed that of goods with a total value of some 398 
million rupees, 109 million worth came from Britain.5l The Macmillan government 
worked in tandem with the F.B.I. through the Board of Trade and the Treasury on its 
Middle East economic activities and policy. In a letter to Sir Leslie Rowan at the 
Treasury the Middle East Committee of the F.B.I. commented that: ''The Treasury and 
Her Majesty's Government in general are very anxious that we should export as much 
48 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 209. 
49 PRO: T 2361 4293: Persian Gulf: Financial and Economic Problems Arising from Increased Oil 
Revenues. 
50 PRO: T 236/ 4293: Persian Gulf: Financial and Economic Problems Arising from Increased Oil 
Revenue: Bahrain to Foreign Office, August 14, 1956: Burrows. 
51 MRC: MSS 2001 FI 31 051 31 2 Middle East: F.B.I. Middle East Panel, Minutes and Related Papers; 
Correspondence, January 1956 to February 1957. 
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as possible to Middle East countries, so as to mop up as much as possible the money 
for which they are getting for oil."52In a meeting on January 30, 1958, the Middle East 
Committee of the F.B.1. discussed the position of Kuwait. The conclusion was that 
there were considerable drawbacks in having the large amounts of money that Kuwait 
had invested in Britain because of what would happen if the deposits were removed. 53 
In February 1958 the British government set up the Advisory Committee on 
Middle East Trade (ACMET). This organisation was set up to promote British 
business in the Middle East. It was seen as similar to the Dollar Export Council, but 
with the important differentiation that ACMET had both government and businessmen 
among its members. Twelve businessmen, along with Ministers from the Treasury, 
Foreign Office and the Board of Trade, made up the organisation, with the secretariat 
being provided maintained by the Board of Trade. The activities of this group included 
trying to get a greater number of British fmns interested in trading in the area, along 
with promotional and information activities.54The Kuwaiti market amounted to about 
£40m every year.55The share of world trade held by Britain continued to slip during 
this period, as it had to deal in an ever more competitive market. Therefore important 
markets such as the Middle East had to be fostered and built on. The bulk of British 
business in Kuwait had been related to the lucrative area of the development 
programme. British fIrms had been contracted to build or consult on the public building 
programme. The consumer goods market was also very profitable because of the huge 
demand from a very small wealthy populace. 
52MRC: MSS.2001 FI 31 021 11 10 Middle East: F.B.I. Middle East Committee: Correspondence and 
Memoranda, July 1957 to November 1959: Letter from F.B.I. to Sir Leslie Rowan. The Treasury July 
10. 1957. 
53 MRC: MSS.2001 FI 31 021 III 0 Middle East: F.B.I. Middle East Committee: Note on Luncheon 
Meeting of January 30, 1958. on study group for the Middle East: Statement on Kuwait's surplus 
earnings: Sir Edmund Hall-Patch. 
54 MRC: MSS.2001 FI 31 021 10 Middle East: F.B.I. Middle East Committee: Minutes of the Twenty 
First Meeting of the F.B.I. Middle East Committee, July 30, 1958: Item 2 ACMET. 
55 MRC: MSS.2001 FI 31 051 31 29: Persian Gulf Enquiries, January 1954 to December 1957: 
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These trade and financial benefits fonned part of the reciprocal nature of the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship for Britain. They were also a measure of the 
growing control of the client over the patron. The expansion in wealth of Kuwait, 
combined with the increased economic dependence of Britain on the country, meant 
that the patron-client relationship was much less hierarchical. The asymmetry of power 
and resources between Britain and Kuwait was now only in the diplomatic and military 
fields. 
3.4.1.d The movement for change from Sheikh Abdullah 
The changing situation in the Middle East and the episode with Iraq over the 
Arab Union provoked Sheikh Abdullah to seek Regulation of the client-patron 
relationship with Britain and take greater charge of his relationships with Kuwait's 
Arab neighbours. The economic prosperity of Kuwait allowed Sheikh Abdullah to 
pursue this policy for his country. However, the new security threat emanating from 
Baghdad soon tempered any Regulation motives of Sheikh Abdullah and pushed his 
regime back towards an Accommodation goal.56- This goal brought together the 
competing aims of increasing and restricting relations with the patron. As client-patron 
theory would suggest this Accommodation objective was a mixture of the 
Reinforcement and Regulation objectives. 
Sheikh Abdullah placed pressure on Britain to put forward the candidature of 
Kuwait for full membership of the International Telecommunications Union (lTU) and 
as such had made Britain redefine in writing the extent of its responsibilities for the 
foreign relations of Kuwait since full membership of this international organisation 
from 1947 had been restricted to "sovereign" countries. Associate membership was 
granted to any state or territory not fully responsible for the conduct of its own 
international relations. Sheikh Abdullah rejected the designation of Kuwait as an 
associate. It was therefore difficult for Britain to declare that Kuwait fulfilled the 
56 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
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obligations for full membership of the lTV unless they declared that Kuwait was "fully 
responsible for the conduct of its [own] international relations." 
Ironically, it had been the British government who had originally insisted that 
new adnlissions to the lTV satisfied the full sovereignty requirements. Up to this point, 
Britain had followed a consistent policy of insisting that only completely independent 
States could become eligible for full membership of certain specialised agencies of the 
United Nations. It would therefore be difficult for Britain to put forward Kuwait to the 
lTV without changing the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. The Foreign 
Office was sensitive to the strength of feeling from Sheikh Abdullah on this issue and 
were aware that the relationship could be terminated by him at any time. Any statement 
to the effect that Kuwait was responsible for its own foreign relations would be a 
major change in the patron-client relationship. Such a change would also have had a 
direct bearing on the position of Britain in the Gulf.57The policy decision was made at 
ministerial level and, in due course, the Political Agent Aubery Halford was instructed 
to inform Sheikh Abdullah that Britain was not in principle against the idea of Kuwait 
joining the ITU. At the same time, Halford was also instructed to explain the 
difficulties of such a move. 
The economic development in Kuwait was also projecting the Sheikhdom into 
the various international organisations responsible for the regulation of trade. An 
example of this was the purchase by the Kuwait government of its first tanker from 
Japan. This meant that there was a need for Kuwait to adhere to the world's maritime 
conventions. Sheikh Abdullah was also enthusiastic for Kuwait to join the external 
postal service and the wireless and telegraphic communications international bodies. 
57 PRO: T 236/ 5180: Persian Gulf: UK Policy: The Problem of Her Majesty's Government's 
Relations with the Ruler of Kuwait, March 28, 1958: Walmsley. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Developments in the first part of 1958 placed considerable strain on the patron-
client relationship of Britain and Kuwait. The importance of Kuwait to Britain ensured 
that the Foreign Office was overtly sensitive towards the sensibilities of Kuwait. This 
had been demonstrated earlier in 1958 when Britain had discussed the change of its 
representation in Kuwait. Up to this point, the senior British diplomatic representative 
in the Gulf had been the Political Resident based at Bahrain. The Political Agent in 
Kuwait was his deputy. The suggestion was to promote British representation in 
Kuwait to Ambassadorial level to reflect the growing significance of Kuwait to Britain. 
This issue had been discussed a number of times before.58 The old style Political 
Resident and Political Agent were left-overs from the Indian Raj. Changing this form 
of representation was a way for the British government to indicate its continued 
commitment to Kuwait as well as its new sensitivities over past colonial connotations. 
The problem was that any change in the Resident-Agent arrangement would produce 
speculation in Arab nationalist quarters about the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. The 
most important consideration for Britain on this rather minor issue remained the 
conservative inclinations of Sheikh Abdullah. His cautious attitudes meant that any 
changes in relations between Britain and Kuwait would take place over a long rather 
than a short period of time. 
Another example of the sensitivity of Britain to Kuwait was the proposed trip 
by the Secretary of State, Selwyn Lloyd, to Kuwait. This visit, which had been planned 
for the outward leg of Lloyd's trip to Manila, was vetoed on the grounds that it would 
be regarded as putting pressure on Sheikh Abdullah to join the Arab Union. It was felt 
that such a move would precipitate an outpouring of public disaffection toward the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. The British view of Sheikh Abdullah's attitude towards 
changing his exterior relations was summed up by Halford in Kuwait in his Annual 
58 PRO: FO 3711132779: UK Policy Towards and Influence in Kuwait: Appendix A, Kuwait: The 
Possible Separation of British Representation from the Political Resident in Bahrain, and the possible 
change of title, January 1, 1958. 
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Report of 1958. He wrote: ''They are a little like the Uppsala Kings who, according to 
an old Icelandic Saga, 'wished their country to be as quiet as Sweden had been of old, 
and gratified mischief makers and foreigners just so far as became needful to buy 
themselves peace, and nothing beyond'. "59 
Sheikh Abdullah was intent on pursuing policies that retained his internal 
autonomy and the external security of Kuwait. The pursuit of these two objectives 
entailed the internal development of Kuwait and Accommodation in the patron-client 
relationship with Britain. This pursuit of Accommodation was caused by a 
simultaneous desire both to limit and to reinforce the patron-client relationship. The 
limitation objective developed from the economic prosperity of Kuwait whilst the 
reinforcing objective came from the insecurity caused by the revolution in Iraq. 
The commitment of the Macmillan government to a substantial strategic 
posture in the region was made untenable by the revolution in Iraq. This left the 
declining patron power (Britain) able to pursue only its economic objectives and also 
made Kuwait its most important remaining bilateral relationship in the Middle East. 
The crux of Anglo-Kuwaiti relations in 1958 had been the Arab Union issue. 
Britain had lost some credibility with its client over this, and much diplomatic activity 
had to be mustered to repair the damage done. Out of the revolution in Iraq and the 
Arab Union issue sprung the movement for further change in the Anglo-Kuwaiti 
patron-client relationship. Despite Britain's scrupulous avoidance of pressure on 
Sheikh Abdullah to join the Arab Union, its credibility suffered a knock over the issue 
because it did not come out fully against the idea of Kuwait joining the Union. 
59 PRO: FO 3711140064: Persian Gulf States: annual review for 1958: Kuwait, January 6, 1959: 
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Chapter 4: Changing Fortunes; the Power of Oil 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 is divided into three sections. The first deals with British policy in the 
Middle East and the Gulf from August 1958 to May 1961. The second reviews 
security and political aspects of the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. The third 
examines the economics of the relationship. By this point Kuwait had become the most 
important concern of Britain both in the Gulf and the wider Middle East. In addition, 
the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship was undergoing evolutionary changes determined by 
the wealth from oil and the fonnation of OPEC. Both these themes inform the whole 
of the chapter. 
4.2 British Policy in the Middle East and the Gulf 
In January 1959 the Chiefs of Staff (CoS) met to discuss British policy in the 
Middle East. The committee had before it a report from the Joint Planning Staff that 
explained the revised paper, 'Middle East Policy', produced by the Official Committee 
on the Middle East. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Francis 
Festing, disagreed with the general trend of this report, which offered a choice between 
"switching our support from our present friends to the UAR on the one hand, and 
complete disengagement on the other."lHis view, shared by the rest of the CoS, was 
that each British commitment in the Middle East should be judged on its own merits 
and that no commitment need be made in advance to either of the two courses of 
action. The CoS believed that the report was too pessimistic and put too much 
emphasis upon disengagement. They commented that "military intervention must be 
recognised as a potent means of maintaining our position; it might, in some areas, be 
regarded as the first remedy for a deteriorating situation, and not as a last resort. "2 
1 PRO: DEFE 41115: Chiefs of Staff (59) 4: Meeting January 13, 1959. 
2 PRO: DEFE 41 115: Chiefs of Staff (59) 4: Meeting January 13, 1959. 
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Adequate military facilities were needed so that this policy might be continued. 
Bases in Cyprus, the Gulf, and Aden would have to be maintained so that a quick 
response could be made by British forces to any perceived threat. It was anticipated 
that military action might have to be taken in either Kuwait, Libya or Iran. The threat 
to each of these states was seen to emanate from Iraq, the UAR and the Soviet Union 
respectively. The Chief of Navy Staff, Earl Mountbatten of Burma, believed there was 
a need for both political and military actions to be taken in these vulnerable states in 
order to shore up their defensive and security positions. He stressed the need for an 
increase in propaganda and education to counter the effects of UAR active 
propaganda. It was therefore agreed that the option of military intervention had to be 
retained and that the continued maintenance of the Anglo-American alignment was 
crucial for these ends.3This was a key decision especially because of the bearing that it 
had on the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. 
The restrictions on staging and overflight rights experienced by the British 
during the Suez crisis of 1956 had a continued bearing on British defence and foreign 
policy in the Middle East, and on the decision to continue a military presence in the 
Gulf. A recurring theme for policy makers was the need to deal with the problem of the 
reliability of overflying and sea routes. 
3 F th rough critique and examination of the legal constraints of intervention see: Neil 
°fr al 0 "Intervention and Regional Security", Adelphi Paper 196 (London: IISS, 1985), p. 23. Mac ar ane, 
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Balfour Paul assesses the position accurately. 
The Suez affair, the closure of the Canal and the erection thereafter of an 
air barrier by Arab states from Syria to the Sudan strengthened the argument of 
the Services that Britain's peacekeeping responsibilities entailed the deployment 
of army troops and of naval units the other side of the barrier. Between 1957 and 
1959 developments in Oman, the Yemen, Jordan and further afield, all requiring 
British military attention, endorsed the recognition shared by [Dennis] Healey, 
that overseas commitments were likely to increase rather than the reverse while 
empire in the old sense shrank. For such purposes the old reliance on UK based 
air mobility was no substitute for troops on the ground. Thus the role of the 
selected bases expanded in Service terms.4 
One need was for tiny air and sea bases that were inconspicuously placed and 
immune from politics, like Gan and the Cocos Islands.5Expenditure on the three major 
bases 'East of Suez', Mombassa, Singapore and Aden, was increased. Forward facilities 
at Bahrain and Sharjah were extended because of the need to allow the 'teeth' forces to 
be made more mobile and better equipped. The decision to increase expenditure on 
these bases was a clear signal of the continued commitment of the British military 
establishment and the government to a British role East of Suez.6 
Interestingly, this continued financial and military commitment did not cause 
much, if any, dissension amongst the domestic political establishment. Concern had 
been expressed though, by some Conservative back-benchers, over the direction of 
British Middle East policy. Their worries centred upon press reports inspired by 
rumours in the Middle East that the British government was supporting Nasser against 
the dangerous excesses of Communism now dominant in Iraq.7The British government 
was having to playa delicate balancing act, neither supporting Communism nor 
appearing pro-Nasser and undermining the Qassim regime in Iraq whom they still 
believed to be a moderate force. The Foreign Office line was not being expounded 
4 Glen Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire in the Middle East, Britain's Relinquishment of Power in her 
last three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 144-145. 
5 John Ga]]agher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire, the Ford Lectures and other 
Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 152. 
6 Kuniholm, The Persian Gulf, p. 13. 
7 PRO: FO 3711 141831: UK policy in the Middle East: John Biggs Davison to Lloyd, December 18, 
1958. 
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clearly enough. Lloyd was keen to dispel the fears of the Conservative MPs. He wrote 
that Britain was not going pro-Nasser, but that the government recognised the need to 
settle the outstanding financial business with Egypt left over from the Suez War. Lloyd 
believed that a struggle for control of Iraq was still going on between the pro-
Egyptians and the Communists, and therefore su pport needed to be given to Qassim to 
help him stay away from the influence of Moscow.8Qassim was in fact attempting to 
develop his own Iraqi nationalist style that was independent of both Nasserites and the 
Communists. Unfortunately, he was having to rely increasingly on the support of the 
Communists in order to counter the Nasserite elements within Iraq. The Foreign Office 
which was trying to play a balancing act between the two factions, was therefore 
concerned when it appeared that British policy had switched to being either pro-Nasser 
or pro-Communist.9 
The issue of most concern for Britain in the Gulf was the Iraqi threat to 
Kuwait. It was agreed in Whitehall that efforts would be made with the Americans to 
co-ordinate a joint approach on this matter. t O'fhe line taken on this issue was bound up 
with British policy towards the whole of the Gulf. Notes on British policy were 
submitted to Ministers in preparation for a Foreign Affairs debate scheduled for early 
November 1958. Ministers were worried that it might be claimed that the position of 
Britain in the Gulf was outdated and that it was not in the national interest to back up 
feudal and anachronistic regimes there.IIThe counter arguments of the Foreign Office 
were that the relationships that Britain had in the Gulf were beneficial to both Britain 
and the Gulf States and that since Britain had no rights of internal administration in any 
of these states it could not be held responsible for the character of government there 
even though the British government had at times intervened internally in the 
Sheikhdoms. Yet behind these arguments the underlying reason for the continued 
8 PRO: FO 3711141831: UK Policy in the Middle East: Lloyd to Davison, December 29,1958. 
9 PRO: FO 3711141831: UK Policy in the Middle East, Trevelyan to Stevens, January 22, 1959. 
10 PRO: DEFE 41115: JPS (59) 4: Policy Report January 9, 1959. 
11 PRO: FO 3711140048: Submission for Foreign Affairs Debate: Beaumont, October 28, 1959. 
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British presence in the Gulf was the security of its oil and financial interests in Kuwait. 
The relationship that Britain had enjoyed with Iraq had allowed London to disguise its 
vital interests in the Gulf under the blanket of strategic Cold War commitments. It was 
doubtful if British interests could any longer be so disguised following the Iraqi 
revolution. Policies that had been rejected early in 1958 were now being forced upon 
policy makers. Before the Iraqi revolution the majority view in the Foreign Office was 
that Britain could remain indefinitely in the Gulf region. This assumption, quite rightly, 
was now beginning to be seriously questioned. 
The Colonial-Imperial tag that was pinned to the British position in the Gulf 
left Britain and its close allies in the Gulf wide open to attack by the Arab nationalists. 
As long as the British were identified with the Gulf rulers their position would be 
subject to criticism from liberal and nationalist opinion in the Middle East. The fear in 
Whitehall was that the British position would become untenable in the Gulf when, or if, 
the old rulers of the Sheikhdoms were removed. 12The security of the Sheikhs rested 
primarily on the stability of the Gulf and the security relationships that their states had 
with Britain. The key to the success or failure of British policy in the Gulf had 
therefore been the forbearance of Iraq and Iran and the stability of Saudi Arabia. The 
revolution in Iraq now added a new destabilising element to the Gulf. 
Analysis of the Iraqi threats to the Gulf produces a number of conclusions on 
interstate conflict. The threat perception and the activation of disputes is a function of 
the nature of the interacting regimes. A radical change in regime, as observed in Iraq in 
1958 and in Iran from 1979-1980, can lead to disputes over norms, values and policies 
that can destabilise the system. 13 
The most important element in the ability of Britain to guarantee the security of 
Kuwait was the growing United States interest in the Gulf. The stability and 
forbearance of Iran and Saudi Arabia was primarily due to the close relationship that 
12 PRO: FO 3711143071: Planning for the Persian Gulf: Report by R.W.L. Wilding, June 3,1959. 
13 Litwak, Securitx, p. 94. 
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these two states enjoyed with the United States. 14 The objectives of the United States 
government for the Near Eastern and South Asian region were explained to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee by the Assistant Secretary of State William M. 
Roundtree, on May 14, 1959. His statement concluded that United States policy was: 
First, to support the development of strong and independent nations able 
and willing to resist the subversive efforts of international communism; second, 
to contribute, if required by the nations of the area to their security, recognizing 
that, in a broad sense, their security is our security; third, to assist and 
encourage the countries of the area to resolve their disputes in accordance with 
the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; fourth, to contribute to the 
economic progress and development of the nations of the Near East and South 
Asia. 15 
The United States was clearly taking over the role of Britain in the region. The 
objectives of the United States in the Gulf were a mixture of ideological goals, 
international solidarity and strategic advantage. In contrast to this, the goals of Britain 
at this stage were primarily financial. The Assistant United States Secretary of Defence 
and Director of Near East, South Asia and Africa Region, Admiral Grantham, 
underlined the importance of Iran to the United States in a statement to the Senate on 
the Security Act. He pronounced that Iran was "obviously essential to the maintenance 
of our whole Near East position" and that the United States should "use every possible 
means to bolster her defensive capabilities and assure her continued finn alignment to 
the West and her effective contribution to the Baghdad Pact."16The decline in power of 
Britain left the British government seeking economic rather than strategic goals in the 
Gulf. Their ability to do this was due to the new role taken in the Gulf by the United 
States. 
The problem for Britain remained how to maintain its vital interests in the Gulf. 
Should Britain remain loyal to the local rulers in the hope of riding out the storm of 
14 C.C. Fishburne, Jr., "United States Policy Towards Iran, 1959-1963", (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Florida, 1970). 
15 United States, Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Mutual Security 
Act of 1959, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, p. 578. 
16 United States, Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, The Mutual Security 
Act of 1959, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, p. 594. 
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Arab nationalism sweeping the Middle East or should contact be made and friendship 
sought with the local opposition in the anticipation of their coming to power? Rightly, 
it was decided that the later was not an option for Britain. In a report on the Gulf a 
Foreign Office official wrote: "If we tried to ride two horses by befriending the local 
opposition, we should fall between the two. The Rulers would reinsure with whoever 
would defend their own position, and Nasser could always outbid us for the favour of 
the malcontents."17Federation of the Sheikhdoms appeared to be an impractical 
solution because of the conservative, parochial and mutually hostile disposition of the 
rulers in the Gulf (although the eventual formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCe) somewhat belied this position). Pushing the Sheikhdoms towards closer 
association with the Baghdad Pact - CENTO was also not the answer. It was 
calculated that such a policy would send Kuwait into the arms of the UAR and the rest 
of the Sheikhdoms towards Saudi Arabia. 
The Sheikhs continued to wish for a quiet life, little troubled by the 
international scene. Unfortunately, they faced a hostile and changing world that 
threatened their position. They would therefore desire to maintain their relationship 
with the British as long as Britain could protect their families and give them a measure 
of security from the outside world. Neither cosmetic revisions of the Sheikhdoms' 
constitutions, moves toward federation between them, changes in treaty relations with 
Britain, nor any combination of the three would hide the relationship that Britain had 
with the Sheikhdoms. 
Did any of this actually matter? Could Britain not retain its position in the Gulf 
indefinitely or for some considerable time? There were various views within the 
Foreign Office, with Burrows and Riches believing that the position could be 
maintained. Stevens was less sure. However it was generally accepted that if Britain's 
position was to become untenable, then the policy should be to retire from the scene 
graciously. Unfortunately, it was unclear what the future would hold. The decision was 
17 PRO: FO 3711143071: Planning for the Persian Gulf: Report by R.W.L. Wilding, June 3,1959. 
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therefore taken to remain in the region as long as possible. A planning report on the 
Gulf outlined these conclusions. 
It is difficult not to agree with the conclusion that we must carryon in 
much the same way as before, making such progress as we safely can towards the 
modernisation of the regimes in the Gulf, closer relations between the Rulers and 
an accommodation between the Rulers and their larger neighbours. ls 
As far as the larger neighbours were concerned the balance of power in the Arab cold 
war between Egypt and Iraq shaped the system. The Baghdad-Cairo rivalry actually 
strengthened the position of Britain and the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. 
Yet this was less a coherent planned strategy of divide and rule, but more that of 
pragmatic British response to the realities of the region. 19 
It had now become clear that Kuwait was the major concern of Britain not just 
in the Gulf but in the wider Middle East. The decisions taken to continue military 
support in the Gulf and to follow a status quo policy were primarily linked to the 
Anglo-Ku waiti patron-client relationship. 
18 PRO: FO 3711143071: Planning for the Persian Gulf: Report by R.W.L. Wilding, June 3, 1959. 
19 Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire, p. 103. 
~ ~ ~) 11~ 
4.3 An210-Kuwaiti relations from .July 1958 to May 1961 
4.3.1 The security of Kuwait and the chan2in2 nature of the Anglo-Kuwaiti 
patron-client relationship 
The revolution in Iraq caused concern in Britain about the security of Kuwait. 
The first impressions fonned in the Foreign Office about the implications of the Iraqi 
revolution for Kuwait proved accurate in the long term. The head of the Eastern 
Department, Derek Riches wrote that: 
She would [the new regime in Iraq] prosecute the Iraqi claim to Kuwait 
with greater vigour than the previous Iraqi Government. .. The Iraqi attitude to 
Kuwait should have the indirect effect of worsening relations between Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia ... In any event the British connection with Kuwait will be under 
Iraqi as well as Egyptian fire.20 
The revolution in Iraq represented the end of a period of relative security that 
Kuwait had enjoyed since the end of the Second World War. Traditional definitions of 
security have been based on the ability of a state to deter attack on its interests from 
other states through the sufficient possession of military power to wage war.2l Kuwait 
had only been able to attain this security with the help of the client-patron relationship 
that it had with Britain. Kuwait could be characterised as a small weak power in the 
international system rather than a weak state. Buzan clearly defines the two when he 
writes that "weak or strong states will refer to the degree of socio-political cohesion; 
weak or strong powers will refer to the traditional distinction among states in respect 
of their military and economic capability in relation to each other. "22Robert Rothstein's 
definition of a small power amply describes Kuwait's position. He writes: "A small 
power is a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its 
20 PRO: FO 371/ 132502: Events in Iraq in relation to the Eastern Department: Countries of Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Iran: Riches to Sir William Hayter, July 14, 1958. 
21 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983), p. 97. 
22 Tetreault, "Autonomy", p. 566. 
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own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, 
institutions, processes, or developments to do so. "23 
Kuwait was now threatened by internal insecurity as well as external 
aggression. Unfortunately, British policy in the Middle East over the preceding two 
years, especially over Suez and the question of the adherence of Kuwait to the Arab 
Union, had produced doubts for the Kuwaitis over this security relationship. The 
nature of the relationship between Kuwait and Britain therefore became the central 
issue between the two states over the next few months. 
The Communist threat from Iraq also worried Sheikh Abdullah. He believed 
that Iraq had gone totally Communist and that this further threatened the security of 
Kuwait. There were a number of Iraqis in Kuwait, some of whom were believed to be 
Communists. Control or restraint of these individuals was difficult because Sheikh 
Abdullah feared that any action he might take could provoke a move on Kuwait by 
Iraq. Four Iraqi army officers had entered Kuwait to deal with issues affecting Iraqis in 
Kuwait. Pennission had not been granted for this by Sheikh Abdullah or the British. 
The concern was that Iraq was attempting to open a de facto consulate in Kuwait. 
The immediate concern for the British was that the instability in Iraq would 
spread to the Gulf region and threaten the vital oil interests there before a new political 
accommodation could be built with nationalist forces in the region.24Britain pressed 
Sheikh Abdullah to allow a build up of military forces in the Sheikhdom, but the ruler 
rejected such calls reiterating his reluctance to see foreign troops on Kuwaiti soi1.25 
From these developments it was clear that the external threat environment for 
the state of Kuwait had rapidly deteriorated. The patron-client relationship between 
Britain and Kuwait was subsequently oscillating during this period between the goals 
of Accommodation and Reinforcement. 26 The asymmetry in power between the two 
states was still a crucial factor in their relationship. The security problems for the client 
23 Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 29. 
24 PRO: FO 3711141830: Planning for the Persian Gulf. 
25 PRO: PREM 111 2752: Middle East 1958-1959: Kuwait to Foreign Office, July 30, 1958. 
26 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
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characterised the behaviour as indicated in Table 1.3. Any increases in the threat 
environment for the client led to a reduction in the clients control over the relationship 
with the patron. 
At the end of September 1958 Sheikh Abdullah brought up the border issue 
with Iraq in the hope that this area of insecurity for Kuwait could be resolved.27 The 
Political Agent, Halford, was quick to point ou t that the British government had 
pressured Iraq on this issue for the previous thirty years with no success, and that 
without British "protection Iraq would have annexed Kuwait long ago."28To this 
Sheikh Abdullah hinted that if British interests in Iraq conflicted with those of Kuwait 
that Kuwait might be let down as a matter of expediency. Halford vigorously 
attempted to remove any suspicions that Britain had plotted with Nuri to allow Iraq to 
annexe Kuwait. After repeated assurances that Britain would stand by Kuwait in all 
circumstances Sheikh Abdullah dropped the issue. 
Legal aspects of intervention in Kuwait were set out in a memorandum sent to 
Macmillan the day after the revolution in Iraq. It was argued that military intervention 
could be legally justified under the 'Exclusive Agreement' (the 'Bond') of 1899. Even if 
Sheikh Abdullah was unwilling to request such assistance the Foreign Office believed 
that the legal responsibility of Britain to defend Kuwait from external attack or 
imminent threat of attack justified such action.29This interpretation of the agreements 
between Kuwait and Britain seemed somewhat exaggerated. The need for legal 
justification in any action undertaken by the British in this area was uppermost in the 
mind of Macmillan and his advisors because of the lessons of Suez. 
Plans were brought to operational readiness for military intervention in Kuwait. 
The CoS in a meeting on July 18, 1958, reserved their decision on the operations in the 
Gulf and the movement of forces.30'fhe CoS received orders from the Minister of 
27 See p. 55 of this thesis. 
28 PRO: PREM 1112752: Middle East 1958-1959: Kuwait to Foreign Office, September 29, 1958. 
29 PRO: FO 3711 132779: Kuwait: Legal Aspects of Intervention in Kuwait: Eastern Department to 
Prime Minister, July 15, 1958. 
30 PRO: FO 3711 132779: Kuwait: Legal Aspects of Intervention in Kuwait: Eastern Department 
Minutes: Walmsley, July 22, 1958. 
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Defence on July 22 to be ready for three contingencies: "A. Immediate entry by 
invitation, unopposed. B. Entry as soon as possible (minimum is 5 days from now) 
against Kuwaiti opposition. C. Operation to secure Kuwait after the Kuwait 
government had joined the UAR."3IThe Macmillan government were following a clear 
cut policy in nlilitary operations in the Middle East. Not only was any intervention to 
be based upon clear legal grounds, but also, full support from the United States 
government was to be a prerequisite of action.32The Foreign Secretary had departed 
for urgent talks with the Eisenhower administration shortly after the Iraqi revolution. 
During the Middle East crisis of July 1958 the issue of supporting the British in the 
Gulf was put to the Eisenhower administration in the forum of the National Security 
Council (NSC). The question was: "Should the United States be prepared to support, 
or if necessary assist, the British in using force to retain control of Kuwait and the 
Persian Gulf? "33 Although such action, it was recognised, would damage United States 
credibility with the non-aligned bloc and went against United States policy towards 
Arab nations, it was conceded that loss of access to Gulf oil would cause economic 
dislocation in Western Europe while in addition the loss of Kuwaiti sterling 
investments would upset the financial stability of Britain. Discussion in the NSC 
covered the subject: 
31 PRO: FO 371/ 132779: Kuwait: Legal Aspects of Intervention in Kuwait: Eastern Department 
Minutes: Note for Department: Walmsley, July 22, 1958. 
32 Kennedy, The Rise and FaIl, p. 547, notes 'th~ blunt. fact that [after Suez] Britain could not operate 
militarily in the Third World in the face of Amencan dIsapproval. 
33 SDA: NSC: Memorandum for NSC, July 29,1958. 
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Secretary Dulles, commented that 'he thought it agreed that force would 
be used to preserve access to Middle East oil; ... Mr. Allen said that he thought 
our oil concessions should be adjusted to Arab nationalism, and that perhaps we 
should make an adjustment in Kuwait ... The President said the question is 
whether we wish to assist the British to hold their oil position by force ... 
Secretary Dulles reiterated that we have agreed to take a strong line on holding 
the Persian Gulf.34 
It was agreed that in the last resort that the United States government would be 
prepared to use force and would consider supporting the British "with force, whether 
in Kuwait or some other Near East area to meet Western Europe's 
requirements. "35Reporting to Macmillan on his talks in Washington Lloyd wrote: 
I am sure that you are considering anxiously the problem of Kuwait. One 
of the most reassuring features of my talks here has been the complete United 
States solidarity with us over the Gulf. They are assuming that we will take firm 
action to maintain our position in Kuwait. They themselves are disposed to act 
with similar resolution to the ARAMCO oil fields in the area of Dhahran, 
although the logistics are not worked out. They assume that we will also hold 
Bahrain and Qatar, come what may. They agree that at all costs these oil fields 
must be kept in Western hands.36 
The two military operations planned for Kuwait at this time were code named 
'Operation Turtle' and 'Operation Valiant. ' Operation Turtle consisted of one 
company landing by air in Kuwait within six hours-of mobilisation, followed within 
twenty-four hours by the leading battalion coming from Aden by air. Deployment of a 
second battalion would then be completed in approximately ninety-six hours and the 
third battalion would arrive within four to five days by sea. Operation Valiant 
presupposed opposition within Kuwait and was therefore based on an even quicker 
response with two battalions being airlifted into Kuwait within two hours of the first 
parachute drop. The third battalion would be in place within fifty-six hours having 
moved by air transport from Aden. The CoS remained concerned about the slow build-
up, as speed was rightly thought crucial. By stationing two more companies of infantry 
34 SDA: NSC: Memorandum of conference with the President, July 20, 1958. 
35 SDA: NSC: Memorandum for NSC, August 19, 1958. 
36 PRO: FO 3711132779: Kuwait: Legal Aspects of Intervention: Kuwait: Lloyd to Macmillan, July 
20,1958. 
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at Bahrain the timings for the two operations would be improved.37The improved 
tinlings for Turtle consisted of the second battalion being complete in Kuwait in thirty-
four hours and for Operation Valiant the third battalion would reach Kuwait within 
twenty-four hours. 
Once it had arrived the aim of any intervention force would be to gain control 
of the oil fields around Ahmedi, the refinery and port facilities at Minat el-Ahmadei 
along with the Political Agency in Kuwait town and the water supply at 
Abdulliyah.38The military requirements that were under constant review would 
continue to be refined over the next ten years even after they had been put into use 
following the request for military assistance in 1961 by Sheikh Abdullah. 
Military occupation of areas in the Middle East to prevent the spread of either 
Arab nationalism or Communism was felt to be only a short-term political option by 
the British government. It might allow an opportunity for the creation of a more 
favourable political situation, but in the long term accommodation with Arab 
nationalism was felt to be essential. This was summarised in a Cabinet paper: "In 
considering future policy, it was difficult to contemplate any other course than either 
coming to terms with the growth of Arab nationalism or turning the Persian Gulf 
States, for example, into territories dominated by ourselves through armed 
compulsion. "39 
Support from the ruler was helpful if not essential from the point of view of 
international law and world opinion, but the hold on legality that the British gained in 
this way was dependent on the survival in part of the ruling family in the face of rising 
Nasserite sentiment in the armed forces and among the people of Kuwait City. The 
pivotal question was whether "Abdullah Mubarak's confidence in the loyalty of his 
37 PRO: PREM III 2752: Middle East 1958-1959: Note on Middle East policy for Prime Minister, 
July 30, 1958. 
38 PRO: FO 3711 132779: Kuwait: Legal Aspects of Intervention: Kuwaiti report: Riches, July 24, 
1958. 
39 PRO: CAB 130/ 153: Policy in the Middle East, July 22, 1958. 
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forces is not as misplaced as was that of the Iraqi Ruling family and leaders. "40 A 
telegram was sent to the Embassy in Kuwait informing the Political Agent that in the 
event of a coup the highest priority would be the survival of one member of the al-
Sabah family who could then ask for immediate British military assistance.41 
A personal message was sent to Sheikh Abdullah on July 23, 1958, from the 
British government reassuring the returning ruler that Britain would fulfil all its 
obligations with the utmost resolution. The Political Agent was also given leave to 
inform Sheikh Abdullah of the military preparations that had been taken and the extent 
to which Britain and the United States were acting together over this Middle East 
crisis. 42Clearly, the British government was keen to try and dispel some of the 
insecurities that Sheikh Abdullah may have felt about the unfolding events. The 
reaffirmation of support for Kuwait from Britain was also to be expected considering 
the importance of the client relationship to Britain. Part of the reciprocal trade off 
between Britain and Kuwait was the guarantee of the security of Kuwait by Britain. 
While welcoming the British reassurance Sheikh Abdullah pressed his belief that a 
solution would only come through Britain reaching an accommodation with Nasser. 
Oil was clearly the overriding concern of Britain in the Gulf. What the 
documents clearly show is the extent to which the British government were prepared 
to go to secure their vital interests at a point when the United States government still 
regarded the Gulf as a British sphere of influence. Less than two years since the 
turmoil of the Suez disaster the Macmillan government was prepared to intervene in 
Kuwait if it fell under the control of the UAR or Iraq either willingly or unwillingly. 
Even though intervention against the wishes of the al-Sabah family would antagonise 
the rest of the Arab world and international opinion Lloyd was clear that Britain "must 
also accept the need, if things go wrong, ruthlessly to intervene, whoever it is has 
caused the trouble." 
40 PRO: FO 3711 132779: Kuwait: Legal Aspects of Intervention: Kuwaiti report: Riches, July 24, 
1958. 
41 PRO: PREM 111 2752: Middle East 1958-1959: Foreign Office to Kuwait, July 26, 1958. 
42 PRO: PREM 1112752: Middle East 1958-1959: Foreign Office to Kuwait, Lloyd, July 23, 1958. 
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It was rightly argued that a limited operation to secure the oil fields could only be 
tenable for a short period because of popular reaction in Kuwait City. Lloyd accepted 
the implication that, if reasonable conditions for the production and exportation of 
Kuwait oil was to be guaranteed, intervention would have to be on an extended basis 
with the object of controlling the whole of Kuwait and ruling it as a Crown 
Colony.43He went on to say in a note to the Prime Minster that intervention could have 
great benefits for Britain. It is ironic considering the events of August 1990 that the 
British Foreign Secretary should write about hypothetical British intervention in 
Kuwait in 1958 commenting that "the advantage of this action would be that we would 
get our hands fmnly on the Kuwait oil. "44British vital interests (the free supply of oil) 
came above any other consideration in the region. Kuwait would not be allowed to join 
the UAR and if necessary the British government was prepared to send in troops to 
stop them. Assuming that there could be no overflying of Israel, the U AR, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia, forces would initially have to be parachuted from Bahrain. 
Political tensions in the Gulf region were reduced by mid-August, partly 
because of the recognition of the new Iraqi regime by Britain and also by the decision 
of Sheikh Abdullah to resist the stationing of British troops in Kuwait.45By September 
it was agreed by the Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary that the period of 
notice required to implement Operation Valiant be extended to twelve days. Also 
twelve days notice would be given for Operation Turtle (on the understanding that if 
action was required more urgently consideration would be given to using the parachute 
battalion from Cyprus and overflying Israel). Troops could therefore be moved to 
other areas with two battalions returning to Kenya.46These troops could not be moved 
north of the air barrier that had developed because of the loss of the 
43 PRO: FO 3711132779: Kuwait: Legal Aspects of Intervention: Kuwait: Lloyd to Macmillan, July 
20, 1958. 
44 PRO: FO 3711132779: Kuwait: Legal Aspects of Intervention: Kuwait: Lloyd to Macmillan, July 
20, 1958. 
45 PRO: FO 3711 132786: Kuwait to Foreign Office, August 18, 1958. 
46 PRO: PREM 111 2752: Middle East 1959-1959: Extract from record of meeting between the 
Foreign Secretary and the Minister of Defence. 
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Suez base. Throughout the planning process it was clear that the British military 
position in the Gulf, post-Suez, was dependent upon the bases at Bahrain and Sharjah 
supported by the large base at Aden.47 
Another constraint on British military planning was sheer numbers. British 
military strength in the Gulf was easily exaggerated by the inclusion of forces stationed 
at Aden. It was misleading to count these troops because Aden had much broader 
military responsibilities than the Gulf. If these were excluded there were only around 
one thousand British troops in the Gulf area, predominantly in Oman, with twenty-six 
aircraft (twelve of which were combat aircraft).48Although British Forces Aden 
Protectorate (BF AP) was responsible for operational commitments in the Arabian 
Peninsula and British Somaliland it also had responsibilities for naval operations in the 
Gulf (and the Arabian Seas when the East Indies Station was closed), but not Gulf 
territories. In an emergency this situation was likely to change. 
Since the time of the Suez operation, Aden Colony has become a key point 
for the protection of British interests in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere south of 
the 'air barrier'. Whereas it was previously possible to reinforce Aden rapidly 
from the Mediterranean, it is now necessary to station large numbers of RAF 
and Army personnel in Aden.49 
British forces had been placed at a lower level of operational readiness towards the 
end of 1958 because of the reduction in tensions in the area, but concern about Iraqi 
intentions arose again in Kuwait a few months into 1959. The fear was over the threat 
of possible Communist subversive forces sponsored by Iraq, or overt military threats 
from Iraqi annour. Sheikh Abdullah now hinted that he was willing to countenance 
more military planning co-operation between Kuwait and Britain. Several authors 
report Sheikh Abdullah's proud claim that "no Kuwaiti leader since 1899 had 
pennitted a single British soldier to land on Kuwaiti soil for the purpose of defending 
47 Gal1agher, The Decline, p. 151 
48 PRO: FO 371/ 140056: British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain to Foreign Office, 
January 21,1959. 
49 PRO: FO 371/ 140056: British Forces in the Arabian Peninsula: Bahrain to Foreign Office, 
January 21,1959. 
127 
the shaikhdom."50However, British forces had been stationed in Kuwait during a short 
period in the inter-war years when units had supported Kuwaiti forces against Saudi 
tribal incursions. 51 Apart from this military co-operation had consisted in only the 
supply of arms and one or two technical officers, advisors and instructors. In April 
1959 there were two technical non-commissioned officers and one officer from Britain 
attached to the Kuwaiti army. The suggestion of moves towards joint military planning 
is therefore strong evidence of the concern that the Kuwaitis, who were deeply jealous 
of their internal independence, felt about the Iraqi threat. Yet again the al-Sabah family 
faced the age-old trade-off of internal autonomy against external security. 52 At this 
stage the military plans for intervention in Kuwait by British forces were operating on 
the assumption of four days' warning of any attack by Iraq on Kuwait. Apart from 
those outlined in Operation Turtle and Operation Valiant, the initial moves included 
the despatch of a Royal Navy frigate to Kuwait.53With the threat of an Iraqi armour 
the CoS considered the long term move of an armoured squadron from Cyprus or 
possibly Libya to the Gulf. A new plan was put into place on May 1, 1959, to 
supersede the contingency plans Valiant and Turtle. -
This plan, known as Triplex, was an intervention in Kuwait by four companies 
of infantry within forty eight hours of the request for help from Sheikh Abdullah. Two 
of the companies would come from Aden, one from Bahrain by Frigate and one from 
Sharjah by air. Concern was expressed by the CoS over this plan because it would 
mean that Aden and Bahrain would be weakened militarily at a crucial political 
moment. Also the company from Sharjah was soon to be removed, reducing the initial 
intervention to three companies. The plans for intervention were therefore put in a 
constant state of review. 
50 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, p. 100; Alani, Operation Vantage, pp. 197-200; Finnie, Shifting Lines, 
p.129. 
51 Glubb, War, p.198; See p. 55 of this thesis. 
52 Tetreault, "Autonomy", p. 566. 
53 PRO: DEFE 6/ 60: JP (59) Note 14, COS and IPS: Military Assistance to Support the Ruler of 
Kuwait, April 10, 1959. 
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The discussions of Sheikh Abdullah with the new Political Resident, Sir George 
Humphrey Middleton, were felt to signify a commitment to talks on military measures. 
This was a marked advance from the previous year when Sheikh Abdullah had refused 
to countenance any suggestions of this nature. Due to the increase in the threat 
environment Sheikh Abdullah was pursuing a Reinforcement objective in the client-
patron relationship with Britain. The security of the al-Sabah regime and maximum 
domestic autonomy within Kuwait were his two primary objectives. The problems 
facing the al-Sabah regime and the British with Iraq were similar in that they both 
desired friendlier relations with Iraq, but met with problems from the internal 
developments and external foreign policy of Iraq. Reassurance of British support was 
again sought by the Kuwaiti leader from the Political Resident, which was readily 
given, reinforcing the patron-client relationship and building on the bonds of 
Affectivi ty. 54 
The revolution in Iraq should have simplified the policy position for the British 
government, by allowing Britain to concentrate on what had anyway become its 
strongest concern in the Middle East without having to mollify a strategic ally in 
Baghdad. This opportunity was not really grasped, partly because of a lingering 
commitment to Iraq, motivated by fear of the spread of Communist influence and 
expounded through weapons sales. 
There was concern expressed by diplomats in the Gulf, and at all levels of the 
British policy process, that the proposed arms sale to Iraq would damage the progress 
that had been made with Sheikh Abdullah on security issues.55A request had been 
made by the Qassim regime for arms. The view of Sheikh Abdullah was that the new 
Iraqi regime was Communist and the argument that the arms sale would help try to 
curb Communist influence was void. Middleton rightly argued that it was difficult to 
justify British sales of military goods to a regime that was threatening a state under 
54 PRO: PREM 111 2752: Middle East 1958-1959: Bahrain to Foreign Office, Sir George Middleton, 
May 3, 1959; For an explanation of Reinforcement and Affectivity see p. 22 of this thesis. 
55 PRO: PREM 1112752: Middle East 1958-1959: Bahrain to Foreign Office, Sir George Middleton, 
May 3, 1959. 
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British protection. He did not accept that Canberras could be regarded as a defensive 
weapon and believed that if the British government went through with the deal Sheikh 
Abdullah could possibly tum to Nasser to guarantee the security of Kuwait. His fear 
was that the deal would be seen as an example of British duplicity and would only 
reinforce the suspicions of Sheikh Abdullah that Britain was no longer a trustworthy 
ally. This could have damaged two of the core characteristics of the Anglo-Kuwaiti 
patron-client relationship: first, its mutually beneficial aspects and second the affmity 
and loyalty characterised by Affectivity inherent in the relationship. The effect could 
have been to move Sheikh Abdullah from either a Maintenance or a Reinforcement 
objective to a Regulation or Accommodation objective. Middleton wrote: 
It has long been his suspicion [Sheikh Abdullah's] that we were ready to 
sacrifice the interests of Kuwait for the preservation of our investments in Iraq 
and the arms deal will reinforce him in this opinion ... 1 am also concerned about 
the effect on our military plans. The various exercises with which the MCC 
(persian GulO have been concerned have all been based on the possibility of 
aggression by Iraq against our vital oil interests in Kuwait. We are now 
apparently engaged in building up the military potential of our most likely 
enemy. This will, in any case, call for a reassessment of military plans after 
1960.56 
The subject came up for discussion in Cabinet. Iraq had made requests for the 
supply of Centurion tanks and Canberra aircraft. The general feeling in the Cabinet was 
that if the arms were supplied this would strengthen the hand of Qassim and reduce the 
spread of Communism in Iraq. Moreover, if they refused to supply weapons the Iraqi 
government could easily obtain them from the Soviet block and this would thus 
strengthen the hands of the Communists in Iraq. Consultations had been made with the 
governments of the United States, Canada, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, all of whom 
agreed that the arms should be supplied. 57 
The danger of Soviet penetration of Iraq mounted following a revolt in Mosul 
In which Nasser was clearly implicated.58This damaged the position of the pro-
56 PRO: PREM 1 II 2752: Middle East 1958-1959: Bahrain to Foreign Office, Sir George Middleton, 
May 3, 1959. 
57 PRO: CAB C.C (59) 22: Middle East: Iraq, April 9, 1959. 
58 Marr, The Modem History, pp. 162-163. 
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Nasserites and strengthened the Communists in Iraq. For a while the Communists were 
able to terrorise the country with government authority breaking down.59The decision 
of the British government to supply arms was postponed for a few weeks until the 
picture in Iraq was clearer. 
The Cabinet decided that the Iraq arms deal should go ahead. Problems were 
anticipated from Nasser over such a move. He was likely to increase his anti-British 
propaganda and this would reduce the chance of a rapprochement, however unlikely, 
between Egypt and Britain. But it was felt that whether the deal upset the Egyptians or 
not there was little realistic chance of friendly relations being established with Egypt 
and the only benefit could come to the British from feeding the traditional Cairo-
Baghdad antagonism. Perhaps more important to the Macmillan government were the 
domestic political benefits. The deal would allow the continued production of 
Canberras in Britain and would also help deter the Iraqis from withdrawing their 
sterling balances. If this was the decisive factor, Macmillan was to be disappointed. 
Iraq withdrew from the sterling area on June 22 -23, 1959, despite the arms sale. 
59 PRO: FO 371/ 149839: Annual Report for Iraq: Baghdad to Foreign Office, January 1, 1960: 
Trevelyan. 
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4.3.2 The changing status of Kuwait: diplomatic representation 
A meeting was arranged between Sheikh Abdullah and the Political Agent, 
Aubery Halford, upon the return of the Sheikh to Kuwait in late July 1958. Sheikh 
Abdullah put forward the notion of Kuwaiti adherence to the Arab League. His 
argument was that just as the British government had assented to the notion of Kuwait 
joining the Arab Union they could now agree with them joining the Arab League. He 
believed that this would afford Kuwait greater security by keeping it more in touch 
with the Arab world. Britain could no longer be expected to intervene in the problems 
of Kuwait and the other Arab states although he still wished for the agreements 
between Kuwait and Britain to remain unchanged. Sheikh Abdullah had made it clear 
that he did not approve of foreign consulates in Kuwait even though he was coming 
under pressure from the governments of Iraq and Lebanon to accept them. The 
problem was that allowing one or two might result in a flood of applicants. 
Membership of the Arab League was a possible solution to this problem. The move 
would also gain the regime credit from public opinion at home and hostile Arab 
opinion abroad.60'fhis suggestion represented an important change in the Anglo-
Kuwaiti patron-client relationship and was therefore referred to the highest level of the 
British policy process, discussion between the Prime Minister and the Foreign 
Secretary. 
Concern was expressed by Halford that the adherence of Kuwait to the Arab 
League would be seen by many people in the Middle East as Kuwait joining the UAR, 
and that this move would be claimed as another victory for Nasser on Cairo Radio. He 
believed that the proposal was to be expected and that the move was linked to a 
heightened awareness of the vulnerability of Kuwait. Halford wrote: 
I can only guess that after his talk with the Political Resident when, in 
effect, he was forced to acknowledge his ultimate reliance in Her Majesty's 
Government he felt he must find some expedient whereby he could in public 
60 PRO: FO 371/ 132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: Kuwait to Foreign Office, July 31, 1958, 
3.30p.m. 
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reconcile this relationship with the new forces of Arab nationalism at work 
around him.61 
The proposal came from the need of Sheikh Abdullah to bolster the security of 
Kuwait. The idea of joining the League came from a desire to be able to defend Kuwait 
from external forces, especially Iraqi aggression, by some means other than calling on 
the British to send in troops to Kuwait. The League would deter Iraqi aggression by 
political rather than military means. The move would also reiterate the commitment of 
Sheikh Abdullah to Arab unity. Kuwaiti membership of the league would weaken the 
power that Britain had in the patron-client relationship with Kuwait. It was recognised 
in Whitehall that this influence might be reduced to the level where the only role that 
Britain would have in the patron-client relationship would be through its military 
guarantee of the independence of Kuwait. It was also believed that Nasser would seek 
to acquire a large share of the petrol dollars of Kuwait if it joined the League. He 
would then be expected to undermine and destroy the Gulf regimes, such as Kuwait, 
that had joined the League. It was therefore deemed essential by the Foreign Office 
that in the event of Kuwait allowing diplomatic representation, Britain should urge the 
Kuwaiti government to accept as many Western and non-aligned diplomatic missions 
as possible to counter any dangerous influences from Egypt or Iraq.62Britain's 
perspective on the issue turned on the repercussions that it would have on oil and 
sterling deposits, and the expectation that rather than adding to the security of Kuwait 
the League could undermine it. That the League had offered no protection to Iraq, 
Jordan or the Lebanon, during the Middle East crisis of 1958 was testament to this 
VIew. 
61 PRO: FO 3711 132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: Kuwait to Foreign Office, July 31, 1958, 
5.41 p.m. 
62 PRO: FO 3711 132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: Secret Memorandum on Kuwait, August, 
1958. 
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The Foreign Office began to consider various other proposals that could be 
developed with Sheikh Abdullah. These included the establishment of Kuwaiti missions 
to both Arab and non-Arab countries, membership of the United Nations with a re-
negotiation of the Exclusive Agreement of 1899, a treaty of alliance between Britain 
and Kuwait on equal tenns, or the incorporation of a third party in the guaranteeing of 
the integrity of Kuwait. The option of Britain negotiating for Kuwait a treaty with Iraq 
covering the frontier and trade was put forward. These proposals were put to Sheikh 
Abdullah but on the understanding that the British government felt that the present 
relationship with Kuwait did not need changing and that they would stick by their 
obligations to Kuwait come what may.63Reiteration was made of the British view that 
the safety and security of Kuwait ultimately still depended on their ability to deploy 
armed forces quickly to defend Kuwait. 
In August 1958 the State Department of the United States informed the 
Foreign Office that they had heard of the proposal of Sheikh Abdullah to join the 
League and believed he wanted to make some move to show that he supported closer 
inter-Arab ties. The American position was that a closer tie with Iraq through 
demarcation of the frontier might occupy his mind and distract him from joining up 
with Nasser. They also held the mistaken view that a reconciliation could still be 
reached between Kuwait and Iraq.64The British scepticism over the League centred on 
the influence of Egypt and Nasser within it. They were concerned that if the Kuwaiti 
government was seeking diplomatic ties to increase its security then these links should 
63 PRO: FO 3711132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: Report on Kuwait, August 1958. 
64 PRO: FO 3711132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: Notes of conversation between Mr. Burdett 
of the American embassy and Riches of the Foreign Office, August 5, 1958. 
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be as wide as possible and most importantly to include as many Western or pro-
Western missions as possible. 
The al-Sabah family actually had no intention of joining up with Nasser and 
giving up any of their autonomy. Yet the British and American government documents 
show that both Washington and London believed that joining the Arab League was 
simply union with Nasser and the U AR. According to the legal counsel of the Foreign 
Office there was nothing to stop Kuwait joining the League. The agreements between 
Britain and Kuwait (unlike those with Bahrain) did not forbid the Kuwaitis from 
entering into a treaty obligation with another State. The problem came in the 'conduct' 
of relations, currently vested in Britain, and over the question of whether Kuwait could 
remain under the protection of Britain if it joined the League. Protection in the military. 
sense presented problems. Membership of the League would allow Kuwait to appeal to 
the Council under Article six of the Covenant for protection against other 
states. 65 Adherence to the Arab League did not automatically mean the participation of 
a member in the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation that came under 
the Arab League Council. In theory Kuwait could still remain under British protection. 
The line adopted by the British government was to pitch for a postponement of 
any quick decision and to try to appeal to the cautious tendencies of Sheikh 
Abdullah.66Surprisingly, when the subject was next broached with Sheikh Abdullah, by 
Halford, he backtracked, indicating that it was neither a formal proposal nor an opinion 
but rather a thought for discussion. Halford did not therefore discuss with him the 
alternatives to the League proposed by the Foreign Office. Sheikh Abdullah indicated 
65 PRO: FO 3711 132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: legal points by J.L. Simpson, August 6, 
1958. 
66 PRO: FO 3711 132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: Burrows to Lloyd, August 2, 1958. 
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that his reason for mentioning the Arab League had been the attitude of the British 
government over the Iraqi negotiations on the Arab Union, and his proposal was as 
much a test of the response of the British government as an indication of his feelings 
over that issue.670ne important side effect of this request or "thought" had been to 
prompt the British government to consider the likely developments of the international 
position of Kuwait in the future. Burrows accepted that British jurisdiction in Kuwait 
was bound to end at some time. He also made mention of the view widely held in the 
region that future oil supplies would be safer if Anglo-Kuwaiti relations were placed on 
a less peculiar footing. 68Sheikh Abdullah requested more confidence in his abilities and 
less jittery concern in London. 
67 PRO: FO 3711132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: Burrows to Lloyd, August 18, 1958. 
68 PRO: FO 3711132786: Kuwait and the Arab League, Burrows to Lloyd, August 2, 1958. 
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Burrows in a report to the Foreign Office wrote: 
I know that Kuwait is vitally important to us, but it would be much better 
if we did not say so quite so often. It would also be better if we did not so often 
suggest that something terrible was just going to happen with regard to it. With 
the example of Iraq before us it is always possible that something terrible will 
happen, but neither we nor the Ruler can at present detect an imminent danger 
and public alarmism on our part is only likely to bring on the thing we fear by 
exciting political activity in Kuwait to greater heights than at present.69 
The question became one for the back burner as Sheikh Abdullah left Kuwait 
for another holiday towards the end of August and was not reconsidered until late 
September, with a clarification of the relationship between Kuwait and Britain,700ver 
certain issues it was accepted in Whitehall that the active participation of Sheikh 
Abdullah in the conduct of the foreign relations of Kuwait would be of mutual benefit 
to both Britain and Kuwait. Essentially the relationship remained fundamentally the 
same with the al-Sabah regime shouldering some of the responsibilities of Kuwait in 
the Arab world. The British policy of supporting and encouraging the desire of Sheikh 
Abdullah for friendlier relations with neighbouring Arab states was continued. This 
comprised supporting Kuwait in joining and taking a full part in various international 
bodies including those associated with: marine, postal services, telephones, 
telecommunications and quarantine. The first steps in this process would come with 
the full adherence of Kuwait to the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU),7IAlthough the decision had been taken to allow Kuwait to join the ITU, at this 
stage, the Foreign Office had not decided whether Kuwait should join these 
international organisations as a "Protected State of the UK, or independently. "72 
Remarks made by Sheikh Mubarak about the League on his visit to Cairo at the 
end of September upset the British government. Sheikh Abdullah denied any 
knowledge of what Sheikh Mubarak had said and also denied having sent a letter to the 
Secretary General of the Arab League. He reiterated his decision not to join the 
69 PRO: FO 3711132786: Kuwait and the Arab League: Burrows to Hayter, August 18, 1958. 
70 PRO: FO 3711 132779: Kuwait: Kuwait to Foreign Office, August 24, 1958. 
71 PRO: FO 3711 132547: Memorandum for the Secretariat: Government of Kuwait, September 30, 
1958; For details on the ITU see p. 108 of this thesis. 
72 PRO: FO 3711 132547: Kuwait Letter of Assurance, October 21, 1958. 
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League. The Arab Press made much of this incident suggesting that Kuwait was on the 
verge of joining the League and renouncing her special relationship with Britain. Any 
British move therefore to support Kuwaiti application for full membership of the lTV 
and other international bodies would now be seen as a capitulation to pressures from 
the DAR. Macmillan was concerned over these developments. Commenting on the 
membership of Kuwait to the lTV he wrote: 
It involves our admitting implicitly and, if necessary, explicitly that 
Kuwait is fully responsible for the conduct of its international relations; and 
although such a statement merely confirms what is already the case, it will 
undoubtedly be seized upon by popular opinion throughout the Arab World as 
an indication that we are gradually yielding to the pressure of the UAR.?3 
The general conservatism of the Gulf Sheikhs enabled the British to act slowly 
or not at all on many issues. The international position of Kuwait was one such issue 
and could be tackled over time. It was not until January 1959 that the subject once 
more came up between Kuwait and Britain. Discussion now centred upon the question 
of consulates in Kuwait. The Exclusive Agreement of 1899 specifically forbade the 
admission of foreign consuls without the permission of the British governmentJ4 
Sheikh Abdullah was now of the opinion that Arab consuls in Kuwait would be 
inescapable in the long run and that the independent status of Kuwait, reiterated in the 
letter of assurance from Britain, allowed him to make his own decision on this 
issue.75Halford, who recognised the need to rebuild the confidence of the al-Sabah 
regime in the British, pressed for a clear and quick response from Whitehall. Sheikh 
Abdullah seemed determined to make some sort of gesture to Arab nationalism, but 
the problem for the Foreign Office was to find an outlet for this that did not damage 
the patron-client relationship and the security of Kuwait. The danger with consulates 
was that they could be used by foreign powers as bases for subversion, propaganda 
and dissent. The desire for an Arab gesture had to be tempered with the need for 
73 PRO: PREM 111 2752: Kuwait's International Relations: MacmiJIan, October 4, 1958. 
74 See p. 48 of this thesis. 
75 PRO: PREM 1112752: Kuwait's International Relations: Halford to Foreign Office, January 5, 
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internal security. Sheikh Abdullah again tentatively suggested the adherence of Kuwait 
to the Arab League as perhaps the solution. The Foreign Office was sympathetic to 
this suggestion as it was clear that Sheikh Abdullah would eventually decide to accept 
Arab consuls and would sooner or later decide to join the Arab League. Such 
developments, it was also acknowledged by the Foreign Office, could not be stopped 
without an unacceptable amount of damage to the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship.76 
Macmillan sent a personal message to Sheikh Abdullah thanking him for his 
frank views and asking for some time to consult with Lloyd who was at this time in 
hospital. He wrote: 
Meanwhile I should like you to know that I entirely understand your 
views about the logic of events and the requirements of Kuwait's interests. I have 
no doubt that the time has come to show flexibility in adapting the long-standing 
relationship between our two states to changed circumstances, but I am 
confident that whatever changes may occur it will be possible to preserve the 
fundamental features of that relationship.77 
Macmillan clearly understood that more emphasis was being placed by Kuwait 
on the goal of greater autonomy yet his government desired that the fundamental 
features of the patron-client relationship should remain in place. The policy of Sheikh 
Abdullah was quite subtle. He was facing the traditional problem for the al-Sabah 
family of reconciling internal autonomy and external security. The Anglo-Kuwaiti 
relationship certainly needed to evolve, but in a way that kept these two vital 
objectives balanced. Some of the suggestions put forward by Sheikh Abdullah were as 
much ploys to test the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship and the British position as serious 
policy moves. 
Interestingly, Middleton was convinced that Sheikh Abdullah was still against 
the idea of foreign consuls as the British. He believed that Arab consuls once in Kuwait 
would place tremendous pressure on Kuwait to join the Arab League. Alternatively if 
Kuwait were to join the League, either as an associate member or a full member, the 
76 PRO: PREM 1112752: Kuwait's International Relations: Macmillan to Halford, January 6, 1959. 
77 PRO: PREM 1112752: Kuwait's International Relations: Macmillan to Ruler, January 6, 1959. 
139 
pressure nlight well be removed for it to take consuls.78In Kuwait at this point, apart 
from the Political Agent, there was only an American Consul. His exequatur was 
issued by the Queen and his dealings with the government of Kuwait, apart from on 
routine matters, were communicated through the Political Agent. There were also 
Saudi and Pakistani trade agents operating in Kuwait. 
Characteristically, Sheikh Abdullah decided to wait and see the outcome of 
developments in the region before choosing either consulates or the Arab League. The 
issue came before the British Cabinet in late January 1959. It was decided that the 
Foreign Secretary should be invited to instruct the Political Resident, Middleton, to tell 
Sheikh Abdullah that the British government, while preferring no change to the Anglo-
Kuwaiti relationship, acknowledged his need to make a gesture to the domestic and 
regional popUlace. The Cabinet decided that this should take the form of the accession 
of Kuwait to the League, not the establishment of consulates in Kuwait,79 
The international status of Kuwait in line with the traditions of the patron-client 
relationship and Kuwaiti history was changing gradually. The major change was in 
Kuwait's move from a protected to an independent state. Although no fonnal revision 
of the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship had been made at this time, Kuwaiti membership of 
international organisations was having a fundamental if gradual effect on the 
international position of Kuwait. These included institutions dealing with shipping, 
telecommunications, postal services and civil aviation. Together, they brought the 
Kuwaiti government into the international system. Part of the reason for Kuwait 
joining these international organisations had indeed been to give meaning and function 
to Kuwaiti independence. Keohane persuasively argues that: "A major function of 
international organizations - perceived by small and middle powers - is to allow these 
78 PRO: PREM 1112752: Kuwait's International Relations: Middleton to Foreign Office, January 11, 
1959. 
79 PRO: CAB 129/963(7): Middle East: Kuwait, January 29, 1959. 
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states acting collectively to help shape developing international attitudes, dogmas, and 
codes of proper behavior. "80 
In April 1959 a tanker was due to be delivered from Japan. This was the first 
large ocean going vessel purchased by the newly formed Kuwait Tanker Company. 
The ship would be registered in Kuwait and fly a Kuwaiti flag. The Kuwaiti 
government with the assistance of the British was acceding to the various maritime 
organisations and conventions. This included membership of the International Safety of 
Life at Sea and Load Line Conventions. Kuwait with the full co-operation of Britain 
joined this convention as an independent state. Membership was not extended to 
Kuwait as a territory for whose international relations Britain was responsible. The 
British government also agreed to support the full application of Kuwait to the ITU. 
Full membership of the ITU was only appropriate if the state applying was fully 
independent.81 The local subsidiary of Cable and Wireless had been taken over by the 
Kuwaiti government on January 31, 1956. The application for membership of the ITU 
formed part of the desire of the Kuwaiti government to express its independence. 
Britain had fallen back on the role of agent rather than controller of the foreign 
relations of Kuwait and even this position was under pressure. 
The British Postal Agency in Kuwait was taken over by the Kuwaiti 
government on February 1, 1959. Kuwait issued its own stamps to mark the occasion 
and put in an application for membership of the Universal Postal Union (UPU). 
Admission for new members had historically been restricted to 'sovereign countries'. 
Kuwait was following the same route as it had done for the ITU. 
80 Robert O. Keohane, "Li1Iiputians' Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics", International 
Organisation 23 (1969), 297. 
8 t See p. 108 of this thesis. 
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For International Civil Aviation purposes Kuwait, like the other Gulf 
Sheikhdoms, was considered a British territory and formed part of a British system 
which was organised for the purpose of international bargaining over air traffic rights. 
A confidential agreement had been signed in 1956 in which Sheikh Abdullah had 
agreed to Britain being responsible for negotiation of traffic rights after consultation 
with him. Kuwaiti Airways was at this time associated with BOAC and as long as this 
association proved convenient and Kuwaiti interests were safeguarded by Britain the 
agreement seemed set to continue. Under the Chicago Convention of 1944 Kuwait was 
regarded as a 'protected state'. 
Kuwait was therefore regarded as an independent state in some international 
bodies while for others it was still a protected state. Kuwait had associate status in 
UNESCO, because this arrangement was made before the British decision on the 
membership of Kuwait to the ITU. However special arrangements were made for 
Kuwait to conduct its own aid program directly with-UNESCO.82 
The dominating theme for Kuwait and the al-Sabah family, from the Iraqi 
revolution through to the intervention of British troops in 1961, was the 
transformation of the internal structures of Kuwait to meet the developments that had 
resulted from the changes in its external environment. Internal autonomy and external 
security still remained the dominating concerns in the policy of Sheikh Abdullah. The 
Political Agent, Richmond, put this another way in his annual report on Kuwait. He 
eloquently wrote: 
The problem facing Kuwait's Rulers has always been how to preserve an 
independent existence among more powerful neighbours ... and the rulers of 
Kuwait have been faced in recent years with their old problem in a more 
complex form: how to reconcile Kuwait's independence with the new and 
82 PRO: PREM 1112752: Kuwaitis International Relations: Report on Kuwait, March 23, 1959. 
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powerful emotion of Arab Unity and how to adapt their absolute rule to the new 
conditions and a more sophisticated population.83 
The al-Sabah family for all this internal pressure for change never faced an 
effective internal challenge to their power in this period. The wealth derived from oil 
made Kuwaitis poor revolutionaries. The only exception to this was in February 1959 
when the Kuwaiti Social Clubs, the Social Affairs and the Educational Departments 
got together and organised a celebration of the anniversary of the UAR formed on 
February 1, 1958. Twenty thousand people attended the nationalist celebrations in 
which the speaker Jassim Qatami called for "the Sabah to yield power or have it taken 
from them."84The al-Sabah family reacted with traditional repression and Clubs of a 
pan-Arabist persuasion were dissolved while some of the press were suppressed. 
Kuwait continued on its path towards becoming a modern state throughout 
1959 and 1960. An important element in this development was the reforming of the 
judiciary and the law. Judge Sanhoury from Britain arrived in Kuwait in October 1959 
and quickly set about revising the law and the jUdiciary. His expertise ensured that 
achievements were made quickly in this area. By the end of 1960 a substantial amount 
of law had been enacted into Kuwait. This included criminal legislation, commercial 
law, civil and commercial procedure rules, health legislation, budget law, laws setting 
up currency board, a reformed public works department and a municipal council. The 
budget law and the new civil service establishment were produced by Sheikh Jabir al 
Ahmad. His reforming drive had set up the structure of a modern governmental 
machine. 
Change in the areas of new international commitments, domestic legislation and 
reform continued at a rapid pace. The British government continued to assist Kuwait in 
the development of what Richmond termed "her international personality. 11851n March 
1960 a spokesman on behalf of the British government testified, at a preparatory 
83 PRO: FO 3711148896: Kuwait: Annual Report for 1959, January 4, 1960: Richmond to 
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meeting of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation Conference, 
that "Kuwait was fully responsible for the conduct of her international relations. "86By 
the end of 1960 Kuwait had gained full membership of the ITU, the Universal Postal 
Union, the W orId Health Organisation, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organisation, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the Special Fund of the 
United Nations, and the United National Educational and Cultural Organisation. 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship blossomed from late 1958 
onwards. The lack of any serious disagreements between the two states and the close 
co-operation in international affairs benefited from and added to the dyadic bond. The 
growing strength of this relationship and the return of confidence of the al-Sabah in the 
British was evident to Richmond. He wrote in his report for 1960 that the "reward [for 
the British government] has been a year free from any serious disagreement with 
Kuwait, a close co-operation in international affairs and even more tendency to consult 
us in internal matters from which in the past the Kuwaitis have tended to exclude this 
Agency as far as possible. "87The relationship was once more on a setting characterised 
by affmity and Affectivity. The events of 1961 would see a further reinforcement of 
these two characteristics. 
4.3.3 Oil and OPEC 
In the short term the basic structure of the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client 
relationship was not changed by oil, but as Jill Crystal writes "it raised the stakes by 
creating both greater constraints and greater opportunities. "880il had reinforced the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship throughout this period. The free flow of 
Kuwaiti oil at reasonable prices had been part of the reciprocal exchange of resources 
in the patron-client relationship. The money generated from this oil for Britain and 
86 PRO: FO 3711156823: Kuwait: Annual Report for Kuwait 1960, January 5, 1961: Richmond to 
Middleton. 
87 PRO: FO 3711156823: Kuwait: Annual Report for Kuwait 1960, January 5, 1961: Richmond to 
Middleton. 
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Kuwait along with the strategic importance of the oil itself had become the raison 
d'etre for Britain being in the region. British interest in Kuwait had risen rapidly in line 
with the increase in its oil production. Clear instructions on Kuwait had been sent out 
in 1953 to the Political Resident, Burrows. The direction of British policy towards 
Kuwait was shaped over the next few years by the underlying facts noted in these 
instructions. 
During the last three years Kuwait has become of prime importance to 
the United Kingdom and the sterling area as a whole. It is now a major source of 
oil supplies and an important element in our balance of payments ... HMG can no 
longer afford to confine themselves to the role authorised by the treaties in all 
matters which affect the political and economic stability of Kuwait or which may 
affect the interests of the United Kingdom in the widest sense. The new 
conception of the role of HMG in regard to Kuwait entails a change in the nature 
of the advice to be tendered to the Ruler and in the channels through which that 
advice is communicated.89 
The nationalisation crisis of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) of 1951-
1953 had forced British oil companies to expand their operations in other areas. 
Kuwait had become the main source of oil for Britain and by the time of the Suez crisis 
in 1956 fifty percent of British petroleum crude supplies came from Kuwait and over 
eighty percent from the Gulf area.90 
British petroleum imports from Iran up to the crisis in Iran of 1951-53 had 
consisted of refined petroleum products developed at the Abadan refinery. These 
imports were replaced by non-refined crude oil. This gave the opportunity to the oil 
companies to change their refinery policy. Frank Brenchley writes that "Western 
governments, for balance of payments and employment reasons, were pressing for 
refineries to be built in their [own] countries. The companies, and especially AIOC, 
were the more inclined to yield to this pressure when they had seen the difficulties 
caused, not by the loss of Iranian oil but by the loss of the Abadan Refinery."9IThe 
balance of power between the producers and the buying states continued to change 
89 PRO: FO 3711104270: Kuwait: Foreign Office Minutes, July 17, 1953: Ross to Burrows. 
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with refineries being built outside the region, because crude oil was less marketable 
than petroleum products and so reduced the bargaining strength of the producers. 
During this period discovery of oil in marketable quantities was made in 
Nigeria, Algeria and Libya. These discoveries had three affects on the politics of oil. 
First, these oil finds along with the development of other known supplies in the Soviet 
Union and Canada increased the supply of oil. Second, the new finds, especially in 
North Africa, gave the oil companies another option to Gulf oil and reduced some of 
the Western reliance on this area. Third, supplies from the new producer states were 
less dependent upon transit facilities across politically volatile areas, such as the Suez 
Canal, to get to the markets of Europe. Libya was to become an important supplier of 
crude oil to Britain in the later 1960s and early 1970s. 
For all the changes in refinery policy and the increase in production outside the 
Middle East, Europe was still dependent upon oil from the Gulf. A United States 
government report, on the dependence of Europe on Middle East petroleum, estimated 
that by 1960 over seventy percent of the oil needs of Europe would be met by this 
area. 
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Table 4.1 shows the primary sources of the oil supplies of Europe under normal 
conditions and points to the significance of the Middle East as a source of supply. 
Figures for 1955 are used because those for 1956 and 1957 were distorted by the Suez 
Crisis. 
TABLE 4.1 
THE SUPPLY OF OIL TO EUROPE 
Year 1955 1960 1965 
Thousand barrels per day Actual Estimated Estimated 
Total Nonnal Demand 2368 3750 4800 
Indigenous 178 300 350 
Imports- Middle East 1730 2675 3150 
North Africa (principally Algeria) 
- 100 400 
West Africa - 50 100 
United States 350 450 450 
Other Western Hemisphere 350 450 450 
Communist Block 60 200 300 
SOURCE: Adapted from: SDA: MILL 207: Free Europe's Dependence on Middle 
East Petroleum, January 1959, p. 2. 
Comparing oil consumption with consumption of other fuels shows that oil 
made up less than a third of the total energy sources used. Coal and Lignite still 
remained the primary energy source for Europe and could be expanded in times of 
emergency. Table 4.2 presents a breakdown of the relative importance of demand for 
pnmary energy of Europe, at this time, also estimated by the United States 
government. 
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Figure 4.1 shows the actual figures for Crude oil into the European Community 
from 1955 to 1965 (West Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg). 
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It is clear from Figure 4.1 that Western Europe remained heavily dependent on oil 
from the Gulf region, although with large increase of imports between 1960 and 1965 
there was a relative decline in dependency on this area. 
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TABLE 4.2 
THE ENERGY SOURCES OF EUROPE: TOTAL CONSUMPTION 
OF PRIMARY ENERGY IN EUROPE 
Year 1955 1960 1965 
Percentage Actual Estimated Estimated 
Coal and Lignite 70.50/0 62.3% 56.0% 
Hydro 7.4% 8.1% 8.6% 
Natural Gas 0.70/0 1.1% 1.3% 
Oil 21.4% 28.5% 32.3% 
Atomic Ener~y - - 1.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
SOURCE: Adapted from: SDA: MILL 207: Free Europe's Dependence on Middle 
East Petroleum, January 1959, p.1. 
The extent of European dependence on oil from the Middle East is shown more 
clearly when the percentage of oil in the total consumption of primary energy is 
reviewed. In a crisis in the Middle East a number of scenarios could apply. If the Suez 
Canal were to be closed and the oil pipelines to the eastern Mediterranean were to be 
shut down, Europe could still operate. This could be achieved by re-routing the oil in 
tankers around the Cape of Good Hope. This had been done during the Suez crisis of 
1956 and would be again during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. With strict 
rationing of petrol in Britain and the export of emergency supplies from the Americas 
(America, Canada, the Caribbean and Venezuela), Europe dealt with these crises, 
admittedly at high [mancial cost. This scenario assumed that North African and 
Communist block supplies would still remain available. The second scenario would 
entail a curtailment of all Middle East oil and Communist block supplies. In this case 
with all the emergency measures in place 'Free Europe' would be operating in 1960 
with sixty-nine percent and in 1965 with fifty-nine percent of its oil requirements.92 
The United States and Britain were following a third possible scenario in the 
formulation of their respective Gulf policies. This entailed the continued access of at 
92 SDA: Mill 207: Free Europe's Dependence on Middle East Petroleum, January 1959, p. 4. 
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least one main supplier of oil with all other oil cut off: from North Africa, the 
Communist block and the Middle East. In the case of the United States this would be 
either Iran or Saudi Arabia and for Britain it would be Kuwait. This third scenario 
would only bring a ten percent reduction in oil supplies for 'Free Europe'. 
The cost of any of these scenarios would have been felt most by Britain and 
then by France. Any oil crisis involving Middle East oil would entail large dollar 
expenditures and would therefore be very damaging to the British economy. This 
would be because of the switch from cheaper Middle East oil that could be paid for 
partly in sterling to North American oil paid for wholly in dollars. 
The British therefore had most to fear from any disruption of Middle East oil 
supplies. An energy crisis would also involve the loss of petro-sterling, and an outflow 
of dollars and gold leading to a resultant currency crisis. This took place during the 
Suez crisis, when it had been the currency problems that had fatally wounded the Eden 
government. 93 
Table 4.3 shows the emergency export capabilities, estimated by the United 
States government, of the various Middle East countries through the Gulf. 
TABLE 4.3 
ESTIMATED EMERGENCY EXPORT CAPABILITIES OF OIL 
EXPORTING STATES IN THE GULF REGION 
Year 1960 1960 1965 1965 
Thousand barrels Percentage of the Thousand barrels Percentage of the 
per day estimated whole per day estimated whole 
Iran 1000 21.3% 1700 25.8% 
Iraq 300 6.4% 500 7.6% 
Kuwait 1800 28.3% 2300 34.8% 
Saudi Arabia 1300 27.6% 1500 22.7% 
Other 300 6.4% 600 9.1% 
Total 4700 100% 6600 100% 
SOURCE: Adapted from: SDA: Mill 207: Free Europe's Dependence on Middle East 
Petroleum, January 1959, pp. 4-5. 
93 Kyle, Suez, p. 500. 
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It was estimated at the time that the level of nonnal exports through the Gulf 
would reach 2,855,000 barrels per day in 1960 and 3,310,000 barrels per day in 1965. 
From Table 4.3 clearly in a time of emergency as long as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
continued production and increased it to the maximum level the nonnal exports from 
the Gulf could be maintained. For instance in 1960 the combined projected emergency 
export capabilities of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait was put at 3,100,000 barrels per day, 
while the estimated level of exports through the Gulf was 2,855,000 barrels per day. 
Similarly in 1965 the combined projected emergency export level of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia was expected to be 3,800,000 per day while the estimated normal level of 
exports through the Gulf was 3,310,000 barrels per day. Due to the scale of 
production that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia could attain in an emergency the strategic 
security of oil production could be maintained by the West by protecting just Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia. The added advantage to Britain of Kuwait making up any of the 
shortfalls in an emergency was that the oil would be paid for in sterling. 
The importance of Kuwaiti oil to Britain and the importance of oil to the 
Kuwaiti economy ensured that a strong bond developed between the producer, the 
host and the consumer of this oil (see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.7). The lack of skilled 
technical personnel in Kuwait meant that the Kuwaiti economy and the Kuwaiti 
government would remain dependent for some time on the Western oil companies 
operating in Kuwait. This dependence was a vital reinforcing element in the Anglo-
Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. Figure 4.7 shows the importance of oil revenue to 
the total income of the Kuwaiti government between 1956-1963. By 1960 oil 
accounted for around eighty percent of government revenue. Investment income, the 
majority of which came from the London money markets and the Kuwaiti investment 
board, was also an important element in this government income. Although it would 
not have been difficult to market Kuwaiti oil to other consumers on the international 
oil market this could only have been achieved with the support of the oil companies in 
Kuwait. 
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Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 clearly show the vital importance of Gulf oil in 
general and Kuwaiti oil in particular to the British economy. Throughout the height of 
the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship in the late 1950s and early 1960s a large 
percentage of British oil came from Kuwait and the Gulf. The British government and 
the oil companies from the mid-1950s onwards were attempting to reduce Britain's 
dependence on Kuwaiti and Gulf oil for other sources of oil as can be seen from Figure 
4.2 and Figure 4.3. The increase in British dependence on Kuwait oil in 1960 after five 
years of decline was as a result of the Iraqi revolution and the resulting problems 
between the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Petroleum Company. 
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Figure 4.3 
Percentage Import of Crude Petroleum from Gulf Region 
into United Kingdom as Percentage of Total UK Imports 
of Crude; 1952-1974 
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Figure 4.4 
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Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show that Kuwait clearly outstripped Iraq in the production 
of oil. The graphs also show that economically Kuwait was a very tempting prize to 
Iraq, both as a source of government income and as an export earner. Figure 4.6 
indicates the actual financial prize that Kuwait represented to Iraq at 1989 prices. 
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Figure 4.7 
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Two observations can be made about the importance of oil to the Kuwaiti 
economy. First, that whatever the political alignment or relationship Kuwait had with 
the outside world it would still be massively dependent upon the sale of its oil. This is 
clearly shown in Figure 4.7. Therefore the consumers of the oil could be quite 
confident that whatever the regime in Kuwait the oil would still be sold to them. 
Second, the rationale of British security guarantees to Kuwait, which were made to 
ensure the cheap and uninterrupted supply of oil (Figure 4.8 shows that Kuwaiti oil 
was cheaper than the average crude imported into Britain), were based on sound logic. 
With control of Kuwait's oil as well as its own, Iraq would have had a big enough 
market share to cause short-term disruption of a very destabilising kind either through 
price manipulation, or by withholding supplies, or by diverting supplies. Also its 
position with the oil companies would have been much stronger. 
Unfortunately, some of the key files on British oil policy at this time have 
remained closed from the Public Records Office. However, it would probably be 
correct to surmise that the British government was deliberately trying to reduce its 
dependence on Kuwaiti oil in the late 1950s because its control in the patron-client 
relationship was being reduced. This assumption also leads to the conclusion that the 
British government's energy policy and military planning were quite closely linked. 
What the British government could not be sure of, with the loss of Kuwaiti 
independence, was that Kuwait would either remain a swing producer or the source of 
some of the cheapest oil in the world. However, with the formation of OPEC it was 
obvious that these two benefits to the West could be put in jeopardy with the 
possibility of production quotas and standard pricing. The advantage of Kuwait, as 
may be seen from Table 4.3, was that oil production could be rapidly increased and 
therefore could act to reduce the effects of an oil crisis caused by the sudden shortfall 
of oil for whatever reason. Low production costs and ease of extraction in Kuwait 
meant that it was also some of the cheapest crude to produce in the world. This was of 
importance to a British economy under heavy financial constraints. 
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Even though the demand for oil was increasing rapidly by the late 1950s, 
supply was still above demand. Prices of oil fell during this period for a number of 
reasons. These included the emergence of large reserves and excess production 
capacity, the entry of new states into the production of crude, the increase in the 
number of independent refiners with the ability to bargain for lower priced crude, and 
the decrease of production and supply costs. It was in the oil companies interest to 
lower the posted crude prices as this was the level at which they paid royalties to the 
oil states. On August 9, 1960, Standard Oil Company of New Jersey announced a 
reduction in the posted price of crude oil. This was followed on August 11 by Shell 
and on August 16 by British Petroleum.94The economies of the majority of the oil 
producing states depended heavily on the sale and profits from oil. Falling oil prices 
were met with disdain by these producers. The governments of the oil producing states 
were invited to Baghdad, and out of these meetings that ended on September 14, 1960, 
emerged the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This 
organisation was committed to the preservation of the 1960 posted prices. This new 
organisation was not strong enough in its early years-to raise prices but was successful 
in stopping any further reductions. Kuwait had drawn closer to the other Middle East 
oil producing states by being one of the founder members of OPEC and by setting up 
the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC). For the British government these 
two developments signalled both the ending of a fully independent Kuwaiti oil 
marketing policy and the eventual desire of Kuwait to run its own oil industry. 
These two developments were to have a profound affect in the long term on 
the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. Along with the enormous wealth 
generated from oil production, that had already transformed Kuwait internally, these 
developments meant that Kuwait would eventually be in a position to replace the 
client-patron relationship with rentier security policies.95This entailed buying off 
94 Roger Stevens, Middle East Oil in International Relations (Cambridge: Leeds University Press, 
1973), p. 18. 
95 Tetreault, "Autonomy", pp. 577-578. 
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potential enemies and keeping existing allies sweet with the use of massive dollar 
diplomacy. British control of the foreign policy of Kuwait had clearly come to an end. 
Kuwait was now fmnlyon the route to full independence. British de facto recognition 
of the independence of Kuwait would be followed in time by de jure recognition. This 
represented a major change in the patron-client relationship. Yet this major shift did 
not imply that the client-patron relationship was not still in operation. To the contrary, 
the insecurity of Kuwait was reinforcing the bond. Ironically, this insecurity was partly 
caused by the transition period in Kuwait's international position, and as such was 
leading to an Indian Summer in the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship underwent a steady process of 
change during this period. The reduction in British power in the Middle East caused by 
Suez and the Iraqi revolution had ramifications for the dyadic relationship. The 
vacillations of the British government over the possible adherence of Kuwait to the 
Arab Union and over arms sales to Iraq also damaged the patron-client relationship. 
But an increased threat environment for Kuwait caused by the revolution in Iraq 
tempered the Regulation of their relations with Britain that the Kuwaitis might 
otherwise have been expected to pursue. Instead of assuming any more overt fonn, 
Regulation was attempted by the development of Kuwait's "international personality" 
and the level and breadth of its security. Some measure of Regulation had to be 
attempted because it was clear to the ruling family that in certain respects the dyadic 
relationship with Britain was now actually undennining its internal security. What 
Kuwait needed, and what was sought during this period, was membership of a myriad 
of institutional and bilateral groupings and relationships that would collectively 
increase its security. Kuwait was what Robert Keohane characterises as a "system-
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ineffectual" state. Pertinently to Kuwait, Keohane writes: "Some states that cannot 
hope to affect the system acting alone can nevertheless exert significant impact on the 
system by working through small groups or alliances or even through universal or 
regional international organizations: These may be labelled 'system-ineffectual' 
states. ''96The reality for Kuwait was that its patronal state had become less powerful 
and more problematic as an ally. The need or adjustment was therefore to develop and 
foster other relationships in the international environment to deal with this new reality. 
The major policy questions for Kuwait was whether the transition to a collective or 
diversified pattern of guarantees could be accomplished without losing British support, 
and whether the new system would deliver reliable security. Kuwait wanted to avoid 
falling between stools and to be sure that the new stool had at least three sound legs. 
For the British this period was one of profound change brought on by the 
realities of the developments in Iraq and Egypt. Although British commitment to the 
Gulf had actually increased through extension of bases in the Gulf, the remit and 
modes of behaviour of British forces had been tempered and changed. In July 1958 the 
British Foreign Secretary had advocated the use of force to take over Kuwait if oil was 
denied to the West, even by the al-Sabah regime. While they might tolerate or even 
encourage the al-Sabah strategy of diversified security, the British were so dependent 
on Kuwaiti oil that they could not afford for Kuwait to make a move in its foreign 
policy that jeopardised the security of its oil. 
What is clear is that there was a great deal of vacillation and dither on both 
sides. Both states wanted to maintain the patron-client relationship, but without paying 
the cost (military, for Britain; political for Kuwait). The new Iraqi regime interpreted 
96 Keohane, "Lilliputians", p. 295. 
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this weak policy from London as suggesting potential future acquiescence by Kuwait 
and Britain to external aggression. 
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Chapter 5: The Crisis; May to December 1961 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 is split into five parts. The first covers the crisis in Kuwait from May 
to December 1961. The second assesses the policy of Britain in the region, while the 
third deals with the multilateral diplomacy of the major actors. The fourth looks at the 
policy review of the patron, and the fifth contends with the military dimensions of the 
cnsls. 
5.2 The crisis 
Discussions were held in London during 1960 about the status of Kuwait, the 
further securing of Sheikh Abdullah's position, and the protection of vital British and 
Western interests in Kuwait. No conclusions were reached on these issues at this time, 
but consideration was given to admitting an independent Kuwait into the 
Commonwealth. Nothing came of this proposal, although rumours about it were 
widespread throughout the region early in 1961. Qassim attacked the idea in a speech 
on April 30, 1961. He declared that there were "no frontiers between us and the 
Kuwaiti people."l 
These comments of Qassim were cause for concern for governments in both 
Britain and Kuwait, at this time on the verge of formulating new mutual relations. A 
denial of the Commonwealth rumour was formally issued by the Kuwaiti government.2 
Nerves were settled in the early part of June when the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Hashim 
Jawad, reassured Trevelyan that Qassim's comments were 'purely historical.' A 
statement issued jointly by Iraq and Kuwait on commercial relations boosted Kuwaiti 
and British government confidence further. 
IMajid Khadduri, Republican Iraq - A Study in Iraqi politics since the revolution of 1958 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 169. 
2 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 169. 
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Planning for a Kuwaiti declaration of independence on June 19, 1961, therefore 
went ahead. The British government did not anticipate any overtly hostile reactions 
from Qassim to the announcement of Kuwait's independence, or to any problems 
within Kuwait itself. This thinking was based on four factors. 
The first of these was that Trevelyan in Baghdad was advising that the Iraqi 
government had recognised the independence of Kuwait de facto, implying statehood 
in a number of official letters and by its support for Kuwait's application for 
membership of international organisations open only to independent autonomous 
states. The second factor was the belief that the internal pressures in Iraq inhibited 
Qassim from adopting an aggressive foreign policy. These internal concerns included a 
Kurdish rebellion in the north of Iraq, the increasing strength of the Ba'thist opposition, 
and the important negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company (lPC). The third 
factor was Qassim's lack of credibility both in Iraq and in the Middle East because of 
his opposition to pan-Arabism. Trevelyan argued that Qassim was in too weak a 
position to contemplate action over Kuwait. 
Negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company, against which there is 
widespread emotional prejudice, have been difficult, though this is no new 
phenomenon. They are made more difficult by the weakness of Qasim's internal 
position... The development of the internal situation remains unpredictable. 
Opposition to Government is a natural feature of the Iraqi political scene and, 
though Qasim may disappear any day, it is not out of the question that he will be 
able to hold on to power for some time, despite the chorus of his detractors ... 3 
The fourth factor was the absence of nationalist forces within Kuwait following their 
suppression in February 1959. Internal pressures within Kuwait towards unity with the 
DAR had therefore been removed.4 
Although it was not expected that there would be open support for Kuwait's 
independence it was not believed that Qassim would react in a hostile manner. The 
agreed policy was to help guide Sheikh Abdullah down the path of acknowledged 
3PRO: FO 371115760: Annual Report for Iraq, January 2, 1961: Trevelyan. 
4 S. K. Hashim, ''The Influence of Iraq on the Nationalist Movements of Kuwait and Bahrain, 1920-
1961 II (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Exeter, 1984), p. 443. 
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independence at the pace and extent of his choosing, as long as this did not damage the 
position of the British government with regard to Kuwait, or the vitally important 
Kuwait Oil Company. The advice from Luce was that carefully measured moves 
legalised in the traditions of British governments in the Gulf through exchange of 
letters would be the appropriate form of dealing with the Kuwaiti statehood issue. An 
Exchange of Letters was duly made on June 19, 1961 signifying Kuwaiti 
independence. The text of the agreement consisted of four sections. 
(a) The Agreement of the 23rd of January 1899, shall be terminated as 
being inconsistent with the sovereignty and independence of Kuwait 
(b) The relations between the two countries shall continue to be governed 
by a spirit of close friendship 
(c) When appropriate the two Governments shall consult together on 
matters which concern them both 
(d) Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's 
Government to assist the Government of Kuwait if the latter request such 
assistance.5 
-
The import clause was (d) which signified the continuance of the British 
security guarantee for Kuwait. The important change being that the Kuwaiti 
government would determine if and when a request for assistance should be made. 
Clause (a) publicly recognised the independence of Kuwait. The wording clearly 
signifying that Britain was not giving Kuwait independence, but rather recognising it 
formally. 
On June 19, 1961, Kuwaiti independence was announced. Six days later, 
General Qassim, the ruler of Iraq, responded with a declaration that he would issue a 
Republican Decree the next day appointing Sheikh Abdullah Qaimqam of Kuwait in 
the Liwa of Basra. Qaimqam was a title from the Ottoman Empire that had been 
conferred on the Sheikh of Kuwait by the Turks. This protocol was being adopted by 
Qassim to try and show that Kuwait was part of Iraq through its historical origins in 
5 Schofield, Kuwait and Irag, pp. 104-105. 
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the Ottoman Liwa of Basra.6Qassim also made an historical claim to the right of Iraq 
to Kuwait: that Kuwait was a part of Iraq and that Iraq refused to countenance false 
agreements.7 The next day Qassim duly issued the decree.8 One week later British 
troops entered into Kuwait at the request of Sheikh Abdullah. 
How was it that the gradual development of Kuwaiti autonomy through 
membership of international organisations had suddenly culminated in a public 
statement of full independence? How had the British and the Kuwaitis failed to grasp 
that the unequivocal assertion of Kuwaiti statehood was bound to be taken as 
unacceptable provocation by Iraq, while the equally unambiguous declaration of 
Kuwaiti independence from Britain would necessarily be taken as a reduction, if not an 
abandonment, of Britain's commitment to Kuwaiti security? 
Sheikh Abdullah had always chosen the path of measured careful diplomacy 
throughout his reign. The relationship of Kuwait with Britain and its place in the 
system of states had evolved by close consultation with the British. Following the Suez 
war the al-Sabah family had pressed slowly towards taking over the international 
responsibilities and foreign relations of Kuwait from the British. The first steps had 
been for Kuwait to join a number of international organisations, followed by agreement 
that Kuwait should take on more responsibility for foreign affairs with its Arab 
neighbours. The agreement of June 19 was perceived by both Kuwait and Britain as 
one more step in a gradual transition, and certainly something far short of an abrupt 
termination of their long-standing relationship. This may explain why the strong 
reaction of Qassim over the announcement of the independence of Kuwait was not 
expected by the British. Relations between Kuwait and Iraq had never been very close 
or amicable. Yet the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Jawad, had, a few weeks before, 
characterised Kuwait as a sovereign state. There remained long-standing quarrels 
between the two countries over water, anns, date farms and the border. But during the 
6 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, pp. 105-106; Kelly, Shifting lines, pp. 130-132. 
7 PRO: PREM 111 3427: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 25, 1961: Trevelyan. 
8 PRO: FO 3711156845: Iraq annexation of Kuwait, June 26, 1961: Trevelyan. 
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Nuri period, up until July 1958 there had been discussions, through the British, about 
resolving the many problems between the two states. And although this process had 
slowed down when Qassim came into power, both Britain and Kuwait remained 
hopeful that issues could be resolved. 
So while some concern had been expressed by the British Ambassador to Iraq 
over the timing of the announcement of Kuwaiti independence, the stance of Qassim 
and the subsequent crisis still took the British by surprise. The emergency also 
shattered the attempt by Sheikh Abdullah to lead Kuwait along a quiet path to full and 
effective independence. He had tried to reduce the importance of the client-patron 
relationship between Britain and Kuwait that had so long guaranteed the integrity of 
the city state. The internal and external security policy that he had pursued had been 
bound up with the traditional alliance with Britain. The announcement of Kuwait's 
independence signified the beginning, but not much more, of a move away from the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti client-patron relationship towards a more oil dollar related diplomacy. 
This change in policy was strewn with dangers but, at the same time was a necessity 
for the state in the prevailing anti-imperialist climate; But no one in Kuwait or Britain 
had anticipated the extent and immediacy of the danger. Now, within a week of being 
given control for the conduct of its own foreign relations, Kuwait was fully exposed to 
the dangers and extremes of the international system. 
The crisis highlighted all the problems for the British in the maintenance of their 
position in the Gulf region. Britain was still guaranteeing the security of Kuwait by 
offering the intervention of British troops. To honour this commitment would be 
logistically difficult and politically dangerous. The successful response of the British in 
July 1961 would show the viability of the integrated command at Aden and the 
flexibility of the new strategic doctrine. The declining position of Britain in the region 
and the world coupled with the general pattern of withdrawal from colonial 
engagements had posed the question of whether it would ever unilaterally be able to 
perfonn "Operation Vantage" or any similar operation in the future on its own. The 
British government had to engage in strenuous diplomacy to set out and explain the 
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British position to Commonwealth and European countries. The difficulty of securing 
diplomatic support for the Kuwaiti issue, especially from Sterling Area countries, was 
a measure of the changed power position of Britain. Middle East states that had once 
been controlled by either Whitehall or the British Imperial Raj were now challenging 
Britain's weakened position in the region. Iraq was following in the wake of Iran and 
Egypt. 
The Gulf region was becoming bound up in the politics and power plays of the 
wider Middle East region. Also the Cold War was beginning to be played out in the 
area. The British were becoming less able to deal with all these problems in the Gulf 
and were turning increasingly to the United States for more support. The gradual 
decline in British influence was being hidden by the developing strength of the Anglo-
American relationship as they both began to co-ordinate their policies for the Gulf 
regIon. 
The shape of security in the region had been changed dramatically by Qassim. 
He had made the vulnerability of Kuwait a real and dangerous reality. His reasons for 
making such overt claims on Kuwait might not necessarily be evident but the effects 
were clear enough. The American Ambassador in an interview related a very 
interesting conversation that he had had with Nasser at the time of the Kuwaiti 
problem. 
When this was at its height, I went out to see Nasser, and after discussing 
the situation, I asked him how he accounted for Qassim's move toward Kuwait, 
what he thought Qassim was after. And Nasser said, 'well you tell me what you 
think they're saying in the diplomatic corps.' And I said, 'I think most of the 
diplomats here think that it's very closely related to Kuwait's role as a major oil 
producer. Qassim has been threatening to nationalise the Iraq petroleum 
company. They noted that when Iran nationalised its oil, the nationalisation did 
not affect them because Kuwait took up the slack. If he could now control 
Kuwait, as well as Iraq, he'd have a real corner on the oil market and could get 
his economic objectives.' 
To this Nasser replied, 'well there may be something in this,' But he said, 
'The trouble with all you people are you make things too complicated.' He said, 'I 
think it was very much simpler.' Now this is almost an exact quote. He said, 'I 
think Qassim and his chief of staff went to the men's room one morning. And one 
said to the other, 'Why don't we take Kuwait?' And the other one said, 'Well, 
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Mu~t! by God, it's a good idea. Let's do it.' He said, 'this is the way many of our 
decisions are made.9 
The secondary literature suggests that there were three underlying reasons for 
the revival of Qassim's irredentist claims on Kuwait. to First, and most importantly, was 
Kuwait's oil assets. They represented a substantial prize for the Qassim regime. 
Second, was the dynamics of the internal state of Iraqi domestic politics. The claims to 
Kuwait were certainly a useful device of Qassim's to shift the political focus from 
domestic to foreign affairs and if possible unite the politically fragmented nation behind 
a popular issue. Third came the strategic priority of gaining a secure major Gulf port 
besides Basra, which suffered from security threats from Iran because of the dispute 
over the Shatt aI-Arab. Significantly, one of the first acts of the Qassim regime when it 
took power in 1958 was to take a loan from the Soviet Union of £66m for 
development of the port at Umm Qasr.tl 
Whatever Qassim's reasons for threatening Kuwait, one of the effects was to 
internationalise the whole issue. The use of British troops and the subsequent use of 
the Arab League forces to protect Kuwait heightened tensions throughout the region. 
It also highlighted the cold war between Cairo and Baghdad and the emptiness of Arab 
claims to solidarity. The crisis spilled over into the United Nations where the 
diplomatic manoeuvrings became embroiled with the larger East-West Cold War. The 
security of Kuwait and Gulf oil had become the major policy objective of Britain for 
the region. Qassim in one week had undermined and threatened this policy. 
9 USA: JFKL: Oral history interview with John S. Badeau, February 25,1969: New York City for the 
John F Kennedy Library: (Ambassador to UAR 1961-1964), pp. 1-13. 
10 Chubin Security in the Gulf, pp. 27-28; Richard Gott, ''TIle Kuwaiti Incident", in D. C. Watt, ed. 
Survey of international Affairs (London: ~IIA, 1961), pp. 523-23; Majid ~had~uri, Republican Iraq: 
A Study in Iraqi Politics since the RevolutIOn of 1958 (London: Oxford Umverslty Press, 1969), p. 
168. 
11 James H Noyes, The Clouded Lens: Persian Gulf Security and United States Policy. 2nd. ed. 
(Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), pp. 10-11. 
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5.3 British policy in the region 
5.3.1 Political aspects 
The British government and Sheikh Abdullah interpreted the press conference 
given by Qassim as a direct threat and challenge by Iraq to the integrity of Kuwait. The 
response of the British to the speech of Qassim was crucial. A quick move to defend 
Kuwait under clause (d) of the exchange of letters of June 19 could have backfired on 
them, since this could easily have exposed them to the criticism of old style imperialist 
gunboat diplomacy in which Kuwait was still a tool of the British. But if the plans of 
Qassim were to invade Kuwait then a slow British military response could have proved 
disastrous, and this possibility prompted Richmond, the Political Agent in Kuwait, to 
send for urgent instructions and advice from London. 12 
The Foreign Office sent words of sympathy to Sheikh Abdullah and presented 
its initial views on the problem. After consultation with their Ambassador in Iraq, Sir 
Humphrey Trevelyan, the Foreign Office informed Richmond that they believed 
Qassim had spoken on the spur of the moment and probably against the advice of the 
Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, J awad. First indications were that Qassim was 
unlikely to tum to the military option over the issue. This was based on the unstable 
internal situation in Iraq and the consequent need to use a large proportion of the 
Army for internal security. The Foreign Office advised on a calm approach by the 
Kuwait government, with no statements that could be viewed as provocative by 
Iraq.13The hope was that the attitude of Qassim could be moderated by reason. 14 
Walmsley, who was assistant to the head of the Arabian Department, 
Beaumont, consulted with Trevelyan on whether the Iraqi 1932 recognition of the 
Iraq-Kuwait boundary should be made public. It was decided that the publication of 
Nuri Said's letter of July 21, 1932, might provoke Qassim to further action.t 5 
12 PRO: PREM 1113427: Kuwait to Foreign Office, June 26, 1961: Richmond. 
13 PRO: PREM 111 3427: Foreign Office to Kuwait, June 26, 1961. 
14 PRO: FO 3711156845: Confidential: The Iraqi threat to Kuwait: June 26, 1961: Walmsley. 
15 PRO: FO 3711156845: Foreign Office to Baghdad, June 26, 1961: No.780. 
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Trevelyan advised that the letter should not be published, because Qassim would only 
reciprocate by firstly denouncing this as having been written under pressure from the 
Imperialist British and secondly, publishing the later claims to Kuwaiti territory made 
in June 1958 by Nuri Said. 16 
The preliminary assessment of George Hiller, head of the Eastern Department, 
was also that Qassim was unlikely to resort to military action over Kuwait. Qassim 
wanted Kuwait to join Iraq, and the new Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement with the future 
possibility of Kuwait joining the United Nations and the Arab League was a threat to 
this policy. The suggested British policy to deal with this issue was to show a "frrm" 
but "not provocative" response to Qassim, with the hope that other Arab countries 
could be encouraged to take up the issue with Iraq. This assessment was similar to the 
views of Trevelyan and the Arabian Department. 17 
Trevelyan met the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Jawad, on June 26, 1961. Iraqi and 
British views on Kuwait were exchanged at this meeting. Trevelyan stated that Britain 
had never recognised the claims of Iraq to Kuwait and that the new agreement between 
Kuwait and Britain was not a new departure but merely the recognition that Kuwait 
had been responsible for its own international relations for some time. Trevelyan 
commented that during their previous discussions on the questions of Consuls and of 
the emerging independence of Kuwait Jawad had not put forward any objections. The 
Ambassador went on to point out that Jawad had welcomed the new position for 
Kuwait. In discussion, Trevelyan had asked Jawad how he had viewed the emergence 
of Kuwait to independent status to which Jawad responded that he "welcomed the 
acquisition of independence by an Arab State" although, significantly, he did not refer 
to the claims of Iraq.18Jawad expressed to Trevelyan some of the difficulties that he 
was in over this question. The British Embassy in Baghdad concluded that Jawad had 
not been consulted before Qassim made his statement on Kuwait and that the Foreign 
16 PRO: FO 3711156845: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 27, 1961: No.650: Trevelyan. 
17 PRO: FO 3711156845: Confidential: Qassim's policy towards Kuwait, June 26, 1961: Hiller. 
18 PRO: FO 3711156845: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 26, 1961, No.633 at 4.14p.m.: Trevelyan. 
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Ministry opposed the aggressive policy being pursued by Qassim. An official of the 
Ministry remarked that his Minister [Jawad] was "like a man walking in the desert who 
was suddenly hit by a large rock from behind."19 
Trevelyan was one of the key players in the direction and formulation of British 
policy in the Middle East. His assessments of the Iraqi position on Kuwait would be 
instrumental in subsequent developments. The Foreign Office requested his opinion on 
the motives of Qassim and the possibility of military action by Iraq. It was stressed to 
the Ambassador that the earliest possible warning of any Iraqi military moves be 
communicated to London.2o 
Trevelyan claimed that the prime motive of Qassim was to manoeuvre Kuwait 
into a union with Iraq and that this was a foreign policy position held by many in Iraq. 
Taking Kuwait would also allow Qassim to exert substantial market power following a 
nationalisation of IPC. Control of oil was a vital issue in the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. The 
enormous wealth that Kuwait possessed, its function as a swing producer, as well as 
the potential market share that could be gained by annexation were tempting prizes for 
Qassim. In addition to the external reasons for the strategy adopted by Qassim there 
were also important internal reasons for the move. The Ambassador believed that this 
declaration was a way for Qassim to improve his weak position within Iraq by 
adopting a strong nationalist display of aggression.21Twelve hours later Trevelyan sent 
a more detailed prognosis. He wrote: 
Qassim's original plans may have been further developed than guessed 
and may have included an early internal coup supported by military action, 
perhaps timed for July 14, under cover of the usual troop movements. They may 
well have begun to take shape during his visit to Dmm Qasr in March after his 
and Jawad's talks with Abdulla Mubarak, whose part in all this, if any, is 
obscure, but who, as I have reported, is believed to have special connections with 
Qassim.22 
19 PRO: FO 3711156845: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 26, 1961, No.633 at 4.14p.m.: Trevelyan. 
20 PRO: PREM 1113427: Foreign Office to Baghdad, June 26, 1961, 2.44p.m. 
21 PRO: PREM 1113427: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 26, 1961, 11.26p.m.: Trevelyan. 
22 PRO: PREM 1113427: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 27,1961, 11.25a.m.: Trevelyan. 
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Trevelyan, although cautioning at this stage that this was only a hypothesis, 
indicated that Hussain Jamil had stated that Qassim was considering not only 
statements but also the use of force. The vulnerability of his internal position was now 
viewed as the prime spur. The reassessment of Trevelyan of the position in Iraq was 
that the internal unrest could best be countered by Qassim with a bold foreign policy 
nlove. The Anglo-Kuwaiti declaration had foiled the plans of Qassim SInce, by 
strengthening Kuwaiti sovereignty it raised the price of invasion in terms of 
international law. Colonel Bowden, the Military Attache to Iraq, believed a military 
move could be made by the Iraqi regime without affecting the internal security 
position. Trevelyan advised that Iraq should be left in no doubt that any military action 
on its part would be met with British force. Within two days the Embassy in Baghdad 
had changed its initial assessment of the significance of the press conference of Qassim 
from simply Iraqi political manoeuvring to potential military intervention in Kuwait. 
British military plans for intervention in Kuwait to prevent an Iraqi invasion 
assumed that there would be four days advance notice of Iraqi ambitions. A paper 
produced by the War Office on June 9 outlined the signs that would highlight the 
possible imminent use of force by Iraq on Kuwait. Following an increase in political 
tension between Iraq and Kuwait indications would come from the movement of Iraqi 
armed forces. The deployment of the Iraqi army suggested that parts of the First 
Infantry Division, located to the south of Baghdad, were the most advantageously 
placed for moves on Kuwait. Parts of the Third or Fifth Infantry Division could also be 
used. Movement by infantry from Musaiyib, Diwabiya and Nasiriya to the areas of 
Basra and or Shuaiba by road or rail would be part of any Iraqi plan. An Iraqi invasion 
would also require tanks and artillery. Movements of Iraqi armour by road or rail 
towards the areas of Basra and Shuaiba would therefore be a clear indication of Iraqi 
intent as would any concentration of rail flats (used to move tanks by rail) or tank 
transports around Baghdad. The stationing or pre-positioning of fuel and military 
stores in the Basra-Shuaiba areas would be essential to any Iraqi operation. It was also 
anticipated that the movement of shipping in and out of the Port of Basra would be 
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restricted just prior to the use of military force. The War Office also predicted that the 
Iraqis were most likely to act between August and March.23 
Great problems faced the British in assessing or determining these indicators. 
Military weaponry and personnel were likely to travel at night. Since success for any 
Iraqi military moves would depend upon speed and total surprise, military tactics 
would be well disguised. Britain had only a limited intelligence gathering operation in 
Iraq. This included the Embassy in Baghdad and the Consulate in Basra. In these 
locations there would be the usual mix of Foreign Office and MI6 operatives. At this 
stage their role would be first to locate and then to report on the various activities, if 
any, that would be associated with any attempt by Iraq to invade Kuwait. 
The reports that came out of Baghdad and Basra were of vital importance to 
decisions being made in Whitehall. On the night of June 27 the Consulate in Basra 
reported that there were no indications of any imminent Iraqi attack on Kuwait. 
Although there were rumours that some Iraqi troops had moved to Safume on the 
night of June 26 a reliable informant was unable to confmn such activity. There were 
no unusual movements or extra police operating in the area. The Iraqi fleet of torpedo 
boats stationed at Basra was constantly reported upon but there was no activity of an 
unusual nature. Flights to Kuwait from Iraq (that over-flew the frontier) were still 
operational and no restrictions had been made upon the aircraft of the Basra Petroleum 
Company. 24 
None of the reports from Basra showed any clear indications of Iraqi military 
moves upon Kuwait. Reliable sources reported that there had been no unusual numbers 
of troops or weaponry inside the main Basra barracks. All that could be reported were 
unconfirmed rumours of troops having moved from Divisional Headquarters to Shaiba 
Air Base. This report was given more substance by the arrival of the Garrison 
Commander at Shaiba, together with other officers, by civil airline.25None of this 
23 PRO: FO 3711 156847: Memorandum for Foreign Office from War Office, June 9, 1961. 
24 PRO: FO 3711 156847: Basra to Foreign Office, June 27, 1961, No. 45, 12.30a.m. sent July 28. 
25 PRO: FO 3711156847: Basra to Foreign Office, June 29, 1961, No.46, 1.4Op.m.: Pyman. 
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infonnation provided a clear answer to the vital question of whether, and if so when, 
Iraq was going to attack Kuwait. The British Consulate in Basra could give no 
concrete indications either way. In a telegram sent to the Foreign Office, just hours 
before British troops arrived in Kuwait, Pyman argued that there was no evidence of 
any preparations for an attack on Kuwait. The problem remained that the nearness of 
the border to Iraqi barracks meant that a surprise attack could be undertaken without 
attracting much, if any, attention.26 
The infonnation from Baghdad was much more alarming, and it was reports 
from the Embassy in Iraq that led ultimately to the British decision to send troops to 
Kuwait. Like the consulate in Basra, the Embassy had no ftnn evidence of Iraqi troop 
or armour movements.27Trevelyan clearly reported this on the eve of British troops 
arriving in Kuwait. The earlier telegram giving detailed infonnation had been based 
upon unconfmned rumours and reports. Infonnation on troop levels was based on 
these rumours and on the known strength of the Iraqi garrison at Basra. The 
infonnation that convinced Trevelyan and the Foreign Office of the seriousness of Iraqi 
moves was of a covert nature. In an emergency telegram, on the morning of June 30, 
Trevelyan infonned the Foreign Office of "unusual activity" in the Centurion Tank 
Regiment in Baghdad. Indications were that the tanks were being moved out by 
railway. The flash message also spoke of the possibility that some tanks had left during 
the night on railway flats. There were also unconfinned reports of infantry movements 
during the night of June 29 suggesting that the Twentieth Infantry Brigade, three 
Divisions at Jaloula and possibly some paratroopers from Baghdad, had been moved 
south.28 
It was not known what troops were already in the Basra region. Estimates 
suggested one infantry mobile brigade, an artillery regiment and a squadron of 
26 PRO: FO 3711156847: Basra to Foreign Office, June 30,1961, No.52, 1.00a.m. sent July 1.: 
Pyman. 
27 PRO: FO 3711156847: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 30,1961, No.703, 10.31p.m.: Trevelyan. 
28 PRO: FO 3711156875: Baghdad to Foreign Office, War office Distribution, June 30, 1961, 
No.690, 10,45a.m.: Trevelyan. 
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centurion tanks already in place with the rest of the regiment preparing to move out of 
Baghdad, along with some paratroopers, twelve Russian torpedo boats (with some 
Russian crews), and a limited amount of air support. The embassy advocated 
immediate air reconnaissance to be made of the area around Shaiba near the border 
with Kuwait to add confirmation of the rumours.29 A few hours later a flash emergency 
telegram from the Military Attache in Baghdad arrived for Cabinet distribution, (the 
Cabinet had been called to evening session to decide upon the Kuwaiti issue). The 
telegram from the British covert sources in Iraq announced that: "Alfa. Source close to 
G.O.C.1 [General Officer Commanding 1st Division of the Iraqi army] ... reports 
tanks, troops and elements of 20th Infantry Brigade have been moved to Basra. Bravo. 
Remainder 1st Centurion Regiment still in Baghdad."3o 
Information continued to arrive from Baghdad on Iraqi forces. Reliable 
information indicated that the Commanding Officer of the First Centurion Tank 
Regiment was in Basra organising preparations for the arrival of his regiment. 
Although the evidence from Basra suggested that a military operation was not 
imminent other indications suggested otherwise. The -political climate in Basra was one 
of expectancy with the Iraqi propaganda machine sowing seeds of apprehension in the 
region. Tension in Baghdad was even more heightened than in Basra. 
The Political Resident, Sir William Luce, sent an assessment of the political and 
military situation in the region to London on June 29. Luce advocated a ftnn response 
in the form of military intervention in Kuwait. He believed that the public declaration 
of Qassim, whom he also characterised as being unbalanced and unpredictable, had 
bound him unequivocally to uniting Kuwait with Iraq. His opinion was that Qassim 
was in the process of building up his forces for an invasion and that his propaganda 
machine was setting up political support for this intervention. The report of an 
armoured regiment being moved towards the Basra-Kuwait border area meant that, 
29 PRO: FO 3711126875: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 30, 1961, No.693, 1.39p.m.: Trevelyan. 
30 PRO: FO 371/156875: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 30, 1961, No.700 9.38p.m. from Military 
Attache, No. MNIFI11Nl1: Trevelyan. 
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with an infantry brigade already stationed at Basra, the Iraqis would be able to attack 
Kuwait within seventy-two hours. Luce also believed that affirmations of support by 
other Arab states for Ku wait would not dissuade Qassim from intervening, as he would 
have foreseen and discounted them. None of the Arab States could offer Kuwait 
military protection in time to stop an Iraqi invasion. 
The British government remained consistent in its support for Sheikh Abdullah 
throughout the crisis. Messages of support were communicated to him from the 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Home who wrote that: "Her Majesty's Government wish to 
assure His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti people of their support and 
sympathy in the present situation, and to re-affrrm their determination to carry out all 
the obligations entered into in the exchange of Notes signed on June 19, 1961."31Lord 
Home was prepared for Sheikh Abdullah to publish this message of support if he felt it 
essential, but advised that it should not be published as it might be taken as a 
provocation by Qassim. 
The British government was eagerly trying to win the propaganda war with 
Qassim and other critics such as Nasser and Radio Cairo. The weakened position of 
the British meant that this battle was essential. A strong diplomatic effort was therefore 
made towards Commonwealth and other states. Telegrams were sent from the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, as early as June 27, stating the familiar points of the 
British position and instructing British representatives to make full and vigorous use of 
them. This position was that Kuwait was an independent sovereign state and had been 
given diplomatic recognition by a number of states that had also voted for the 
admission of Kuwait to certain international organisations. Iraq had been one of the 
states voting for the admission of Kuwait as an independent and sovereign state to the 
lTD in 1959. Iraq had also spoken in favour of the admission of Kuwait to the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) on June 13, 1961. The British government 
had recognised the independence of Kuwait in a letter to the then ruler, Sheikh 
31 PRO: PREM 1113427: Foreign Office to Kuwait, June 27,1961, 7.55p.m. 
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Mubarak the Great, on November 3, 1914. The letter had stated that: "the Sheikhdom 
of Kuwait is an independent Government under British protection. "32The British 
government also made clear that they were fully obliged and prepared to stand by 
Sheikh Abdullah. The Lord Privy Seal, Edward Heath, had stated unequivocally in the 
House of Commons on June 19 that the Exchange of Notes obliged Her Majesty's 
Government to aid the government of Kuwait if so requested. 
On the evening of June 29 the Foreign Office instructed Richmond to approach 
Sheikh Abdullah and infonn him that the latest infonnation was that Qassim was 
preparing to make an early military attack on Kuwait. Richmond was told to urge 
Sheikh Abdullah to make a fonnal request for British military assistance under clause 
(d) of the Exchange of Notes.33The instructions given to Richmond were clear in that 
he had to obtain a request from Sheikh Abdullah: 
It is of vital importance to get the formal request from the Ruler for 
assistance as soon as possible. If possible this should be in writing, but if the 
Ruler is hesitant to do so, an oral request which you could then write down and 
to which the Ruler could give his assent would suffice. Please do your best to 
secure this as soon as practicable and report. At all costs however you should 
conduct the interview so that the formal request is made by the Ruler, even if 
this should only be oral.34 
In the early morning of June 30 Sheikh Abdullah requested the intervention of 
British armed forces into Kuwait. Far from requiring to be persuaded by Richmond, 
Sheikh Abdullah was anxious that British intervention should take place as quickly as 
possible and submitted a fonnal written request on the SpOt.35 
'His Excellency Her Majesty's Political Agent in Kuwait 
Greetings. In view of the military movements which have been undertaken by 
the Iraqi army on the borders of Kuwait and which are such as to threaten the 
security of Kuwait 1 have decided to submit a request for military assistance to 
Her Majesty's Government in accordance with the Note which I exchanged with 
Sir William Luce on June 19, 1961.1 beg you to inform your Government of this 
32 PRO: PREM 1113427: Outward telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office, June 27, 1961. 
33 PRO: FO 3711156874: Foreign Office to Kuwait, June 29,1961, 6.4Op.m. 
34 PRO: PREM 1113427: Foreign Office to Kuwait, June 30,1961, 2.35a.m. 
35 PRO: PREM 111 3427: Kuwait to Foreign Office, June 30, 1961, 11.50a.m. 
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immediately and I have full confidence Her Majesty's Government will adopt all 
measures and will muster their whole potential to ward off the aggressors. 
please accept my best wishes. May God preserve you. 
Dated June 30, 1961 
Abdullah ai-Salim al Sabah 
Ruler of Kuwait')6 
On the morning of June 29 Lord Home made a statement to the Cabinet 
outlining the latest British position. He related the indications of an imminent 
movement of Iraqi tanks and armour into the Basra area estimating their readiness for 
an attack by July 1. He briefed the Cabinet that Trevelyan was at that moment 
infonning the Iraqi Foreign Minister of British assurance of support for Sheikh 
Abdullah. Forces were on full alert with H.M.S. Bulwark ready to arrive of the coast 
of Kuwait on July 1. Aircraft had been moved from Aden to Sharjah and Bahrain and 
tanks were standing by in landing craft (LST) off Bahrain within twenty-four hours 
reach of Kuwait. 37 Unconfmned accounts of Iraqi troop concentrations on the Kuwaiti 
border had also been reported in Cairo on June 29 and in Washington on June 30.38 
The order to send troops into Kuwait was given on June 30, 1961, following 
the fonnal request from Sheikh Abdullah to the British government and a favourable 
decision at a special Cabinet meeting. The military plan put into action was the 
'Reinforced Theatre Plan' code named Vantage. This had been set up by Air Marshal 
Sir Charles Elsworthy in November 1960 when he had been Commander in Chief of 
Aden. Although already subject to criticism this plan remained the blueprint for the 
subsequent British military intervention. 
Trevelyan advised that the British government should make it clear to Iraq that 
if its forces attacked Kuwait they would be met by British forces in strength with 
orders to resist any military incursions. He also suggested that, as part of the moves to 
deter Qassim from attacking Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah should request a token force of 
Saudi Arabian troops. This would mean that Qassim would be faced with the need to 
fight Arab forces. 
36 PRO: PREM 1113427: Kuwait to Foreign Office, June 30, 1961, 9.26a.m. 
37 PRO: FO 3711156874: Statement of Secretary of State in the Cabinet, June 29, 1961. 
38 '''The Kuwait Crisis: Synopsis", Middle East Record, 1961, p. 118. 
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5.3.2 l\'luitilateral diplomacy 
The tactics to be employed by Kuwait in the United Nations were of the utmost 
importance. The British government suggested to Sheikh Abdullah that Saudi Arabia 
should be encouraged to convene the Security Council in order to give the crisis a 
neutral rather than a Cold War status. Representations were made to the governments 
of India, Pakistan, and Turkey to try to get them to restrain Qassim. The United States 
was also approached in an attempt to get them to urge King Saud to use his influence 
on Iraq. The United Nations and the Security Council from the start were recognised 
by the British as being key instruments in the battle against Qassim. The lessons of 
Suez for the British were that clear legality in its position along with support from 
America and a large proportion of the United Nations were essential for success. 
The British delegation to the United Nations, led by Sir Patrick Dean, was 
optimistic about convening the Security Council to the benefit of the Kuwaiti cause. 
He believed that this could be successful if trustworthy infonnation about the military 
-
build up of the forces of Iraq against Kuwait could be presented before the Council. He 
also suggested that the Kuwaitis, who at this time did not have any representation at 
the United Nations, should send a suitable political representative. This move would 
help the Kuwaiti case before the Security Council both politically and administratively. 
Dean was also against the initiative being instigated by the Saudi Arabian delegation. 
The Saudi representative, Shukairy, at this time had a poor reputation and would in the 
opinion of Dean cause more harm than good. Dean also felt that Shukairy was likely to 
attack the British and possibly the Americans in the Security Council and to widen the 
diplomatic agenda which would risk escalating the issue into a Cold War debate. It was 
hoped that keeping the debate to the sole issue of Kuwait's international status would 
protect British interests in the Gulf from wider examination. Dean preferred an 
initiative to be made by the UAR, but it became clear that the only way for Britain to 
restrict the agenda in the Security Council to the issue of Kuwaiti membership was for 
17Q 
them to take the initiative in the United Nations.390ne aspect of Britain's ability to 
retain its international influence was in its ability, by virtue of its membership as a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to set the agenda.4o 
The Security Council of the United Nations convened on Sunday July 2, 1961, 
at the request of the British delegation. This motion was reiterated by the Secretary of 
State of Kuwait, Bader AI-Mulla, who sent a letter to the President of the Security 
Council, also asking for an inIDlediate meeting of the Counci1.41 Britain supported this 
overture by Kuwait and in its capacity as a permanent member of the Security Council 
put forward the "Complaint" by Kuwait: "Complaint by Kuwait in respect of the 
situation arising from the threat by Iraq to the territorial independence of Kuwait, 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."42 
The representative of Iraq at the United Nations, Mr. Pachachi, had requested 
in a letter to the President of the Security Council that he be allowed to take part in the 
debate. With no objection from the other Security Council members he was allowed to 
take a seat at the Council table. Dean then read out a statement issued early the day 
-
before by the British government in London announcing the formal and urgent request 
of Sheikh Abdullah for Britain to send forces for the preservation of the political and 
territorial integrity of Kuwait. He went on to say that the British government hoped 
that force would not be needed and that British troops would be withdrawn as soon as 
the threat to Kuwait was removed. Dean argued persuasively and clearly the British 
and Kuwaiti position. Reference was made to the statements of Qassim, the Iraqi press 
and radio campaigns against Kuwait and the reports of Iraqi military forces moving 
into the Basra area. Dean also mentioned that the government of the UAR had 
concurred with British concern over the military position of Iraq. Although clearly 
39 PRO: PREM III 3427: New York to Foreign Office, June 29, 1961, 8.13p.m. 
40 For an interesting analysis of agenda setting in international organisations see: Stephen M. 
Saideman "International Organisations and Secessionist Crises: The Relevance of Agenda Setting", 
Studies in' Conflict and Terrorism 17 (Spring 1994), 275-291. 
41 Finnie, Shifting lines, pp. 134-137; See Appendix 1. 
42 UN: SCOR: 957th meeting, July 2, 1961, 11.30a.m.: p. 1. 
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supporting Kuwait the remarks of Dean were also conciliatory towards Iraq. He 
concluded by stressing that Britain had no aggressive intentions towards Iraq and 
wished to remain on friendly terms with Iraq.43The Iraqi delegate to the United 
Nations, Pachachi, argued that Iraq had no intention of employing military means to 
resolve the dispute, but was only interested in peaceful means. He went on to deny 
reports of Iraqi troop movements in southern Iraq and label British military moves 
therefore as an act of aggression towards Iraq.44Pachachi continued to take the line 
that Kuwait was not and had never been an independent sovereign state. 
The issue was again discussed by the Security Council on Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday of the following week. At the meeting of July 5, after some 
procedural bickering between the Soviet Union and Britain, the representative of 
Kuwait, Mr. Abdel Aziz Hussein, was invited to sit at the Council table along with the 
Iraqi delegate. Pachachi made it clear to the Council that Iraq viewed the "gentleman" 
(Kuwaiti representative) at the table as not representing a state but being present as a 
private individua1.45 Abdel Hussein outlined the Kuwaiti case explaining that: "Kuwait 
-
had progressively and systematically established all the requisite institutions by which a 
modern state is defined." Hussein went on to explain that de facto and de jure 
recognition had been given to Kuwait by various states of the world including Iraq. 
Letters were referred to in which Qassim had requested better transportation systems 
between the two countries and had asked at a later date for consular representation.46 
The United States representative at the United Nations, Mr. Plimpton, spoke 
next, expressing the view of his government that Kuwait was a sovereign and 
independent state and the commitment of the United States to support the wish of the 
Kuwaiti people to remain independent and free. The UAR delegate, Mr. Loutfi, 
43 UN: SCOR: 957th meeting, July 2,1961, 11.30a.m.: pp. 3-7. 
44 UN: SCOR: 957th meeting, July 2, 1961, 11.30a.m.: p. 9. 
45 UN: SCOR: 958th meeting, July 5, 1961, 3p.m.: pp. 5-6. 
46 UN: SCOR: 958th meeting, July 5, 1961, 3p.m.: p. 13; Appendix 2. 
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followed Plimpton in the discussion. He spoke in support of Kuwaiti independence but 
called upon the problem to be solved within the framework of the Arab League.47 
After further discussions by members of the Security Council and a subsequent 
meeting on Friday July 7 a vote was taken at 3.00 p.m. on the draft resolutions put 
forward by the British and the UAR delegates. The eleven members of the Security 
Council voted on both issues. The British resolution called on all states to recognise 
the territorial and independent integrity of Kuwait. The Security Council members 
voting in favour of the Resolution S/4855 were Chile, China, France, Liberia, Turkey, 
Britain and the United States. The Soviet Union voted against while Ceylon, Ecuador 
and the UAR abstained. The draft resolution was therefore not adopted because of the 
Soviet veto. The UAR draft Resolution S/4856 was then voted on. This resolution 
noted the statements of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti representatives and the many statements 
of Iraq that only peaceful means would be employed to reach a solution to the 
problem. The UAR resolution urged that the question should be solved by peaceful 
means and therefore called upon the British to withdraw its forces from Kuwait 
immediately. States in favour of this resolution included Ceylon, Soviet Union and the 
UAR with no votes against. Eight countries abstained namely Chile, China, Ecuador, 
France, Liberia, Turkey, Britain and the United States. The resolution did not pass 
because it failed to obtain seven affIrmative votes.48 
The position adopted by Iraqi delegate in the Security Council had been fully 
anticipated by the British. Trevelyan, writing to the Foreign Office, outlined that the 
only line of defence the Iraqis now had was in the political field in the Security 
Council. Qassim had been thwarted by British troops in Kuwait and by UAR moves in 
the Arab League. His only policy would be to try to refute the allegation that Iraqi 
troops had been moved to the Kuwaiti border. Trevelyan warned that Iraq would 
mobilise "Soviet, Arab and other anti-colonial support" to force the withdrawal of 
47 UN: SCOR: 958th meeting, July 5, 1961, 3p.m.: p. 18. 
48 UN: SCOR: 960th meeting, July 7, 1961, 3p.m.: pp. 7-8. 
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British forces.49'Jbe Iraqis were unsuccessful in this approach apart from mobilising the 
Soviet Union's support. 
Efforts were employed by Kuwait and the UAR to set up a framework for 
solving the episode within the jurisdiction of the Arab League. The British view of 
these efforts was initially sceptical. The concern was that an Arab League force could 
not offer the necessary military protection needed to deter an Iraqi attack.5O'fhe Soviet 
veto in the Security Council had effectively stopped any chance of a United Nations 
force being sent into Kuwait. This had some advantages for the British. Concern had 
been expressed by Luce that a precondition of a United Nations force being sent to 
Kuwait might have been British military withdrawal from the Gulf area. This would 
have undermined both the policy and the position of Britain in the Gulf. The British 
were aware that an effective solution guaranteeing the security of Kuwait other than by 
British troops would ultimately be needed. Trevelyan believed that the British 
government should "aim at a political settlement, in accordance with Arab ideas, which 
will provide an effective guarantee of Kuwaiti independence."5t 
The British response to the Iraqi allegations that no troops had moved in the 
period was hampered by the covert nature of the sources of information. The only 
substantive infonnation on Iraqi military moves had been gathered from covert and not 
overt sources. 52 
I regret that none of the military information which has been reported 
can be used publicly without risk of embarrassment to me and my source. In 
future, if any item of news can be used publicly, I will let you know; I suggest UK 
mission New York might stress the proximity of the frontier and the ease with 
which a surprise attack could be mounted.53 
The political tension in the Gulf, caused by the crisis, escalated as both reports 
came in of Iraqi troop movements and the Iraqi press, radio and government continued 
49 PRO: FO 3711156877: Baghdad to Foreign Office, july 4, 1961, No.762, 11.51a.m.: Trevelyan. 
50 PRO: FO 3711156879, Bahrain to Foreign Office, July 7, 1961, No.422, 11.25p.m.: Luce. 
51 PRO: FO 3711156877: Baghdad to Foreign Office, July 4, 1961, No.763, 10.02a.m.: Trevelyan. 
52 PRO: FO 3711156877: Baghdad to Foreign Office, July 4, 1961, No.765, 10.55a.m.: Trevelyan. 
53 PRO: FO 3711156877: Basra to Foreign Office, July 4, 1961, No.63, 11.45a.m.: Pyman. 
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to make belligerent statements.54Information came from Colonel Amjadi, head of the 
Iranian Savak organisation in Khorramshahr, that the Iraqi Twentieth Brigade had been 
deployed on the frontier and that elements of the Nineteenth Brigade had gone to 
Umm-Qasr. Artillery units had also been deployed to reinforce the frontier posts along 
the Shatt el Arab from Khosroabad to the sea. 55 
Macmillan had been pleased with the success of Operation Vantage, but he was 
aware of the mounting political pressure that would develop if there was a prolonged 
substantial British military presence in Kuwait. Such pressure had already started to 
emanate, from Cairo, for British withdrawal of forces. 56Press reports in Cairo alleged 
that either the British had hatched up the whole affair in advance or that the British 
government had taken advantage of the situation to reassert its position.57 
Arab nationalist opinion was now being redirected at its traditional target, the 
British. Reductions in the number of troops in Kuwait were therefore required to 
counterbalance this new political threat that was beginning to undermine public opinion 
within Kuwait itself. Consideration had been given by the Defence Secretary, Profumo, 
to building up a Kuwaiti force. Profumo believed the Kuwaitis would need a Brigade 
group for successful security including a regiment of tanks and modem fighter and 
reconnaissance aircraft. 58 Macmillan was unhappy with these proposals. His concern 
was over the practical problems of being able to establish such a force from the 
Kuwaiti population and the notorious political and military unreliability of Arab 
officers. Macmillan preferred the idea of a small British garrison being permanently 
situated in Kuwait with an airfield somewhat removed from Kuwait city. 59 
Lord Home wrote back to Macmillan arguing that a permanent British garrison 
in Kuwait would not be acceptable in the long run to Kuwaiti and Arab opinion. This 
54 See Appendix 3. 
55 PRO: FO 3711156878: Two Telegrams: Tehran to Foreign Office, July 5 and July 7, 1961. No.786 
and No.796.: Harrison. 
56 Harold MacmiI1an, Pointing the Way; 1959-1961 (London: Macmillan Press, 1972), p. 385. 
57 PRO: FO 3711156880: Cairo to Foreign Office, July 7, 1961, No.696, 12.16p.m.: Beeley. 
58 PRO: FO 3711156883: Defence Secretary to Foreign Secretary, July 5, 1961. 
59 PRO: FO 3711156883: Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, July 6,1961. 
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was also the view held by Luce.60He argued that keeping troops in Kuwait might also 
damage the position of Britain in the rest of the Gulf and might lead to pressure on 
Britain to withdraw from the Gulf area altogether. The more isolated Kuwait became 
from the rest of the Arab world because of the presence of British troops, the more 
dependent it would be on the continued military support of Britain. Kuwait would 
become perhaps more of a British protectorate than ever before and this would damage 
the claim to independent statehood that constituted its main diplomatic and legal 
bulwark against Iraq.61 
Up to this point the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship had been a successful patron-
client relationship. The al-Sabah ruling family had been able to achieve its desired 
internal autonomy and external security with the help of the British and the position of 
Sheikh Abdullah had remained frrm and secure because of the relationship. In return, 
from the mid 1950s onwards, the British had received a flow of oil and fmancial 
support of sterling derived from extensive Kuwaiti investments. The intervention of 
patronal force on behalf of the client had been the ultimate way of securing the 
integrity of Kuwait. The problem and the concern was that this intervention had 
undennined the credibility of the al-Sabah ruling family. Too close a relationship with 
the British would damage the Kuwaitis and actually reduce their security. 
On July 12 Kuwaiti Radio announced that three British battalions and some 
naval units would be withdrawn from Kuwait.62At this time the number of British 
troops in Kuwait numbered around 6,000 men. The reduction in the numbers of British 
troops to 3,500 was approved by the Cabinet during a meeting held at Admiralty 
House on July 18. This was the number that the Ministry of Defence felt to be the 
"irreducible minimum" at this point for the defence of Kuwait.63 
60 PRO: FO 3711156883: Foreign Secretary to Prime Minister, July 14, 1961. 
61 PRO: FO 3711156884: Kuwait to Foreign Office, July 16, 1961: Luce to Stevens. 
62 PRO: FO 3711156882: Kuwait to Foreign Office, July 13, 1961: Richmond. 
63 PRO: FO 3711156882: Defence of Kuwait: Discussion in the Cabinet, July 18, 1961. 
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An Arab League solution began to be taken more seriously by the British. Lord 
Home met up with part of the Kuwaiti delegation to the United Nations, Abdul Aziz 
Hussein and Sa'ud Fawzan, and discussed such a solution. Lord Home insisted that any 
force sent to Kuwait had to be capable of fending off a surprise Iraqi attack for 
between thirty-six to forty-eight hours so that reinforcements from the outside could 
be rushed in.64Abdul Hussein set off on a tour of Tunisia, Morocco and the Sudan to 
put forward the proposal of a force capable of holding up a surprise Iraqi attack for up 
to forty-eight hours. Consideration was again given to the possibility of building up the 
indigenous forces of Kuwait. Unfortunately, implementation of this proposal would 
take up to a year. This policy, combined with the decision to stockpile military 
equipment in Kuwait for British use in times of emergency, would mean British troops 
remaining in Kuwait for some time. This would cause mounting political pressures in 
Kuwait and elsewhere in the Middle East against the British. An Arab League force 
seemed to be they only possible solution, but one that would present problems for the 
British government. There was a possibility that the Arab League would lay down as 
one of the criteria for the force the abrogation of the Anglo-Kuwaiti Exchange of 
Letters of June 19, 1961.65Also the composition as well as the political direction of the 
force might be outside the control of either the British or the Kuwaitis. The difficulties 
of balancing Kuwaiti security with political harmony in the region presented a tricky 
diplomatic challenge for the British. For the Kuwaiti ruling family it was the old 
problem of juggling internal autonomy and external security. 
On the day after the Exchange of Letters, Kuwait made an application to join 
the Arab League. Under Article 1 of the Arab League Charter any independent Arab 
State had the right to join the League. The membership of Kuwait had been supported 
by Saudi Arabia and Jordan and on June 23 the Council met to consider the 
application. Following the claim to Kuwait by Iraq the Council met to consider the 
position further. On July 20, 1961 it was put to the Iraqis that they either recognise the 
64 PRO: FO 3711 156882: Foreign Office to Kuwait, July 14, 1961, No.803, 11.00p.m.: Home. 
65 See pp. 132-134 of this thesis for arguments on Kuwait joining the Arab League. 
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independence of Kuwait, register that recognition in the Arab League and the United 
Nations and drop their claim to Kuwait, or else the Arab League would set about 
producing a force that would be sent to Kuwait to replace the British troops. The Iraqi 
delegate walked out of the debate and the remaining members voted unanimously to 
admit Kuwait as a member.66 
The Secretary General of the Arab League, General Abdul Khalik Hassouna, 
set about forming an Arab League contingent to replace the British forces. Any 
solution to the problem of the security of Kuwait would have to meet certain criteria 
set out by the British. The force would have to be an adequate deterrent to an Iraqi 
attack. The undertaking that Britain had given to Kuwait in the June 19 Exchange of 
Letters would still have to be maintained. The solution would also have to be 
acceptable politically to Kuwait such that it would not split Kuwait from the rest of the 
Arab world. The only solution that met all these criteria was an Arab League force. 
5.3.3 Policy review 
British policy in the Gulf became the subjec-t of a review in the wake of the 
intervention by British troops in Kuwait. Policy in the Gulf had been the subject of 
much debate within the Foreign Office after Suez. Sir Michael Wright and Sir Roger 
Stevens had both called for a change in the posture of Britain in the Gulf in 1956 
arguing that the existing position was an "anachronism" in this area and that the small 
Sheikhdoms should be brought into some kind of association with the Baghdad Pact. 
The Political Resident in the Gulf at that time, Sir Bernard Burrows, had defended the 
existing British disposition and called for a continuation of things as they were. Selwyn 
Lloyd, while Foreign Secretary, had set out policy in a dispatch of January 15, 1958, to 
Burrows. In this he had stated that any substantial change in British policy then would 
constitute an unacceptable risk. Sir George Middleton incorporated the views of the 
66 Finnie, Shifting lines, p. 138; Appendix 4. 
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Foreign Secretary and the Political Resident with his conclusions that Britain would be 
unable to leave either easily or quickly from the Gulf. 
Policy had recently been looked at by Sir William Luce when he had become 
the Political Resident in the Gulf in the middle of 1961. His judgement was that the 
relationship of Britain with the Gulf Sheikhdoms should be one of "adaptation" and not 
"transformation." Correctly, Middleton had previously suggested that it would be 
outside pressures and events rather than internal developments that would decide the 
future of the Gulf states. The threat from Iraq, the role of Egypt, the revolution in 
Syria and the stance of the Arab League was playing an instrumental role in 
developments in the Kuwaiti issue and thus reinforcing the validity of the comments of 
Middleton. 
The Iraq-Kuwait crisis had added some troubling elements to the position of 
Britain in the region. The intervention in Kuwait had once again heavily committed 
Britain, politically and militarily in the Middle East. This was a reversal of the reduced 
political and military commitments of Britain in the rest of the world and went against 
the general pattern of its decline and reduction in power and influence. There were 
three main reasons for this paradoxical position. 
First, the Sheikhdoms owed their survival as independent entities to the 
protection given by Britain. In the early years it had been the client-patron relationships 
with Britain that had secured these mini-states from being engulfed by the expansionist 
policies of the Persians and the Turks. After the First World War it was again the 
patron-client relationship that protected the Sheikhdoms from Saudi Arabia and later 
Iraq. Luce argued that in an age of self determination, on this issue alone, Britain had a 
moral obligation to protect these states and not allow them to be abandoned and 
absorbed by their more powerful neighbours.67 
Second, the importance of the production and supply of oil, especially Kuwaiti 
oil, to Britain had provided an even weightier reason for maintaining the independence 
67 PRO: FO 3711156670: UK policy in the Persian Gulf: Bahrain to Foreign Office, November 22, 
1961, No.98: Luce. 
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of the Sheikhdonls. Inevitably the wealth created by the oil increased the desires of the 
Sheikhdoms more powerful neighbours to gain control over them. This, combined with 
the development of modem anned forces in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, had necessitated an 
increase in the size of British military forces required for the protection of the 
Sheikhdoms. The extent of the British liability was made all too evident when Iraq 
backed its claim to Kuwait with a direct military threat. 
Third, British commitments had increased because they had failed to devise a 
political framework that would substitute security for purely military protection. As 
Luce put it: "Perhaps the main reason for our increasing involvement in the Persian 
Gulf has been our inability so far to devise any policy other than the exercise of military 
power to protect our interests in the area and to meet our treaty and moral obligations 
to the states. "68 
Two lesser reasons for the continued commitment of Britain to the Gulf 
included first, the lack of internal political development within the Sheikhdoms and 
second, the wishes of the Sheikhs themselves. A problem that Britain faced in creating 
a suitable political framework was the lack of political control that it exercised 
internally within the Sheikhdoms.69 The patron-client relationship had limited the 
power that Britain had to shape internal policies and so had left it without the ability to 
foster political development in the ways it had adopted throughout colonial Africa. A 
key aspect of clientelism was that it left the client with a high degree of internal 
autonomy. Therefore Britain had no formal powers to impose administrative 
bureaucracies, democracy or judicial organisations. The much needed political, 
economic and social development in the Sheikhdoms could neither be prompted or set 
up by the British. All that they could do was to suggest and encourage the steps that 
would engender some form of political legitimacy for these anachronistic mini-states. 
68 PRO: FO 3711156670: UK policy in the Persian Gulf: Bahrain to Foreign Office, November 22, 
1961, No.98: Luce. 
69 Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire, pp. 108, 136. 
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Perhaps precisely because these democratic urgings had been ignored, the Sheikhdoms 
remained in the hands of families opposed to British withdrawal. 
Combined with the vital economic interests that Britain had in the Gulf, these 
arguments remained powerful reasons for the continued engagement of Britain in the 
area. What was needed was an approach that combined a policy in keeping with the 
spirit of the times, kept stability in the Gulf and safeguarded British interests. If a 
policy could be found which met all these criteria then Britain could disengage 
militarily and politically from the region. Luce believed that no such solution could be 
found without some change in circumstances in the area. He wrote that "given 
Kuwait's geographical position, it is British and Western interests in the maintenance of 
her independence which is at the root of our present day position and commitments in 
the Gulf as a whole.' '70 
The threatened annexation of Kuwait by Qassim could now be executed by 
Iraqi military intervention at any time without much or any warning. This presented a 
difficult military problem for the client-patron relationship. Sheikh Abdullah followed a 
three-pronged approach to the problem. First, knowing that only Britain could muster 
the necessary forces in time to thwart any Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, he continued to 
hold Britain to the agreement signed on June 16, 1961, and thereby prolonged the 
patron-client relationship. Second, he promoted closer ties between Kuwait and the 
rest of the Arab world by joining the Arab League and through other diplomatic and 
fmancial manoeuvres. This was done because the British position was in decline and 
too close an alignment with them was politically dangerous for the ruling family. Third, 
he courted wider diplomatic support by applying for United Nations membership. 
Although the independence of Kuwait could only be maintained by the British military 
commitment in the Gulf, events had demonstrated to Sheikh Abdullah the need for 
Kuwait to court different patrons. 
70 PRO: FO 3711156670: UK policy in the Persian Gulf: Bahrain to Foreign Office, November 22, 
1961, No.98: Luce. 
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For the British the fulfilment of international obligations was very important. 
Britain would only withdraw from its agreement with Sheikh Abdullah if a suitable 
alternative could be found to guarantee the security of Kuwait and then only after 
giving three years notice. The Arab League force that had taken over from British 
troops in Kuwait had little military significance and was more important politically. 
Only a large and strongly balanced pennanent Arab League force in Kuwait could 
guarantee the security of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia would probably be the only Arab state 
willing to do this and such a force could in itself represent a threat to the security of 
Kuwait. Iran would be the only other state geographically placed to be able to help 
guarantee some fonn of military security, but this would be politically unacceptable for 
Kuwait because Iran was a non-Arab state and any link would be provocative to Iraq. 
Some fonn of a United Nations force could be one possibility, but this was unlikely to 
take shape given the Soviet Union's negative attitudes in the region. 
The general conclusion of this was summed up succinctly by Luce in his 
dispatch of November 1961: 
I am therefore to the conclusion that, so long as Qassim controls Iraq, 
Kuwait must rely on external military aid to secure her independence, that only 
HMG can effectively provide that aid and that the present Amir will expect them 
to do so. Equally, so long as Kuwait oil retains its present importance to Britain, 
it is in our interests to continue to bear this responsibility.7 1 
Even with careful strategic planning, Middle East developments outside the control of 
Britain would have a significant bearing on the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship and 
therefore the security of Kuwait. A static British policy towards Kuwait would be 
unprofitable because of many factors, including the Arab-Israeli question, the nature of 
the regime in Iraq, the potential spread of Communism in Iran and Iraq and the wider 
East-West confrontation. The weakened position of Britain and the uncertainties 
surrounding this area left policy makers looking only to the short tenn. The head of the 
Middle East Department, Sir Roger Stevens, agreed with the conclusions of Luce 
71 PRO: FO 3711 156670: UK policy in the Persian Gulf: Bahrain to Foreign Office, November 22, 
1961, No.98: Luce. 
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about the difficulty of discerning future events. The Foreign Office believed that the 
best policy for the Gulf and Kuwait was to continue on the present course of 
guaranteeing the security of Kuwait.72 
There would be problems with pursuing this course of action. The policy 
towards Kuwait would become increasingly difficult to maintain as Kenya reached 
independence (in 1963). Reinforcements of troops and aircraft from the Kenya base 
had formed a key part to the military plans for the security of Kuwait. With 
independence this base would be lost. The British undertaking given in the June 19 
Exchange of Letters would therefore become more difficult and expensive. The 
Foreign Office was also concerned that access to Kuwaiti oil on favourable terms 
might be undermined by the Kuwaitis themselves. This was based on the belief that the 
favourable terms would be erased by the greater effectiveness of OPEC, in which 
Kuwait was a founder member, the reduced ability of the oil companies to deal with 
the oil producing states and the future desire of Kuwait to run its own oil industry 
demonstrated by the setting up of the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC).73 
The newly formed OPEC organisation had already managed to halt the slide in 
oil prices. It was clear that this new organisation would soon be pushing for more 
power and a greater share in the profits for the oil states. The client-patron relationship 
was in the process of breaking down on both sides. Stevens rightly called for certain 
considerations to be taken into account: 
For these reasons alone we ought, I suggest, to be considering how to get 
out of our military obligations towards the Amir of Kuwait should we at any 
future time desire to do so. If we hope one day to shed these with safety and 
honour we are surely condemned to an unremitting search for political means of 
underpinning the independence of Kuwait.74 
72 PRO: FO 3711 156670: UK policy in the Middle East: Foreign Office to Bahrain, December 10, 
1961: Stevens to Luce. 
73 PRO: FO 3711 156670: UK policy in the Middle East: Foreign Office to Bahrain, December 10, 
1961: Stevens to Luce. 
74 PRO: FO 3711 156670: UK policy in the Middle East: Foreign Office to Bahrain, December 10, 
1961: Stevens to Luce. 
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The conclusion that can be drawn from these discussions over policy was that 
as soon as it became apparent that the economic and oil reasons for the position of 
Britain in the patron-client relationship were undermined, the British seriously 
considered withdrawal from their obligations. This shows that despite the breadth of 
the reasons given for the continuation of the position of Britain in the Gulf, the 
underlying reason was oil and finance and not Cold War strategic considerations. This 
substantiates the main argument of the thesis that the raison d'etre of declining powers 
in their patron-client relationships moves from strategic to economic objectives. The 
other argument that can be drawn from the policy position of Kuwait and Britain at 
this time is that the client state will still seek protection from the client-patron 
relationship if its security environment remains insecure. Therefore, in the absence of 
any adequate formal security system in the region, the political independence of 
Kuwait continued to depend on the client-patron relationship with Britain. This did not 
stop Sheikh Abdullah from looking for replacements to the client-patron relationship. 
The Gulf policy of Britain was now geared to and governed by its policy 
towards Kuwait. The maintenance of stability in the Gulf and the protection of oil 
supplies, lay at the heart of this policy, but seemed increasingly unattainable. In 1969, 
Sir William Luce commenting on British withdrawal from the Gulf wrote that: "The 
main question behind all this discussion is, of course, oil, and that is because since the 
Second World War, the Gulf region has proved to be the world's greatest known 
source of crude oil."75 The lessons of the Kuwaiti crisis pointed to none of the Gulf 
Sheikhdoms being able to retain their independence after the withdrawal of British 
75 William Luce, "A Naval Force for the Gulf", The Round Table 236 (October 1969),348. 
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protection since the reasons for the vulnerability of Kuwait applied equally to the other 
Sheikhdoms. Threats could come from any of the big three states in the Gulf: Iraq, Iran 
or Saudi Arabia.76 The vulnerabilities of the Sheikhdoms due to their small size and 
low population formed an intractable problem for the British. The reduction and 
decline in British power had removed any chance of Britain being able to impose any 
sort of federation on the Gulf Sheikhdoms. The internal security problems faced by 
each of the Sheikhdoms also would shape any attempt at political union. 
Geographically these mini-states were more accessible to Saudi Arabia than to each 
other. The political and military difficulties of any type of organisational pact would be 
near impossible without the inclusion of Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, Britain remained 
hostile and suspicious of Saudi Arabia. The Buraimi Oasis question and the war in 
Oman along with broken diplomatic relations between Britain and Saudi Arabia were 
the main reasons for this position. Saudi policy in Arabia and the Gulf was believed to 
be inimical to British interests. The dominant view in Whitehall was that the Wahhabis 
of Saudi Arabia were "greedy expansionists. "77Saudi Arabian military forces could get 
to within fifteen miles of the Burgan oil field in Kuwait without leaving Saudi territory. 
Iraq in contrast could only approach to within ninety miles of Kuwaiti town, before 
crossing into Kuwaiti territory. In a note responding to Richmond an official in the 
Foreign Office wrote that: ''The very disarray into which the relations between Arab 
Countries have fallen, to which you have drawn attention, seems to me to make it 
dangerous to rule out the possibility of Saudi Arabia becoming the main threat to 
Kuwait's independence. "78 
The Foreign Office view was that any withdrawal from the Gulf would threaten the 
security of oil production and supply as well as stability, because of the probability of 
conflict and expansionism by the large states in the Gulf. Another crucial consideration 
76 For an interesting analysis of the Gulf region's insecurities in the 1990s see: Zalmay Khalilzad, 
''The United States and the Persian Gulf: Preventing Regional Hegemony", Survival 37 (2) (Summer 
1995),95-120. 
77 PRO: FO 3711 156670: UK policy in the Persian Gulf. 
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in any British calculations was the East-West confrontation. Following on from their 
nineteenth-century policy of excluding foreign powers from the Gulf (Russia, Germany 
and Turkey), the British had been successful to this point in keeping the Soviet Union 
and Egypt out of the Gulf. Soviet penetration into the Gulf would undoubtedly 
increase with any British withdrawal as would the danger of the Soviet Union being 
able to stop Gulf oil flowing to the West. 
Strategically, the British foothold in the Gulf was still a vital consideration in 
the East -West confrontation. The military and political relationships that Britain 
enjoyed in the Gulf was a vital bulwark to any determined Soviet moves into the area. 
The obvious strategic importance of the Gulf to the West, both in the East -West 
struggle and because of oil, prompted Luce to suggest that the United States should be 
more actively encouraged into supporting the position of Britain in the Gulf,79 
The United States had been clear in its support of the British intervention in 
Kuwait and this was backed up by a general understanding and support of the British 
position. The Anglo-American alliance was operating successfully in the region. The 
United States remained for the moment content to leave Britain with the job of keeping 
the Gulf Sheikhdoms stable and under Western control. Joint military planning with the 
United States in the Gulf was desired by Luce and Stevens. The British were warming 
to the idea of the Americans taking a more active role in the Gulf in addition to Iran 
and Saudi Arabia. This had been tried unsuccessfully in the past. The imperatives of the 
Cold War meant that the United States had to be persuaded about the dangers posed 
to Western security by the formation of a power vacuum in the Gulf. Reduced British 
power in the Gulf would be exploited by the Soviet Union. The United States, because 
the tensions in the Gulf and the Middle East region coincided with heightened East-
West tensions in the wider world over Cuba and Berlin, remained in the background 
over the Kuwaiti issue. 
79 PRO: FO 371/ 126875: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 30, 1961: Trevelyan. 
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TIle need for an analysis of the costs and the benefits of British policy in the 
Gulf prompted Macmillan to call upon the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the 
Minister of Power to prepare an assessment of the economic and financial 
considerations. Points were raised over the cost to Britain of its investments made in 
the oil industry in the Gulf. In 1961 this annual investment was estimated at around 
£67 million. The military industrial complex supporting the role of Britain as policeman 
in the Gulf (bases and forces in Cyprus, Libya, Aden, the Gulf and Kenya), was put at 
around a recurrent cost of £40 million.80'fhere was also the risk that the oil policy of 
Kuwait could move against the interests of Britain, because of the need of Kuwait to 
keep in step with the other oil producers. It was the view of the Chancellor and the 
Prime Minister that the primary economic aim of Britain was to safeguard the 
production profits of the oil companies. A report on Kuwait came before the Cabinet 
on October 2, 1961, outlining the importance of its oil and finance to Britain. It was 
clear that Kuwait was of vital importance to the Middle East oil interests of Britain. 
The guaranteed supply of oil, the favourable effects on the sterling balances of British 
companies operating in Kuwait and the readiness of Sheikh Abdullah to receive and 
hold his royalties in sterling, were considerable advantages and benefits to Britain. A 
paper entitled "Kuwait and Middle East Oil" had been circulated on August 4, 1961, to 
the Future Policy Working Group of the Cabinet. In this paper an attempt was made to 
discern the total British economic interests at stake in the Middle East. It was 
calculated that if British companies were excluded from the Middle East, the cost to 
the balance of payments of Britain would amount to around £200 million a year. 81 
A more likely scenario was that British companies would still be able to operate 
but for a much reduced share of oil production profits. The cost of this to the balance 
of payments could be as much as £100 million per annum. British Petroleum (BP) had 
a half share of Kuwaiti Oil Company (KOC), while Shell purchased on good terms the 
majority of the half share of the American partner. The Middle East region was of 
80 PRO: FO 3711 126875: Baghdad to Foreign Office, June 30, 1961: Trevelyan. 
81 PRO: CAB 129/ 106: Kuwait, October 2, 1961, C. (61) 140. 
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overwhelming importance to BP, which in 1960 drew ninety-eight per cent of its 
supplies from the area and fifty-one per cent from Kuwait alone. The independence of 
Kuwait along with its close relationship with Britain acted as a counter balance against 
any further move for control of Middle East oil by one of the other three big producers 
(Iran. Iraq and Saudi Arabia). The independent status of Kuwait ensured that oil 
continued to flow on reasonable terms and in large quantities.82 
The Foreign Office believed that the best way of protecting this economic 
interest was to help preserve the al-Sabah ruling family and an independent Kuwait and 
so continue the close relationship of co-operation between Britain and Kuwait, but a 
change in the terms of the concession agreement of KOC or a decision by the al-Sabah 
family no longer to hold substantial amounts of sterling could have effectively reduced 
the importance of Kuwait to Britain financially. 
Due to negotiations between some of the Arab states and the importance of the 
United Nations in the Kuwaiti crisis, the Prime Minister felt that there might be a need 
to change the existing strategy of Britain. Macmillan realised early on in the crisis that 
Britain might have to accept either intervention by-United Nations or Arab League 
forces. This might well have to be accompanied by a partial or a full withdrawal of 
British forces. He wrote that: 
It would be optimistic to assume that we should then indefinitely be able 
to have access to and control Kuwait oil on present terms. It would also be 
optimistic to assume that we should be able to repeat our recent military 
intervention, at any rate in anything like the same way. These considerations 
point to the need for an up-to-date assessment of our stake in the Middle East as 
a basis for an examination of how far we can, or should, adjust our military 
strategy for that area in the future.83 
Macmillan was keen that both the military and the financial considerations were 
fully explored before any decisions were made concerning the overall British strategy 
towards Kuwait. 
82 PRO: CAB 129/ 106: Kuwait, October 2, 1961, C. (61) 140. 
83 PRO: PREM 111 3452: Draft minute from Prime Minister to Chancellor of the Exchequer, July 12, 
1961. 
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5.3.4 Military dinlension of the crisis 
A number of problems faced British military commanders when planning 
intervention in Kuwait. The geographical isolation of Kuwait from large British 
military bases meant that troops could only be readily moved into Kuwait in large 
numbers at speed using air transport. Aden and Cyprus were closest at around 1,500 
miles. The Cyprus base was handicapped by the new problem of the "air barrier". One 
of the effects of the Suez disaster had been to rule out air routes for the British military 
in the region. Pennission had to be sought from various governments to overfly their 
territories.84 This was no straightforward matter as was clearly demonstrated during 
the intervention of British forces in Jordan in 1958 when troops were flown from 
Cyprus over Israel. Permission was only granted at the last minute after aircraft had 
been fired upon by the Israeli Air Force and forced to tum back to Cyprus. 
The air barrier over Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and at times Israel, Jordan and 
the Lebanon, meant that only two air routes were open to British forces West of Suez. 
The RAP could fly either over Turkey and then Iran to Kuwait from Cyprus or via the 
base at Libya, flying across the desert through Sudan~ Even these two routes presented 
problems for the COS. Permission from Turkey for overflying was no mere formality. 
During the Kuwaiti crisis the refusal of Turkey, at first, to allow overflying put 
Operation Vantage in real jeopardy. The flight from Libya had to cross difficult terrain 
and was lengthy, adding to the time required for effective intervention. The proximity 
of Iraq to Kuwait along with the excellent terrain between the two states for tanks and 
annoured vehicles meant that speed of intervention was of the essence. East of Suez, 
British forces could be moved from Aden, Kenya, Bahrain, Nairobi, the Gulf and from 
the Indian Ocean. The distances to be covered by the military remained a formidable 
strategic problem for the British. 
84 For analysis on overflying issues see pp. 112-113 of this thesis. 
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TABLE 5.1 
Distances to Kuwait from British Military Bases 
To Kuwait from:- In Miles:-
UK via Cyprus, Turkey, Iran 3,790 
Cyprus via Turkey, Iran 1,770 
Nairobi direct 1,940 
Singapore via Gan 4,235 
Aden via Shajah, Bahrain 1,560 
Bahrain direct 225 
Source: Adapted from: David Lee, Flight from the Middle East (London: HMSO, 
1980), p.169. 
The problem of overflying rights was to hamper the military plans of the British 
government throughout the 1960s. Joseph Salem commenting on British overflying in 
the late 1960s writes: 
There is one important limitation imposed upon air routes. Overflying 
rights are jealously stipulated and strictly observed and the situation is such 
today that overlying rights are largely denied to British military aircraft. A 
transport plane of the RAF proceeding eastwards from Cyprus must take one 
route only: north over Turkey and thence into Iraq, turning south near Tehran 
to descend towards Bahrain. No other route is at present politically possible. If 
Iran or Turkey were induced to deny Britain the right to fly over their 
territories, then the transport of troops to any point east of Suez would present a 
major problem in logistics and communications. This is a consideration with 
grave strategic implications even though the much needed longer Westward 
route across three oceans were freely available.85 
The shortage of troops and equipment also meant that Operation Vantage 
could jeopardise other potential operations. At this time political tension was mounting 
in Northern Rhodesia, the Congo and in Berlin. Any intervention of British troops to 
sustain law and order in Northern Rhodesia, under the plan code named Kingfisher, 
would need the entirety of RAP transport. These planes, vital for Operation Vantage, 
would be needed for up to six weeks to mount Kingfisher and then for an 
indeterminable period while troops remained in Rhodesia. Three Brigades would have 
to be assembled, mainly from Kenya, leaving Vantage dependent on units of the British 
Army of the Rhine (BAOR). Operation Fume was the plan for helping the Federal 
85 Joseph Salem, "The Drama of US-Iraq Relations", pp. 66-67. 
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government keep stability and internal security in the Congo. This also competed for 
the resources required for the Kuwaiti operation.86 
Diplomatic and moral support was sought from the United States at this 
important juncture. It had become part of British foreign policy, following Suez, to 
keep the United States fully infonned about military moves in the Middle East. Thus 
the Americans were briefed about the belief in London that Qassim was preparing to 
reinforce his troops near the Kuwaiti border with a tank regiment. Rusk was infonned 
by June 29th that the Iraqis could reach Kuwait by July 1. Once the Iraqi forces were 
positioned in the Basra area there would be no warning of an attack. Lord Home asked 
on June 29 whether the United States government could be counted upon to give its 
full political backing to Britain if force had to be used in Kuwait. A meeting was held 
of the United States National Security Council on June 29, 1961 in which the issue of 
Kuwait was discussed. The Kennedy administration clearly understood the importance 
of Kuwait to the West. 
The Secretary of State opened a discussion of Kuwait by saying that the 
situation was critical and that decisions might be called for .... There was a brief 
but careful discussion in which the great interests of the West in Kuwait were 
noted, and there was concurrence in the view that the Secretary of State could 
give reassurance to Lord Home on both points .... [Action memoranda 2431] 
Noted the President's approval. .. that the United States give full political and 
logistical support, if required to the United Kingdom in connection with certain 
actions it is taking to forestall any Iraq attempt to take over Kuwait by force.87 
Rusk telephoned and sent a telegram assuring Lord Home that his government would 
indeed give its full political support for such a move. Rusk also agreed with the British 
request to a combined approach between their two countries' missions in the United 
Nations on the Kuwaiti question.88 
86 PRO: FO 3711 156874: Military preparations for intervention in Kuwait, Walmsley, June 26, 1961: 
Wa1msley. 
87 JFKL: NSC Meetings and Memoranda Series: Memorandum for Record, Discussion at NSC 
Meeting June 29, 1961. 
88 PRO: FO 3711156874: Washington to Foreign Office, June 29,1961, No. 1596: Caccia. 
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The possibilities of military support was also discussed between Rusk and Lord 
Home. At the time of the last crisis over Kuwait during the Iraqi revolution of 1958 the 
then Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had agreed to offer support to Britain. 
Dulles had been prepared to occupy parts of Saudi Arabia if necessary and had urged 
Lloyd to be ready to take control of Kuwait and the other oil fields of the Gulf. At that 
time it had been agreed that if Britain were obliged to occupy Kuwait then America 
would lend the British their full support. Subsequent joint Anglo-American military 
planning in the Gulf had not, however, run the smooth course that the British had 
hoped for. The United States government had been reluctant to discuss military 
planning in the area and no commitment had been made by them to the British 
government after the emergency in July 1958.89 A commitment to morally support a 
British resort to force had, however, been given. 
It was therefore reassuring for the British when the Chief of Defence Staff, 
Mountbatten, was given infonnation by Admiral Page-Smith on June 29, 1961, about 
the United States forces that might be available in the region to assist in any British 
expedition into Kuwait. Admiral Page-Smith offered it squadron of United States Navy 
Alpha Delta long-range propeller aircraft that could be flown from their carrier to the 
Gulf and could then operate from bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, Turkey or Iran. He also 
offered a battalion of 2,100 Marines from the Sixth Fleet which at this point was in 
Sicily, but these could be transported by air at short notice to the Gulf. The United 
States also had forces that could be moved from Gennany at short notice. These 
included two airborne battle groups, two squadrons of fighters, a squadron of 
interceptors and a squadron of reconnaissance aircraft. 90 
None of these forces at this time had been alerted. On July 1 Rusk called the 
British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Harold Caccia, and made an offer of military 
support from the United States Naval Force at sea off the African coast near 
89 PRO: FO 3711 156874: The Possibility of Assistance from the United States in Defending Kuwait, 
June 27,1961: Walmsley. 
90 PRO: PREM III 3427: Information Conveyed by General Code, Secretary of CoS, June 30, 1961. 
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Mombassa. This force, code-named Solent Amity, was made up of two destroyers, one 
small craft, one LST (with equipment but no tanks on board) and 500 United States 
Marines. Rusk infonned Caccia that this force could reach Bahrain to join the other 
two American destroyers there by July 5 and sought the opinion of Britain on its 
despatch, since the State Department was concerned about despatching forces to an 
area where there was no specific United States commitment.91 
The offer was discussed by Macmillan and the Cabinet the next day. By this 
time the question was whether Qassim would still attack even with a British force in 
place. Over the next few days British forces would still face a superior Iraqi force. If 
the Iraqis were to attack then United States forces close by in Bahrain would be very 
useful to British operations. If there was no attack the West would be left with a 
political problem. The presence of Solent Amity in the northern Gulf could be 
perceived and presented by Arabs and Soviets alike as part of a Western imperialist 
manoeuvre. So Macmillan asked the Americans to allow Solent Amity to continue on 
its course for the next twenty-four hours or so at which point the situation would be 
-
reviewed. Macmillan also asked that one of the United States Destroyers presently in 
the Gulf should go to the northern part of the Gulf and act as a reconnaissance vessel 
looking out for Iraqi maritime activity. In particular the British were concerned about 
the twelve motor torpedo boats at that moment based at Basra. The Naval forces of 
Britain in the area at that moment were stretched and despatch of an extra Destroyer 
from Aden to Bahrain was of great help.92 
Plans for intervention in Kuwait by the British had been in existence for some 
considerable time. The Joint Planners Committee of the three services had been due to 
meet on July 5 to implement the revised plan Operation Bellringer in place of 
Operation Vantage. There had been careful planning to ensure that many of the vital 
elements needed for the operation were in place in and around Kuwait because for 
reasons of weight and size these logistics would be the hardest to move into the area at 
91 PRO: PREM 1113428: Washington to Foreign Office, July 1, 1961: Caccia. 
92 PRO: PREM 111 3428: Foreign Office to Washington, July 2, 1961. 
speed with the strategic reserve. The pre-positioning of these elements meant that only 
troops and their lighter equipment remained to be moved into the area. These vital 
logistical provisions included eight Centurion tanks with operating and maintenance 
personnel and equipment. These tanks were kept in an LST which was pennanently on 
station in the Gulf (at the time of Operation Vantage was at Bahrain) with the ability to 
reach Kuwait in four days. Within Kuwait eight Centurion tanks were maintained by 
the Kuwaiti anny so that they could be available for immediate use by British forces. 
Three Whirlwind Helicopters, owned by the Kuwaiti government and operated by a 
British charter company, were to be placed at the disposal of the British, along with a 
number of Auster light aircraft of the Kuwaiti flying club. The Kuwaiti government, 
the Kuwaiti anny and KOC had promised 688 "B" type vehicles (Land Rovers, three-
tonners. lorries, trailers etc.) for the British forces. Drinking water and petrol was to be 
available in vast quantities in Kuwait for the intervening forces. Plans had also been 
made for certain buildings to be put aside for the British for living and storage 
accommodation.93 
There were three vital bonuses to the operation: the stockpile at Bahrain, KOC 
and the extra forces available in the Gulf. The stockpile of military equipment held at 
Bahrain, which could be moved to the Kuwaiti theatre within thirty hours steaming by 
supply ships or ninety minutes flying time of transport aircraft, contained "B" type 
vehicles, Saladins, Ferrets, 'Twenty-Five' pounder guns, ammunition, rations and POL 
(Petrol, oil and Lubricants). The close proximity of this stockpile to the "hot zone" was 
a logistical bonus. The KOC provided invaluable help to the British forces and to the 
whole operation throughout. The oil company, partly owned by the British 
government, provided facilities and amenities to the British forces that smoothed the 
whole operation through. The KOC had an extensive network of VHF radio 
telephones which they lent to the British anny. This means of communication proved 
the most reliable in contact between the Joint Administrative Headquarters (JAHQ) 
93 PRO: WO 321 20721: Army Operational Research Group report on Operation Vantage, completed 
August 1961: D.F. Bayly Pike. 
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and '24th' Brigade Headquarters.94British forces available in the Gulf region at the 
time of the crisis were better than usual. The Commando ship H.M.S. Bulwark, with 
most of '42' Royal Marines Commando and parts of Headquarters Three Commando 
Brigade on board, was in the vicinity at Karachi. This ship was on route to undertake 
hot weather trials in the Gulf and was due to arrive in Kuwait on July 6. 95It was given 
new orders at midnight on June 28-29 to sail towards Kuwait, but to remain out of 
sight of land.96Steaming at twenty-four knots, H.M.S. Bulwark arrived within twelve 
miles of the new airfield in Kuwait on July 1 at 11.17 a.m. There were also twice the 
usual number of Centurion tanks available in the Gulf because the operation had 
coincided with a changeover of the eight tanks stationed at Bahrain (the normal 
contingent).97The eight Centurion tanks held in Kuwait were quickly put in position on 
July 1. 
The operation ran into trouble from the outset over the overflying and air 
landing facilities. Turkey and the Sudan refused overflying permission and the 
Commander in Chief of the operation, Sir Charles Elsworthy, was faced with entering 
Kuwait and securing the airport without the Paracnute regiment earmarked for this 
operation from Cyprus. Elsworthy had little choice but to enter Kuwait on July 1 with 
just '42' Commando, one squadron of Carabiniers and two squadrons of Hunter 
aircraft. Lee wrote that this development "took both Whitehall and the Middle East 
Command completely by surprise."98 
The decision was taken to change the operational plan. The modification 
decided upon was to give priority to the "teeth" fighting units. Men with personal 
weapons and light equipment were to reach Kuwait as soon as possible at the expense 
of freight and administrative units. Although this meant that a large number of fighting 
94 PRO: WO 3V 20721: Army Operational Research Group report on Operation Vantage, completed 
August 1961: D.F. Bayly Pike. 
95 PRO: PREM 1113427: Foreign Office to Kuwait, June 27, 1961. 
96 PRO: PREM 111 3427: Foreign Office to Baghdad, June 28, 1961. 
97 David Lee, Flight From the Middle East (London: HMSO, 1980), p.171. 
98 Lee, Flight, p.174. 
forces arrived in Kuwait in a very short space of time, their actual battle readiness was 
very much reduced by the lack of administrative co-ordination and command and 
control. 
Within forty-eight hours British forces had entered Kuwait in sufficient force to 
deter any potential Iraqi attack. The operation was without doubt a political success 
for Britain and Kuwait. Its success meant that the British Cabinet did not in fact review 
the state of British forces deployed for the Kuwaiti theatre until September 1, 1961. 
The pre-positioned equipment in Kuwait included twenty-four tanks, twenty four 
annoured cars (sixteen Saladin and eight Ferrets), twelve field guns, engineering 
equipment, heavy vehicles, ammunition, aircraft rockets and mobile radar type "t". 
Adequate technical personnel were left in Kuwait to maintain this equipment. In the 
Bahrain and Sharjah area military personnel and equipment included one parachute 
battalion, one annoured squadron, one armoured car squadron, one parachute light 
battery, a detachment of Hunter G.A.9s and Beverleys, Twin Pioneers and a few 
Pembrokes. In Aden, forces deployment for Kuwait included one infantry battalion, a 
-
regimental headquarters, one armoured squadron, one field battery, one troop of field 
engineers, Hunter G.A.9s, Shackletons, four Hastings (detached from NEAF transport 
force) and four Brittannias. In Kenya forces earmarked for the Kuwaiti operation 
included a brigade headquarters, two infantry battalions, a regimental headquarters, 
one field battery, a field squadron less one troop, brigade administrative units, and a 
number of Beverleys. West of the air barrier forces on standby for a return to Kuwait 
included one Canberra squadron in Germany, and two in Cyprus and, in Britain, four 
Brittannias on twenty-four hours notice.99 
The conclusions and lessons to be drawn from the military viewpoint were 
extensive. Clearly, properly trained and equipped military forces directed under the 
right operational plan were a necessity for the continued security of Kuwait. The 
recognised problems of moving forces to this distant military theatre as well as the 
99 PRO: CAB 129/ 106: Kuwait: Memorandum by Minister of Defence, September 1, 1961, C (61) 
133. 
sustainment of those forces once they had arrived was clearly shown up in Operation 
Vantage. This operation had many similar problems to those experienced in Operation 
Desert Storm of 1990-1991. Jeffrey McCausland offers a useful military analysis of the 
Gulf Conflict that can be used as a basis for understanding British military intervention 
in July 1961. 100 
In Operation Vantage although a large number of fighting units were moved in 
quickly into Kuwait some of them were ill equipped to fight the Iraqis. Many of the 
units were relying on local transport for strategic mobility in the field. The great failure 
of the Kuwaitis to meet the agreed transport plans and needs of Operation Vantage 
meant that, had some of the British forces been forced to fight anything but a static 
defensive battle, they would have been incapable of doing so. 
The lack of defmite real-time intelligence was also a problem for both the 
military and the politicians. This aspect of the crisis as already mentioned has remained 
the most controversial. The government documents do not mention the use of aerial 
reconnaissance in the assessment of the Iraqi threat. Alani writes that: "there [was] no 
evidence to suggest that the RAF intelligence gathering capability was put into use 
before British forces landed in Kuwait."101There were also large problems of command 
and control of forces within the field area. The decision to give priority to fighting 
units with personal weapons and light equipment was partly responsible for the 
massive breakdown in ,the strategic communications of the British forces. In the 
operations plan it had been assumed that the civil airport would be shut to commercial 
traffic and would be at the disposal of British forces. Unfortunately, from the 
operations perspective, civil aircraft continued flying into Kuwait throughout the crisis 
and the British forces therefore had to fly into the new airport at Magwa. This airport 
was far from completed and had no unloading or refuelling facilities. Fighting troops 
arriving on Brittannias had to leave by the emergency chute. A lack of administrative 
100 Lt-Colonel Jeffrey McCausland, "The Gulf Conflict: A Military Analysis", Adelphi Paper 282 
(London: IISS, 1993). 
101 Alani, Operation Vantage, p.109. 
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manpower in Kuwait to deal with the incoming military supplies meant that many vital 
supplies were either lost or were taken back on the aeroplanes back to Bahrain and the 
troops guarding the runway became unofficially used for unloading aircraft. An 
example of the detrimental effect that the administrative and tactical problems had on 
the efficiency of British forces was the '29th' Field Royal Artillery, that nine days after 
the start of the operation was still without its wireless sets, batteries and charging 
engines. So many units were without their vital supplies that hundreds of 'flash' 
messages were sent on the communications network. The effect of this was to 
completely clog up the communications network. Important messages were held up for 
days on end as a result. Command and control of British forces had to be done on an 
ad hoc basis in the operations area. 
The British Commander had been given certain rules of engagement to deal 
with an Iraqi attack. Authorisation was given by the Cabinet for the Commander to 
extend air attacks into Iraq to a depth of fifteen miles towards grounds forces. If the 
Iraqi air force attacked authorisation was given to engage in hot pursuit back to the 
Iraqi bases where they could be destroyed on the ground using rockets or guns, but not 
bombs. I02These restrictions were influenced by the strategic view of the politicians and 
military commanders in London. The strategic view was based on experience 
accumulated over many years, and the politicians and the military were especially 
influenced by the Second World War and the Suez campaign. At Suez they had seen 
military victory tum into political defeat. They were also sensitive about the need not 
to be seen as acting as an imperialistic power. Britain had controlled Iraqi rebels during 
the British mandate by using the RAP to bomb villages and towns. Bombing as a 
weapon was a tool that the politicians preferred not to use because of the effect it 
could have on Arab and world opinion. 
102 PRO: WO 32120719: Flash message from Ministry of Defence, London to CINC MIDEAST, 
Bahrain, July 3, 1961. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
The exclusive agreement between Britain and Kuwait was abrogated on June 
19, 1961. Within twelve days of this announcement British troops had entered Kuwait 
at the request of Sheikh Abdullah to combat the threat of military annexation of 
Kuwait by Iraq. Qassim had instigated the political crisis on June 25 when he gave a 
press conference voicing the historical Iraqi claim to Kuwait. The ensuing events 
changed the political and security map of Kuwait fundamentally and forced a close 
review of British policy. The crisis of June-July 1961 represented the most important 
and dangerous moment in Kuwaiti history between the signing of the 'Bond' in 1899 
and the Gulf War of 1990-1991. 
The 1961 crisis became a focus of political and later of historical debate. The 
question of whether Iraq really did move military forces towards the border in 
readiness for an invasion and whether there was an actual threat to the political and 
territorial integrity of Kuwait has been discussed at length by many writers. 103 Alani 
argues that Qassim never intended to invade Kuwait and was more interested in the 
"disruption of the new Anglo-Kuwaiti alliance" than annexation. He goes on to say that 
Qassim's statements did not clearly indicate the intention of using force to "liberate this 
section of Iraqi territory."104Bulloch takes a similar line claiming that the Kuwait 
intervention was an operation "contrived" by the War Office that wished to test out its 
new rapid deployment force in the Gulf. IOS There is good cause to dispute the analyses 
of Alani and Bulloch. First, there were a number of reasons why Britain would have 
preferred not to have had a crisis in its relations with Iraq. Britain had extremely 
important assets in the Gulf region, particularly in Kuwait and Iraq. The two major 
103penrose, AJani, BuJJoch and Chubin take the view that Iraq's threats were more poJitical than 
military in 1961: Edith and E. F. Penrose, Iraq: International Relations and National Development 
(London: Ernest Benn, 1978), pp. 276, 293; Chubin, Security, p. 27; Alani, Operation Vantage; 
BuHoch The Persian Gulf Unveiled; Ibrahim and Ke]Jy take the view that Iraq massed troops on the , 
Kuwaiti border ready to invade: Ibrahim, Ibrahim ed., The Gulf Crisis: Background and 
Consequences (Washington D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1992), pp. 8-9; John B 
KelJy, Arabia. the Gulf and the West (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980), p. 284. 
104 Alani, Operation Vantage, pp. 74, 76. 
105BuJIoch, The Persian Gulf Unveiled, pp. 62-65. 
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British oil companies, BP and Shell, extracted the bulk of their oil from this region. 
Any sustained military operation in this region far from securing the production and 
supply of oil, which was the main policy objective of the British, could actually have 
led to disruption and instability of the oil supply. Concern was expressed in Whitehall 
over the possible measures that Qassim was likely to take against Britain in Iraq. These 
included nationalisation of the Basra Oil Company and the freezing or sequestration of 
British assets. At this time delicate negotiations were taking place between IPC and the 
Iraqi government. The cost to British business and to the all-important balance of 
payments would have been high. British interests in Kuwait were more important than 
those it had in Iraq. Sending British troops into Kuwait also raised important political 
and financial considerations. The extensive sterling deposits held by Sheikh Abdullah 
might easily have been withdrawn in response to an Arab nationalist propaganda attack 
while the political settlement in Kuwait after British troops withdrew could have 
damaged British vital interests. It is true that one of the main reasons Britain 
intervened was to safeguard British assets. The Macmillan government was also well 
-
aware that this action could have jeopardised the very interests that it was intended to 
protect. It is inconceivable that British military interests in 'testing out Operation 
Vantage' would be allowed to circumvent interests fmancially worth in the estimated 
region of annually £300 million. 106 
The war-game hypothesis is rendered all the more implausible by timing. 
Strategically, Operation Vantage came at an inopportune moment, with east-west 
relations were becoming increasingly problematic as political tension rose over Berlin. 
The Chiefs of Staff were worried about dangers posed throughout the world by the 
Cold War. After Suez and the Sandys Defence cut, British military forces were at full 
stretch. At a time when British forces might have to be used at short notice to fulfil a 
NATO role in Berlin, to intervene in the Congo or in Rhodesia, only the most urgent 
military necessity could have justified the use of some 6,000 British troops, the bulk of 
106 Luce writing in 1969 put the figure contributing to Britain's balance of payments at around £200 
million a year. Luce, "A Naval Force", p. 348. 
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the aircraft of Transport Command and substantial numbers of fighter aircraft, tanks 
and Royal Navy Ships in an extended exercise. 
Besides, intervention carried enormous political risks. Sir Anthony Eden had 
been politically destroyed by a botched Middle East intervention. The slightest hint of 
British imperialist ambitions would have opened up a whole volley of attacks from 
nationalist forces. By intervening, the Macmillan government was drawing world and 
Arab attention to an area where close observation was not in British or Kuwaiti 
interests. Inevitably the Arab infighting would cease and the disparate factions would 
unite in an attack on the easy target of the British. There was also the electoral danger 
of having British troops in the firing line. British casualties in a war fought far away in 
an Arab mini-state would have been difficult to justify to a critical House of Commons 
and electorate. 
Had it been discovered that Britain had contrived an Iraqi threat to Kuwait then 
British credibility would have been severely undermined. In the United Nations and the 
Middle East, Britain could have faced a diplomatic catastrophe similar to Suez if such 
an allegation had been credible. At a time when Britfsh policy was to roll back its own 
colonial past, an imperialist adventure in Kuwait did not make historical, political or 
common sense. 
The recently released government documents tell a different story to that told 
by Alani and Bulloch. The files show that the British government was convinced that 
Iraq was on the verge of invading Kuwait. Influential voices in the Middle East such as 
Sir William Luce and Sir Humphrey Trevelyan advised the Foreign Office that there 
were indications that Iraq was about to invade Kuwait. Covert sources in Baghdad and 
Basra reported movements of Iraqi troops and armour towards the border. There was 
uncertainty about the nature and extent of the threat that Iraq posed, but the political 
and military information coming from Iraq suggested that intervention in some form 
was imminent. 
Alani bases much of his argument on discussions with the Political Agent in 
Kuwait Richmond. Both he and Bulloch state that Richmond was not supportive of , 
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British military intervention in Kuwait and saw no evidence of a direct Iraqi threat. 
Alani also makes ou t that the British government instructed Richmond to secure from 
Sheikh Abdullah a request for British military intervention. 107The Foreign Office did 
indeed instruct Richmond to get the request of Sheikh Abdullah for British 
intervention. Yet, according to the account given by Richmond, the ruler had pre-
empted his instructions from Whitehall and had already requested British intervention. 
That the British should have taken the initiative to prompt Sheikh Abdullah to request 
intervention formally is in any case poor evidence that they were manufacturing the 
crisis. It is consistent with their acute sensitivity to the difficulty of establishing the 
legality of their action and securing good public relations should the crisis develop into 
an anned conflict with Iraq, given the strength of Arab nationalist sentiment in Kuwait 
and the Middle East and of anti-colonialist feelings in the United Nations and the 
United States. The dovishness of Richmond is understandable because he would have 
been fully aware of the potential dangers that British intervention could have had for 
the position of Britain in the Gulf and because he, like Sheikh Abdullah, was very much 
-
in the dark over Iraqi troop movements. The Agency was limited in its ability to gather 
intelligence information and Richmond along with the government of Kuwait was 
dependent upon London for information. In a letter to the Foreign Office Richmond 
wrote: "As you know, I had hoped it would not have been necessary to obtain the 
Ruler's request for help until evidence of Iraqi build-up was stronger. But now that he 
has asked for our help it would be most damaging here if nothing arrived. "108 
The facts that faced Macmillan and his Cabinet were that Qassim had made a 
clear and unambiguous claim to Kuwait and that the radio and press in Iraq had 
launched a vitriolic campaign against Kuwait calling for military intervention. These 
heightened political tensions were backed up with rumour, gossip and unconfrrmed 
reports of Iraqi troop movements. It was not until covert secret intelligence reports 
from Baghdad arrived in Whitehall informing of troop and armour movements that the 
107 Alani, Operation Vantage. p. 179. 
108 PRO: PREM 111 3428: Kuwait to Foreign Office, July 1, 1961 2.20a.m.: Richmond. 
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green light was given for intervention. These reports were sent direct to London and , 
from there, were copied only to the British Embassy in Washington and the British 
delegation to the United Nations. 
Intervention had to be on a completely legal basis. The request of Sheikh 
Abdullah for help had to be obtained before the operation could be mounted. The 
Foreign Office was also quick to announce that British forces would leave Kuwait as 
soon as Sheikh Abdullah requested it. This policy was linked to legitimacy in the UN 
and the support of the United States. The lessons of Suez were dominating the style of 
British action overseas. It also showed that the British were still prepared when 
necessary to take steps to secure their vital economic interests. The security of oil 
supplies was the dominant factor in this decision making process. The economic health 
of Western Europe was dependent upon the free flow of cheap oil from the Middle 
East. Kuwait by 1960, was the third largest oil producer in the world and had a quarter 
of known world oil reserves. 109 
British policy in Kuwait was also linked to the wider issue of the position of 
-
Britain in the Gulf. British credibility was at stake. Any retreat over Kuwait would 
have put the British position throughout Arabia at risk. Operation Vantage was the 
largest and most noticeable intervention by the British in the Gulf during this period. 
Military force had been used in Oman, Bahrain, Aden and the small Gulf Sheikhdoms 
to deal with local revolts. This investment would have been ruined had the British not 
fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty signed on June 19, 1961, allowing the power 
balance to swing dramatically in the favour of Iraq. As Elizabeth Monroe points out: 
"For some time before the collapse at Aden, there had been discussion of abandoning 
defence expenditure 'east of Suez', but always the sanctity of long-standing treaties 
with Gulf rulers had stood in its way. "110 
The extent of the forces eannarked for the Kuwait represented an important 
military commitment. The size and scale of forces needed to effect an immediate 
109 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, p.107. 
110 Monroe, Britain's Moment, p. 215. 
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intervention in Kuwait was a large burden on already stretched military resources. The 
need for these forces was also welcomed by the various branches of the military who 
were at this time in the process of having to justify their force levels. The defence of 
Kuwait had been partly secured by units arriving from Kenya. It was unlikely that 
Kenya could be used as a British military base after the end of 1962 (with its proposed 
independence). The need to provide accommodation for these forces moving from 
Kenya to the Gulf was set out in the Kuwait report to the Cabinet in September 
1961. 111 
TABLE 5.2 
The Estimated Annual Cost of Maintaining Forces in the Persian Gulf Region 
Forces 1962-1963 1966-67 
Cost £mill £mill 
3 Frigates & Amphibious 1.1 1.0 
Squadron 
8 Army Units in Aden and 8.3 (Includes Aden 19.0 (Includes £1.2 mill for 
Gulf Federal Army) temporary accommodation) 
RAP in Aden and Gulf 5.8 8.15 
TOTAL 15.2 28.15 
Source: Adapted from: PRO: CAB 129/ 106: Kuwait, October 2, 1961, C (61) 140. 
The military difficulties of mounting another intervention into Kuwait had 
increased due to the new assessment of Iraqi capabilities. The emergency of July 1961 
had demonstrated the military difficulty of mounting an intervention in Kuwait. The air 
barrier, the steady depletion of British forces in the Middle East theatre, the potential 
political and diplomatic pitfalls of joint Anglo-American action, the impending loss of 
Kenya and new assessments of Iraqi capabilities and of the speed with which Iraq 
could overrun Kuwait all drew attention to the ever greater difficulties that would 
attend any subsequent intervention. It was estimated that substantial forces would have 
to be deployed within thirty-six hours. Britain was still in a position to guarantee the 
security of Kuwait, although the cost of doing so with a weakening British economy 
was appearing more and more prohibitive. 
III PRO: CAB 129/ 106: Kuwait, October 2, 1961, C (61) 140. 
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The patron-client relationship between Britain and Kuwait had been tested to 
the limit with the intervention of British troops in the Summer of 1961. The 
relationship was undergoing a period of fundamental change. The declining power of 
Britain meant that Kuwait was seeking a different type of client-patron relationship 
with Britain and ultimately some other political and security relationship to replace the 
fonner agreement. For the British the flow of goods and services coming from the 
Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship was so important that other means would 
have to be sought to guarantee their continuation. Therefore, the British military 
obligation to Kuwait was continued as it was still in the interests of both states. 
5.5 : Appendix. 
Appendix 5.1 
a. Letter from General Qassim to the Ruler of Kuwait, dated September 7, 1958, and 
signed General A Qassim, Prime Minister of the Iraqi Republic. 
His Highness, Sheikh Abdullah AI-Salam AI-Sabah, Ruler of Kuwait: I 
have received your letter dated 12 August 1958, -and I thank Your Highness for 
the brotherly feelings which have been expressed by you towards Iraq. 
I wish to inform Your Highness with great pleasure that instructions have been 
directed to the concerned Iraqi officers to free the transportation between our 
two countries.1l2 
b. Letter to the Ruler of Kuwait, from Secretary of State, dated December 29, 1958. 
It gives me a great honour to inform you that the Iraqi Republic is always 
keen about maintaining and fostering close and co-operative relations with the 
sister Arab countries, and feels it her duty to co-operate with her dear neighbour 
Kuwait to establish a new foundation of friendship and brotherhood with 
Kuwait. The Iraqi Government believes the best way to accomplish such ends is 
to open a consulate or a representative trade mission of the Iraqi Republic in 
Kuwait.1l3 
Appendix 5.2 
a. Quote from Qassim at press conference on June 25, 1961. 
112PRO: FO 3711156886: Annex extracts from speeches by Qassim. 
113PRO: FO 3711156886: Annex extracts from speeches by Qassim. 
'11,,1 
We are able to get our rights in full, but we always resort to peace you 
should do likewise. But I assure you that peace will not do with Imperiali;m as 
Imperialism is the enemy of peace ... We shall warn this Sheikh not to wrong the 
people of Kuwait who are actually of the Iraqi people and, if he should violate 
this he will surely have to face drastic punishment, being treated as one of the 
rebels. 114 
b. Quote from Qassim at press conference on June 25, 1961. 
A Presidential decree will shortly be issued appointing the present, 
honourable Shaikh of Kuwait as the Qaim Naqam (prefect) of the Kuwait 
district of the Basra (province). 
He will be a traitor who defies the consensus of the Arab people and the 
solidarity of his brothers in Iraq. 
The part of Iraq has now been liberated, but there remains the Kuwaiti 
people who still suffer under the imperialists, under a clique which juggles with 
their destiny and fortunes, and a pack of feudalists and Shaikhs which has even 
denied them water supplies from the land of their brothers in Iraq.115 
c. Quote from Qassim at press conference on June 25, 1961. 
The Republic of Iraq has decided to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait 
and to demand the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs [to Iraq 
as part] of the province of Basra ... We will liberate this section of Iraqi territory 
... \Ve are capable of obtaining all our rights. But we always resort to peaceful 
means ... But I assure you that peaceful methods are useless with imperialism. I 16 
d. Statement made over Baghdad Radio on June 25, 1961. 
[Kuwait is] an indivisible part of Iraq ... it is the Iraqi Republic and no 
one else who signs agreements for Kuwait.117 
e. Note on summary of Iraqi decree of June 1961. 
On June 26, the Iraqi Government issued a note to the Diplomatic Corps 
in Baghdad conveying a memorandum summarizing Iraq's position with regard 
to the U.K.-Kuwait agreement of June 19, which the Iraqi Government 
considered to be contrary to its assertion that "Kuwait was and still is an 
indivisible part of Iraq."118 
f. Quote from General Ahmed Saleh al-Abdi (Chief of Staff and Military Governor) 
General telegraphed to Qassim the following. Not dated. 
114PRO: FO 3711 156877: Baghdad to Foreign Office: Trevelyan, July 4, 1961, No.769 at 2.25 p.m. 
115Hashim, "The Influence of Iraq", p. 443. 
1 16Schofield, Kuwait and Irag, pp. 105-106. 
117Foreign Relations of the United States. 1961-1963 Volume XVII. Near East, p. 160. 
118Foreign Relations of the United States. 1961-1963 Volume XVII. Near East, p. 160. 
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In my own name and in the name of all the members of the Army of July 
14, enlployees, men and officers, I support the statements in your press 
Confe~ence o~ June 25 with regard to the conspiracies of Imperialists over 
Kuwait, the Inseparable part of the immortal Iraq RepUblic. Irrespective of 
whatever conspiracies it may plot to separate it from our beloved homeland, go 
ahead, our faithful saviour with God's blessings and your army with which you 
have destroyed the fortress of Imperialism in the Middle East and achieved the 
greatest revolution in the 20th Century at your command. May God grant you 
success. 1 19 
g. Iraqi news agency report on July 2. 
The Iraqi Army is a force that has been conceived to expel the 
Imperialists and the covetous people within the frontiers of Iraq from north of 
Zakho to the Southernmost part of Kuwait and elsewhere in the great Arab 
homeland. 120 
h. Quote from General Qassim on July 14, 1961, at graduation ceremony, Camp 
Rashid Military academy. 
Kuwait is our land and the land of our forefather. We will fight to regain 
it. Our army is equipped with modern weapons. We have trained our army to 
defend our land and help our brethren gain their rights in other lands.l 21 . 
Appendix 5.3 
-
Letter from the State Secretary of Kuwait, dated July 2, 1961. 
I am instructed by His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait and in accordance 
with paragraph 2 of Article 35 of the United Nations Charter, I have the honour 
to request you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council, to call an 
immediate meeting of the Council to consider urgently the following question: 
'Complaint by Kuwait in respect of the situation arising from threats by Iraq to 
the territorial independence of Kuwait which is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security'.1 22 
Appendix 5.4 
Resolution adopted by the Arab League on July 20, 1961 : "Arab Solution." 
1.a) The Government of Kuwait undertakes to request the withdrawal of British 
forces from Kuwaiti territory as soon as possible. 
b) The Government of the Republic of Iraq undertakes not to use force in the 
annexation of Kuwait to Iraq. 
119PRO: FO 3711156877: Baghdad to Foreign Office: Trevelyan, July 4,1961, No.769 at 2.25 p.m. 
120PRO: FO 3711156877: Baghdad to Foreign Office: Trevelyan, July 4,1961, No.769 at 2.25 p.m. 
121PRO: FO 3711 156886: Annex extracts from speeches by Qassim 
122 SCOR, 957th Meeting, July 2, 1961. 
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c) The Council undertakes to support every wish Kuwait may express for a union 
or a federation with other countries of the Arab League in accordance with the 
League's Pact. 
2. The Council decides: 
a) To welcome the State of Kuwait as a member of the Arab League. b) To assist 
the State of Kuwait in joining the United Nations. 
3. The Arab States undertake to provide effective assistance for the preservation 
of Kuwait's independence, upon its request, and the Council confers upon the 
Secretary-General the power to take the necessary measures for the urgent 
implementation of this resolution. 123 
123 Finnie, Shifting lines in the Sand, p. 138. 
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Chapter 6: End of an Era 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 is divided into three parts. The first covers the major developments 
from the end of the crisis in Kuwait in 1961 to the end of 1963. The second examines 
the policy of the patron through this period, while the third deals with the external 
policy of the client. 
6.2 Developments with a bearing on Anglo-Kuwaiti relations 
The Syrian revolution and the claims by Qassim to Kuwait broke the period of 
relative calm experienced in the Middle East after the Iraqi revolution of July 1958. 
The fundamental tensions within and between the states of this area had re-surfaced. 
These included the sub-regional balance of power in the Gulf between Iraq, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia, the historic Baghdad-Cairo rivalry, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the friction 
between monarchical regimes and Arab nationalism, and the interference of external 
powers in the area. The change in regime in Iraq in July 1958 had reduced the stability 
of the Gulf sub-region and increased the interference of external powers in the Middle 
East region. 
The other impact of the revolution in Iraq was the reduced security of Kuwait. 
Despite the modernisation of the state of Kuwait, the al-Sabah regime continued to 
depend on the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship for its security. For most of the 
twentieth century, small weak states in the Middle East such as the Sheikhdoms in the 
Gulf had sought some form of client-patron relationship with an external power to 
ensure their survival from the larger regional powers.IThe Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client 
relationship was a successful example of this as the intervention of British troops in 
July 1961 clearly demonstrated. Wriggins takes a similar position. He contends that 
weak powers in this region have been compelled to seek relationships with stronger 
I For a comprehensive ana1ysis on sma)] states see: Rothstein, A11iances; Keohane, "Lilliputians" and 
David Vita1, The Inequality of States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967). 
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powers. The diplomatic strategies that are employed have as an underlying aim the 
encouragement of external assistance.2 He writes that "regional states appeal to 
outside states and organisations for military, financial, and diplomatic support on the 
basis of ideology, strategic interests, and patron-client exchanges."3 
Despite these possible problems the position of Britain in the Gulf and the 
Middle East had steadily improved from the dark days of Suez. Its involvement in the 
eastern Mediterranean had admittedly diminished and the only practical interest in 
Jordan by the end of 1963 was not in its independence, but rather that it should not be 
the cause of a new war between Israel and the Arab states. The Arabian peninsula and 
the Gulf was a different case. Britain still retained extensive interests and influence in 
this area. The intervention in Kuwait had earned Britain much political capital, while its 
relations with Saudi Arabia were improving with the resumption of diplomatic 
relations, despite the continuation of the Buraimi problem. The overthrow of the 
Qassim regime in Iraq by a revolution in February 1963 had allowed for an 
improvement in Anglo-Iraqi relations even though the Kuwaiti question had not yet 
been fully resolved. 
The geographical remoteness of Egypt from the regIon caused Nasser's 
influence and interest in the upper Gulf to be somewhat limited. The quarrels between 
Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the war in the Yemen, and the problems with Israel and 
Syria distracted Nasser further from the position of Britain in the Gulf, while the rivalry 
and the battle for the leadership of the Arab world between Iraq and Egypt had 
extended to their attempts to dominate Syria. The British position in the Gulf benefited 
from this continued Arab conflict. One aspect of this friction between Cairo and 
Baghdad was that the governments of Iraq and Egypt tacitly preferred the domination 
of Britain in the Gulf than the region being under the influence of the other. 
The Kuwait-Iraq issue had produced strange bedfellows in the Middle East. 
The UAR was aligned on the issue with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, whose regimes at 
2 See pp. 119-120 of this thesis. 
3 Wriggins, Dynamics, p. 183. 
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this time, were being attacked by Cairo Radio and Egyptian newspapers as being 
enemies of the UAR. The crisis had also made a tacit association between Egypt and 
'the arch enemy' Britain. These anomalies were accepted by Nasser as the price of 
supporting a traditional monarchical rich Gulf oil state that could easily be seen as 
reactionary against the only other progressive state in the region. The peCUliarity of the 
position of the UAR was underlined by the veto used by the Soviet Union over the 
application of Kuwait to join the UN. 
At the end of 1961 the Foreign Office still believed that Britain could hold on 
to its position in the Gulf, although not indefinitely. It also thought that nothing should 
be done to disturb the relationships and agreements with Aden and the Gulf 
Sheikhdoms, and that little was to be gained by dismantling the British position. The 
fear of Britain's position being replaced by a sweeping Arab nationalist revolution was 
also diminishing. Arab unity was a myth and was recognised as such by the Foreign 
Office.4The attempts made at federation over the previous five years (between Egypt 
and Syria and then between Egypt, Syria and Iraq) had not worked. What was also 
encouraging for the weakened British was the new aftitude of the United States. 
The war in the Yemen had drawn the Kennedy government further into the 
labyrinth of Gulf politics. The commercial, financial and strategic importance of Saudi 
Arabia to the United States, meant that it was continually and increasingly concerned 
with Saudi security. The United States was also taking on responsibility for 
maintenance of the status quo in the Arabian peninsula. This was encouraging for the 
British because their position in the Gulf was inextricably linked with their position in 
Aden and while they were incapable of dealing with instability on the scale of a 
potential war between the UAR and Saudi Arabia. The closer alignment of British and 
American policies in the Middle East had become a key element in the continued 
safeguarding of the British position. There was however differences in their respective 
4 Wriggins, Dynamics, p. 183. 
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policies which caused some tension between Washington and London, especially over 
the Yemen and diplomatic recognition of the rebel regime. 
Following the recommendation of the Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir William 
Luce, to discuss Gulf policy with the Americans, the British Embassy in Washington 
was instructed to seek the fullest co-operation on matters, other than military aspects, 
of Gulf policy with the Americans. The British government wanted to leave the 
military angle to a later date. 
It was acknowledged that there was a considerable difference between British 
and American oil policy in the Gulf. The British were primarily concerned with the 
contribution of the profits of their two oil companies to the British balance of 
payments. The policy of the Kennedy government on this issue was influenced by a 
different set of considerations. For instance although United States oil companies had 
increased their role and interest in Iraq, United States policy was not constrained by 
the desire to keep up the supply of oil or to safeguard a high profit yield for the oil 
companies. The Kennedy government was also less concerned with the balance of 
payments benefit of American oil companies in their policy decisions because of the 
much smaller role played by this factor in their very large economy. 
Therefore the key difference between the two over their Gulf policies lay in the 
importance that they placed upon the economic interest. The rest of their policies were 
quite similar. The Foreign Office assumed that United States policy in the Gulf was 
based first of all on trying to keep the Soviet Union and Communist influences out of 
the Gulf and, secondly, on ensuring the "undisturbed access to oil on reasonable 
tenns. "5 An additional objective was the need to maintain peace and stability in the 
region. The Foreign Office was concerned about how much interest the United States 
government had in maintaining the favourable terms upon which the oil companies 
operated. Walmsley wanted to know whether the Americans were concerned mainly 
with supply of oil, the cost, or the possible impact on their balance of payments. His 
5 PRO: FO 3711 162783: US policy in the Gulf: Foreign Office to Washington, January 15, 1962: 
WalmsJey to DJ Speares. 
221 
concern came from the impact that the tenus of the various agreements between the oil 
companies and the Gulf States had on British policy, as it was part of the justification 
for Britain remaining in the area. The American attitude on this policy was therefore of 
significant interest to the British. 
The British Embassy in Washington agreed with the thrust of Walmsley's 
appreciation of United States policy in the Gulf. Greenhill highlighted the main 
differences in policy as the distinction the Kennedy government made between Saudi 
Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms. The majority of American oil interests in the region 
were located in Saudi Arabia through ARAMCO. This, combined with the virulent 
anti-Communist stance of the Saudi government, made the Americans view Saudi 
Arabia as "one of their countries."6In contrast they viewed Kuwait and the other Gulf 
Sheikhdoms as a British area of responsibility. They were prepared to back up and 
support the British government in its lead in the area as long as this did not embarrass 
them elsewhere. This had been clearly shown in the Kennedy administration's 
willingness to send Naval and Marine forces (Solent Amity) sailing off Africa and 
-
Mombassa to the Gulf to support the British action at the time of the Kuwaiti crisis.? 
The United States government had also readily supported the British and the Kuwaitis 
in the United Nations debates. Over the Omani question, United States interests would 
have been best served by backing Saudi Arabia and the Arab nationalists. Yet the 
United States deferred to the British view point. This was primarily due to its decision 
to continue viewing this region as a 'British sphere of influence', and also to the active 
diplomatic pressure of the British government. 
During the 1950s superpower competition shifted from Europe to the Third 
world, particularly the Middle East. In the early 1960s the bipolar rivalry extended 
further in the Middle East into the sub-region of the Gulf. The political power of the 
two superpowers over the actors in the Gulf, like the influence of Britain, proved to be 
somewhat limited. 
6 PRO: FO 3711162783: Washington to Foreign Office, January 23, 1962: Greenhill to Walmsley. 
7 See pp. 203-204 of this thesis. 
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Superpower involvement increased the military capabilities of the 
r~gional s~tes b~ t did not cau~e the conflicts. Even though each of these patron-
chent relationshIps has been hIghly asymmetrical, the external power has shown 
only a limited ability to afTect either domestic reforms or the direction of foreign 
policies if the local regime opposed them.8 
A power vacuum was developing because of the reduction of British authority 
and influence in this area. Attempts were being made by the superpowers to fill this 
vacuum. The war in the Yemen had allowed the Soviet Union to project its power and 
had caused the United States to increase its commitment to Saudi Arabia and the 
stability of the Gulf. The interests of the superpowers were beginning to cover the 
entire Middle East region. 
The other structural tension in the Middle East was the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Syria appeared a prime target for Communist penetration in the wake of the 
revolution, but the split in the UAR had broken the strategic stranglehold that Israel 
had faced and therefore reduced the likelihood, in the short term, of another Arab-
Israeli war. Unfortunately, tensions continued to build-up, with Israel successfully 
launching a meteorological rocket propelled by solid-fuel on July 5, 1961. This missile, 
with its obvious military potential, concerned the Arabs, as did the concurrent Israeli 
nuclear program. Israel was also an issue on which the Arabs could present a sort of 
united front. The Arab states spoke with one voice over the plans of Israel to divert the 
Jordan waters and on the Arab refugees of Palestine, with the Arab League stating that 
a diversion of the Jordan waters by Israel would be a justification for war. In reality, 
even on the issue of Israel, the Arab League was still unable to agree on united action. 
Egypt had made strong efforts to build up a Palestinian military and political entity, but 
this has been strenuously blocked by Jordan for its own security reasons. 
Britain was anxious that the Arab-Israeli conflict should remain that of cold 
hostility rather than hot war. For this reason it was concerned that Western states 
should refrain from policies that either promoted an arms race or changed the military 
balance of power significantly. Its reason for this position was that any escalation in the 
8 Wriggins, Dynamics, p. 197. 
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Arab-Israeli conflict exposed it to criticism and possibly sanctions from both sides, and 
also because of financial and diplomatic reasons it could not readily take sides. The 
issue was also damaging to Britain's position in the Gulf where criticism often came 
from the Sheikhs as well as their domestic populations. 
In the wake of the 1961 crisis, Kuwait was faced with a number of problems 
both internal and external. Domestically, the al-Sabah regime faced problems from the 
change in society and the economy brought on by the oil revolution. Pressures 
emanated from a massive rise in the expatriate population and from the developing 
middle classes in Kuwait.9 To deal with these problems Sheikh Abdullah set up a 
Constituent Assembly to widen the level of political participation. This Assembly 
delivered a draft constitution which was subsequently promulgated by Sheikh Abdullah 
in November 1962. The long term policy for dealing with the social tensions within 
Kuwait was to buy off the most influential families and the Middle Class. This was 
successfully achieved by the Land Purchase scheme.l<Yfhis program was designed by 
the Kuwaiti government to support, preserve and augment the wealth of the merchant 
class. In the 1950s and 1960s land was purchased by the government at high prices. A 
fraction of this land was maintained while the rest was sold at low prices back to the 
merchants at low prices. This constituted a transfer of revenues from the state to the 
merchants. Individual merchants were also fmancially helped by the state through 
preferential monopolies, dealerships, and even personal loans. 
During August 1962 discussion over the possible heir to Sheikh Abdullah took 
place within Kuwait. The legal footing of the succession was needed for the drafting of 
the constitution. Argument raged over who had the right to choose the successor and a 
law was drafted in the constitution setting out the basis of the succession. In 1962 
Sheikh Abdullah fmally named his brother Sheikh Sabah Salim, who was deputy prime 
minister and foreign minister, as his successor.lt 
9 Kamal Osman Salih, "Kuwait: Political Consequences of Modernization", Middle East Studies 1 
(1991),52. 
10 Crystal, Kuwait, pp. 61-62. 
II Crystal, Kuwait, p. 26. 
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In the Arab diplomatic arena there was a reduction in the support for the 
Kuwaiti cause given by the UAR in the beginning of 1962. This was partially because 
of Nasser's decision to withdraw Egypt from the active leadership of the Arab League, 
proclaiming that Egypt would not attend any further sessions or participate in any of its 
actions. The delayed establishment of a UAR embassy in Kuwait and the withdrawal of 
the UAR contingent of the Arab League force in Kuwait were two indications of this. 
Despite this frosting of relations, the British understood correctly that the UAR would 
not support or even agree to the claims of Iraq to Kuwait. Nasser's motives were 
governed more by his attitude over Syria. The riches of Kuwait, if gained by Iraq, 
would have placed Qassim in a commanding position in the Gulf and the Fertile 
Crescent. Such a development would have been inimical to the interests of the UAR. 
The external problems of the al-Sabah regime stemmed mainly from the 
dangerous security environment bequeathed by Qassim's threats. One way to deal with 
this problem was to seek as much international recognition as possible. The security 
framework with the British still remained in place and the political framework of the 
Arab League was important. Membership of the United Nations was the primary short-
term aim of the al-Sabah regime while a resolution of the Iraqi threat was its long-tenn 
aim. The two issues were actually interlinked and the breakthrough came with the fall 
of the Qassim regime in a revolution on February 8, 1963. This change had important 
implications for the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship and for the respective Gulf foreign 
policies of the two states. First, the new regime was quickly given formal recognition 
by Kuwait on February 9, by Sheikh Abdullah who was attempting to exploit the 
change in circumstances to make a breakthrough in relations with Iraq. Second, 
goodwill and confidence building measures were advanced between the two states with 
the opening on February 18 of the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border and the resumption of 
telecommunications and the postal service. Third, tensions between Iraq and Kuwait 
were reduced further by the withdrawal of the Sudanese contingent of the Arab 
League Security Force on February 20. 
225 
The successful application of Kuwait to the United Nations also came with the 
fall of the Qassim regime in Iraq. The Soviet Union now had little to gain by blocking 
Kuwait's application to the United Nation, and on March 12 it extended de jure 
recognition to Kuwait. On May 7 the Security Council duly recommended Kuwait's 
application for United Nation's membership. Four days later the Kuwaiti delegation led 
by Sheikh Sabah aI-Ahmad left for the United Nations and on May 14 the General 
Assembly approved the application. 
On October 4, 1963 a deal was struck between Kuwait and Iraq over the 
recognition issue. Sheikh Abdullah had managed to achieve his policy objectives of 
securing Iraq, but not at the cost of the British connection, even though the new Iraqi 
government had placed pressure on the Kuwaiti government to dismantle its 
agreements with Britain as a quid pro quo for its recognition. With the events of July 
1961 still fresh in the memory, the al-Sabah regime refused. The eventual settlement 
reached was more of a financial transaction than a diplomatic resolution. As Jackson, 
the British Ambassador to Kuwait, wrote in his annual report: 
Kuwait purchased and Iraq cynically sold recognition, however, a draft of 
£30 million on the State reserves was necessary and had to be approved by a 
special session of the National Assembly. On 4th October an agreed minute was 
signed in Baghdad providing for Iraqi recognition of Kuwait and the extension 
by Kuwait to Iraq of an interest free loan of [Kuwaiti Dinars] KD 30 million 
repayable within 25 years. 12 
This security for cash was the beginning of the rentier politics of the Kuwaiti 
regime. Its oil dollar diplomacy for the next few years was a corollary to and not a 
replacement of the Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. 'Oil dollar diplomacy' was 
extended by Kuwait to other Arab States. A loan was given to Algeria of £10 million. 
Egypt received a £3 million loan as well as temporary financial assistance worth around 
£12 million. 
The financial cost of this diplomacy was high even for oil rich Kuwait. Only £5 
million could be distributed by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development that 
12 PRO: FO 3711174882: Kuwait: Annual Review for 1963, January 2,1964: Jackson. 
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was, in contrast to the 'oil dollar diplomacy', based on an economic rather than a 
political basis. 
The client-patron relationship was moving towards its inevitable demise. Oil 
money seemed to be fixing the diplomatic and security problems of Kuwait. The result 
of this was a move of the client towards a Regulation objective. 13 As indicated by the 
patron-client model, shown in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, any reduction in the threat 
environment and or increasing financial status of the client leads to a lessening of ties in 
the clientelistic relationship depending on the level of interaction between client and 
patron. There was a distancing of public relations made by the al-Sabah from Britain. 
In private, relations between the two States continued to be close. For example, the 
British Ambassador was kept fully infonned by Sheikh Abdullah of the negotiations 
with Iraq. Sheikh Abdullah regularly mentioned his belief in the old maxim of relying 
on 'God and the British'. Conversely, in public the Kuwaiti government promised 
support for the Omani rebels, and censured British policy in South Arabia. 
Trouble in Radfan prompted a more interventionist approach by the United 
States in the Gulf. It was clear that the economic and strategic importance of Saudi 
Arabia to the United States played a large part in American Gulf policy. The Kennedy 
government infonned both the UAR and the Yemeni Republicans that they regarded 
"Aden as a joint Anglo-US interest, owing to its importance for the Gulf."14 
The Aden base remained vitally important to the British position in the Gulf. 
Yet more important than Aden for the West was the continued independence of Saudi 
Arabia. The British government mistakenly still viewed Saudi Arabia as a potential 
threat to the Gulf Sheikhdoms partly because the Buraimi Oasis troubles. Buraimi was 
the key to inner Oman and to the neighbouring Sheikhdoms along the Gulf coast. 
Measuring six miles across and circular in shape, the oasis was made up of a dozen 
settlements and a plentiful supply of water. The area was fertile and supported a 
variety of crops and livestock. To the north and west of Buraimi were the tracks 
13 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
14 PRO: FO 3711174882: Kuwait: Annual Review for 1963, January 2,1964: Jackson. 
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leading to Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, and Abu Dhabi. To the south were the routes to 
Nizwa, Bahlah, Izhi and the other ancient towns of central Oman. To the east a pass 
led through the Hajar mountains to Sauhar on the Gulf of Oman. The control of 
Buraimi was therefore of vital importance, because through it these Sheikhdoms and 
inner Oman could be controlled. Added to the strategic importance of the area was the 
expectation that oil might be located there. All these factors fed into the long dispute 
between Britain and Saudi Arabia over the area. 
The main danger for the West came from the Yemeni republicans, who were 
supported substantially by the UAR. Nasser could not be too readily alienated by the 
West because of the importance of his position in the Arab League and the support 
that he extended to Kuwait. At the time, the Kennedy government was pursuing a new 
policy of financial largesse towards Nasser in the hope of influencing his behaviour. So 
they, like the British, were therefore less than keen to abandon this new policy to 
mount an all out attack on Nasser. The position they adopted was to recognise the new 
Yemeni Republic, but at the same time announce both privately and publicly that any 
move to undermine the Saudi regime would be met with a swift military response. 
The conflict in the Yemen had serious security implications for the West with a 
potential threat to the stability and integrity of Saudi Arabia, and the danger that it 
would expose the British position in Aden, which up to then had been an integral part 
of the British military and political set up for the whole sub-region of the Gulf. The 
conflict was a major disruption to stability in the Gulf and, as the West feared, to the 
security of the oil supplies. Egyptian forces were engaging Saudi Arabian forces in the 
Yemen-Saudi border region. 
The British government unlike their American counterparts, did not extend 
recognition to Yemen. The danger to the British position was that rather than limiting 
the threat to Aden this stance had only heightened the dangers. During this time the 
UAR had again bombed Saudi bases just over the border from Yemen. Fortunately, the 
overthrow of Qassim in Iraq and the possibility of a revolution in Syria was a timely 
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distraction for Faysal and Nasser from the Yemen conflict and allowed for a reduction 
in tensions. 
The United States was clearly now taking over the role of Britain as the main 
stabilising influence in South Arabia. The aims of the Kennedy government were to 
stop Yemen being used as a base for hostile action against Saudi Arabia. This required 
the removal of Egyptian forces from the area, but also that the Yemenis be allowed to 
make their own decisions about their future. 15The Kennedy government was also 
determined to stop the conflict. Kennedy instructed Ellsworth Bunker, United States 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, to inform Faysal that United States military support 
would be conditional on Saudi Arabia suspending support for the royalist forces of 
Yemen. 16Although Ambassador Bunker was successful in implementing a limited 
disengagement in March-April 1963, hostilities continued until 1967. The United 
States government was attempting to fulfill three important western objectives. First, it 
aimed to prevent a direct UAR-Saudi Arabia confrontation. Second, it sought to 
secure and preserved the regime of Faysal. Third, it aimed to protect vital Western 
interests in the Arabian Peninsula. 
6.3 Policy of the patron: Britain. 
British policy in the Middle East since 1958 had been shaped by a number of 
broad assumptions. These assumptions were based upon and influenced by core 
fundamental interests that had not changed for many years. Sir Roger Stevens outlined 
these interests as: 
[That of preserving] i. as far as possible the flow of oil and the financial 
benefits resulting from the present pattern of its flow; ii. to minimise Russian and 
communist influence in the area; iii. to have stability or, if there must be a 
change, a peaceful change; iv. to build up such good will as we have, and if 
possible to create more of it, towards the West in general and towards the UK 
and UK policies world-wide in particular; v. to expand our trading position and 
15 JFKL: NSC Countries Series: Box No. 123b: Letter from JFK to Prince Faysal of Saudi Arabia, 
March 1, 1963. 
16 JFKL: NSC Countries Series: Box No. 123b: Memorandum for Mr McGeorge Bundy, The White 
House, February 28, 1963. 
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to assist in so far as we can in promoting the economic stability of the area; vi. to 
maintain defence facilities in so far as they are necessary to meet aims i. and ii. 
above and to preserve such overflying and staging rights as may be necessary for 
our defence responsibilities in the Middle East, Africa and the Far East. I 7 
British policy was to be tested and judged by whether it fulfilled these 
objectives. Stevens was aware of some of the incompatibilities of these aims in certain 
circumstances. The military protection of the oil supply by British forces in the Gulf 
did not engender good will amongst certain States in the region. However, with some 
of these states it was altogether unlikely that any goodwill would be achieved even if 
all British forces were removed from the area. 
The cost of these military commitments brought in the usual Treasury 
pressures to seek cheaper solutions. Exploration was made to obtaining the same level 
of security for oil and finance by political as opposed to military means. British military 
forces in Aden, Bahrain and the Trucial States and the military commitment to Kuwait 
were still present as a direct result of the oil interest. It was now being argued that the 
flow of oil could never be completely guaranteed by military forces. Although Kuwait 
was the largest supplier of oil to Britain the oil companies had access to other 
important sources of oil. Stevens ventured that "the peculiar importance attached to 
Kuwait derives more particularly from its investment habits than from a purely supply 
point of view."18 
It was acknowledged that the military commitment to Kuwait could, because of 
the political cost, become prohibitive and undermine the overall objectives of British 
policy. The British government still sought to contain and minimise the Communist and 
Soviet penetration in the Middle East. This is evidence against the argument that 
patrons which decline in power seek purely economic goals over a mixture of 
economic and strategic goals. Yet these strategic goals could be viewed as being 
purely a way of defending the vital economic goals. 
17 PRO: FO 3711 163972: British interests aims and policies in the Middle East, March 26, 1962: 
Stevens. 
18 PRO: FO 3711163972: British interests aims and policies in the Middle East, March 26, 1962: 
Stevens. 
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The other problem of British troops in the Gulf was that it gave the Soviet 
Union a tool of propaganda with which it could attempt to undermine and subvert 
stability in the Gulf. The key Western military and political grouping capable of 
blocking the Soviet advance into the Middle East was CENTO. The argument that in 
the event of a major East-West military confrontation British forces in the Gulf could 
act to stop the Soviet Union was suspect for two reasons. First, Soviet forces-were 
thousands of miles from the Gulf region. Any movement of these troops towards the 
Gulf would be a long and slow process, fraught with logistical problems. Such a move 
would trigger Western action in this area based around the use of Nuclear weapons 
and the response of CENTO forces. Second, the British forces in the area were not of 
a sufficient capacity to deal with a Soviet invasion, but were rather there to act as a 
policing force and to keep the waters of the Gulf relatively secure. The forces in the 
area could, however, have enabled a larger build-up of troops into the region because 
of their control over numerous base facilities. 
The problem for CENTO (formerly the Baghdad Pact) was that the political 
cost for any of the Arab countries to join this alliance was too great. The Hashemite 
regime in Iraq had been swept from power in 1958 partly because of its Western links 
through membership of the Baghdad Pact. The resultant lack of Arab members of 
CENTO meant that the security provided was more that of a trip wire, with little force 
in depth, than a comprehensive security unit like NATO. 
Iran was a key Middle Eastern country in 1962 in the CENTO alliance, capable 
of dealing to some extent with the Soviet threat. As part of maintaining its Gulf policy 
the British government recognised the importance of its CENTO links and Iran's role 
in it. Iranian stability and its continued economic development was crucial to the 
success of CENTO and therefore partly to the fulfilment of Britain's six core objectives 
set out by Stevens for the Middle East. 
The threat of Communism spreading amongst the domestic populations in the 
region was a concern. Despite these concerns events between 1958 and 1962 in Iraq 
had shown that whatever the advantages there were to the Communist cause, little of 
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significance was achieved by these groups. Islam and the cultural traditions of the 
region played an important role in the failings of this atheist ideology. Soviet advances 
as opposed to Communist penetration was another matter entirely. Soviet largesse 
combined with reaction to certain Western policies had pushed some of the States in 
the region into closer relationships with Moscow. Afghanistan and Iraq were two 
examples of this and so the Foreign Office was sensitive to pursuing policies that did 
not alienate certain Middle East States from the West towards the Soviet Union.t9'Jbis 
policy position was not always attainable when it conflicted with Britain's pressure 
against Arab nationalism. 
This reason was one of the main justifications behind the British policy of non-
involvement in Middle Eastern interstate disputes. The period following the revolution 
in Iraq in 1958 had seen a series of inter-Arab quarrels all of which had added to 
instability in the region. The challenge to the West was as much about playing a non-
partisan role as about adapting to the forever changing circumstances of Middle East 
politics. The West also needed to present a co-ordinated approach to the Middle East. 
-
Unfortunately, this did not always prevail over individual states' economic and political 
objectives. 
The British view was that political stability along with the continued close 
relationship between the Sheikhs and Britain would be the best way of guaranteeing 
that the political alignment of the Gulf states was not changed by Communist 
subversion. The Communist threat, they rightly believed, came from outside the region 
and not from within it, but concern was expressed over the dangers, indigenous 
support for Communism, that could arise from the inequalities brought on by the oil 
wealth. It was believed that political discontent from either lack of representation or 
from the large monetary differentials, caused by oil, could lead to the growth of Arab 
nationalist movements. These groups would direct their criticism towards the British 
and the Sheikhs, but more dangerously would be open to the control or influence of 
19 PRO: FO 3711 163972: British interests aims and policies in the Middle East, March 26, 1962: 
Stevens. 
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the Communists. British policy was directed at avoiding both these eventualities. 
Encouragement was made to the Sheikhs to invest large proportions of their oil 
royalties on improving welfare and infrastructure in the hope of placating these social 
forces. 
Continued British influence in the Gulf derived from a sustained ability to act 
as security guarantor to the Sheikhdoms. A spin off from this was a measure of 
authority over oil affairs, which was also due to the perceived and real independence of 
the British oil companies. The close relationship required between the oil companies 
and the Gulf Sheikhdoms was an important element in the dynamics of the British 
position. The British government was careful not to upset this close relationship and 
went to some lengths to foster it. 
The stability of the Gulf was vital for the uninterrupted flow of oil and the 
continued security of the Gulf Sheikhdoms. Pressures within the area that worked 
against such stability remained. Kuwait was still the glittering prize for Iraq, both 
economically, politically and strategically. The British government also believed that 
Saudi Arabia still harboured designs upon Bahrain, Qatar and, more clearly, Burarmi. 
Iran still laid claims to Bahrain. British forces in the Gulf had always kept the lid on 
these pressures acting as the stabiliser in the balance of power system in the Gulf, 
between Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Sheikhdoms. 
Conversely, a suggestion was made in the Foreign Office that, far from being 
the bedrock of stability in the region, British forces aroused counter-pressures and had 
become a major cause of instability. The idea was put forward that perhaps a period of 
temporary instability (caused by British troop withdrawal) followed by a new settled 
equilibrium would be more in British and Western interests than the continued 
presence of its forces. However there could be no guarantee of what this new stability 
would be as alternative guarantors of the Sheikhdoms security could not be 
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found. 20'fhe UN presence or some form of joint superpower guarantee was considered. 
The view was that this could not be achieved and would be ineffective if it was.21 
Despite the pressures on the British to withdraw from the Gulf they still 
managed to nlaintain their position. Two worse-case scenarios which would have led 
to a total undennining of the British position were avoided. First was the possibility of 
a radical revolution in Saudi Arabia and, second, an alliance between Qassim and 
Nasser. The traditional rivalry between Baghdad and Cairo had always worked to the 
favour of Britain. An alliance between Iraq and Egypt could see the carving up of the 
region between these two powers, while a revolution in Saudi Arabia would have 
destabilised the whole region. 
Although the British government professed a policy of non-involvement in 
inter-Arab affairs this was not the case in the Gulf. They still had direct military, 
economic and political interests in the Gulf region, the most important of which was 
the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. The military intervention of July 1961 changed the 
political picture in Kuwait and the Gulf. British policy was reviewed and reassessed in 
-
the months after Operation Vantage. From September 1961 to May 1962 the various 
British government departments interested in the relationship with Kuwait met 
together and worked ou t a framework for British policy into the late 1960s. 
Arguments concentrated on whether, and for how long, Britain could maintain its 
military obligations to Kuwait and its other Gulf protectorate states. Concern was 
expressed over the motives for British support for Kuwait by the Ministry of Power 
and the Treasury. The old assumptions were beginning to be questioned as the 
Treasury extended its financial influence to this aspect of British policy. Were British 
forces in the Gulf the only way of guaranteeing the integrity of Kuwait and therefore 
the free flow of oil at reasonable prices to Britain? Did the independence of Kuwait 
matter in regard to the oil question? Was it not the case that whoever controlled the 
state would still want to sell the oil? Was the development of OPEC and a Kuwaiti 
20 PRO: FO 3711 162783: Discussion with the State Department on British Policy Draft. 
21 See p. 183 of this thesis. 
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owned oil company reasons to question the assumption of oil at 'reasonable prices'? 
Officials at the Treasury were also worried about the cost of relocating the infantry 
battalions fronl Kenya to Bahrain, which was essential to the continued ability of 
Britain to keep to clause '0' of the Exchange of Letters (June 19, 1961) with Kuwait.22 
The forces from Kenya had played a key part in Operation Vantage and would 
form the backbone of any future planned intervention in Kuwait. The forthcoming 
independence of Kenya and the loss of the British base there compelled the relocation 
of British forces. 23The proposed move of these forces to Bahrain would need an initial 
capital outlay of around five million pounds. The Foreign Office argued that this 
expenditure could clearly be justified by the large foreign exchange benefits made on 
the sterling deposits of Sheikh Abdullah and the earnings from British exports in the 
region, which were guaranteed by British security in the Gulf. 
The revolt in Yemen in September 1962 threw the Gulf region into further 
turmoil. The revolution clearly was going to have an effect upon the Gulf states and 
future British policy in the region. Whitehall had been on the verge of formulating a 
-
Gulf policy for the 1960s, but the revolt had put this on hold. Two important 
considerations, one financial, the other military, had now to be taken into account. 
First, was whether the strengthening of the Aden base proposed by the Governor of 
Aden could or should be attempted. The proposals were costly and far reaching in 
scale, but the Aden base was the vital component of the security and political policies 
of Britain in the Gulf. Second, whether the British military commitments in the Gulf 
could be met if the Aden base was lost. In a report assessing the impact of the Yemen 
revolution Walmsley wrote that "the Joint Planning Staff, following a directive by the 
Prime Minister, [had] begun considering how we could defend Kuwait if we lost the 
use of Aden after 1967."24The Colonial Office had made an assessment of the base in 
22 See p. 164 of this thesis. 
23 See p. 213 of this thesis. 
24 PRO: FO 3711 168632: Report; effects of the Yemen Revolution on the Persian Gulf States and 
future policy in the Arabian Peninsula, December 1962: Walmsley. 
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Aden and had concluded that the base would be impossible to hold after 1970 and that 
graceful withdrawal before this date might be preferred. 
British policy underwent another fundamental review in the spring of 1963. The 
geopolitical picture had changed again with the overthrow of the Qassim regime in 
Iraq and the war in the Yemen. Objectives, policy and problems were again analysed 
by the Foreign Office. A number of questions were posed. First, what were they trying 
to achieve in the region and what were the fundamental objectives of policy? Second, 
taking into account the assessment of the future position in Aden, would their aims still 
be tenable in 1970 or would these objectives have changed? Third, how would they 
achieve these objectives, and would a military presence still be needed to ensure the 
aims as they had in the past? Fourth, if the military option was no longer available, 
what other means of achieving the aims could be used and what changes to their 
position would be needed to use these other means? Fifth, what was the cost factor of 
each course of action and what place would expenditure have in determining the policy 
direction? Sixth, what role would the Anglo-American alliance play in this process?25 
-
The policy objectives were still dominated by the need to protect the free flow 
of Middle East oil on reasonable terms. Middle East oil was still of vital importance to 
the British and West European economies. In 1962 the Middle East had produced 306 
million tons of oil. Out of that, 150 million tons of crude oil had been consumed by 
western Europe, including forty million tons by Britain. The value of the oil imported 
into Britain had been approximately £350 million. The foreign exchange net 
expenditure cost, because of the British oil companies, had only been in the region of 
£150 million. The oil companies, Shell and British Petroleum (BP), were vital to the 
health of the British economy with the balance of payments being heavily dependent on 
their profits. The production profits of the companies amounted to around £200 
million annually. 26 
25pRO: FO 3711170165, "Lord Hood to Sir R Stevens," March 6,1963. 
26 PRO: FO 3711 170165: Report on Middle East oil, March 11, 1963. 
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The investment of the oil companies in the region was very high. It was 
estimated that BP and Shell had spent £350 million, between 1952-1962 on 
, 
production and exploration in the Middle East. Their fixed asset investments amounted 
to around the same figure. The cost to the British economy of Shell and BP being 
excluded from the region would have been immense, and the resultant loss in 
investments and assets as well as the cost to the balance of payments caused by 
exclusion would have been severely damaging to Britain. Added to this, the increase in 
costs of transportation, refining and distribution on a world-wide scale would have 
been a huge blow to Britain. 
It was believed that threats to the British oil production could come from three 
sources: first, Soviet penetration of the region by force or by subversion, second, by 
domination of the area by a single power such as Iraq or Egypt, or third, by local 
disturbances or revolution, such as the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq. This could lead 
to oil being sold at unacceptable prices or complete stoppage of oil supplies. The 
policy aims, remained therefore, to deal with these three potential threats in order to 
secure the free flow of oil on reasonable terms. 
The independence of Kuwait also remained a key objective of British policy in 
the Gulf. In 1962, it was the largest oil producing state in the world, with production 
running at around ninety million tons (Saudi Arabia was producing seventy-four 
million tons, Iraq forty-eight million tons and Iran sixty-three million tons of crude oil). 
Kuwait also possessed huge reserves of oil, estimated to be twenty percent of the 
worlds known oil reserves at the time. 
Kuwait's independence had been an important objective of British policy. This 
had been demonstrated in the Anglo-Kuwaiti exchange of letters and the intervention 
of British forces into Kuwait in July 1961. The military plans and strategic dispositions 
of British forces in the Gulf were largely drawn up to deal with Kuwait's security and 
the military arrangements were bound up in the patron-client relationship between 
Britain and Kuwait. Problematically, but probably correctly, Sheikh Abdullah had 
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agreed only to the pre-positioning of a military stockpile inside Kuwait and not the 
pernlanent stationing of troops. 
The British position was changing in the world and in the Gulf region. The 
decline in its strength and power was affecting the scope and breadth of its policy. The 
Treasury, always keen to make cuts in expenditure, questioned the fundamental beliefs 
upon which British policy in the Gulf had so far rested. It argued that military security 
could be replaced with political alliances, and they also rightly pointed out that British 
forces in the Gulf were not there primarily to contain the Soviet Union or stop it 
advancing into the region. CENTO was the military organisation that contained the 
Soviet bloc in South West Asia. CENTO was made up of Britain, Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan. As with the Baghdad Pact the United States had only indirect association. 
The money spent on CENTO, by Britain, was considerably smaller than the amount 
spent on direct defence of the Gulf. The Treasury went on to argue that if the Soviet 
Union attacked the Gulf region then the West would respond with a general world 
war. Defence arrangements need not therefore be made, for this contingency, with 
forces in the Gulf. It also argued that British oil interests would not be effected by the 
ownership of oil since whoever controlled the oil in the region they would still be 
dependent on the West to purchase it. The Treasury was arguing that the 
interdependence of the Middle East economies with the west and the selling of oil was 
so important to the economies that the sale of oil would always be guaranteed. 27 
A contrary argument was put forward by Sir William Luce in 1967. He wrote 
that: 
No one would deny the importance of the oil interest, but it is frequently 
argued that there is no need for any special political or military effort on our 
part to "protect" it and that it should look after itself like any other commercial 
enterprise; rather than maintain our position in the Gulf, which may itself bring 
dangers for us and our friends in the area, it would be better to withdraw 
quickly and allow the normal economic laws of supply and demand to ensure the 
flow of oil. These arguments over-simplify the problem. It is certainly true that 
British troops neither can nor should protect the oil industry in any direct sense. 
The oil companies must handle their own relations with the host governments in 
27 PRO: FO 3711170165: Treasury memorandum to Foreign Office, March, 1963. 
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all ntatters which affect the terms on which they operate, and it is not necessary 
or desirable that they should receive support from the British Government 
beyond the bounds of normal diplomatic practice. Even in the extreme case of 
nationalisation of British oil interests, should this ever arise, there should be no 
question of forcible intervention. But the oil industry does require a reasonable 
degree of peace and stability in the areas in which it operates if it is to thrive and 
expand in the future, to the benefit of both the producing and consuming 
countries; and this basic requirement is not within the scope of the oil 
companies.28 
These arguments did not stop the eventual British withdrawal from the Gulf 
announced in 1968 and executed in 1971. Yet the sentiments of this argument helped 
keep Britain in the Gulf throughout the 1960s. 
Up to this point Britain had achieved its objectives by having military bases 
and forces in the Gulf. The Soviet threat and the security of oil production and 
transportation had been met by British force in the Gulf. With the fall of Qassim in 
Iraq, the question was whether Kuwaiti security and independence could be achieved 
by other means. The call was for a political rather than a military solution to Kuwait's 
security problem. During his tenure as the Political Resident in the Gulf, Luce 
suggested that this still had little bearing on the position of British forces. Iraqi 
recognition of Kuwait in 1963 did not change the need to maintain British forces to 
defend Kuwait. The main task of these forces remained the protection of British assets 
and investments in the region. The assets were Britain's oil companies and the access 
to oil on reasonable terms that they enjoyed. 
6.4 Policy of the client: Kuwait 
Concern over the vulnerability of Kuwait in the wake of the 1961 crisis led 
Sheikh Abdullah to adopt a new diplomatic strategy. He communicated to the acting 
28 Luce, "Britain in the Persian Gulf', p. 280. 
239 
Political Agent, Alan Rothnie, his decision to exchange certain Ambassadors with 
various countries and to dispatch a number of goodwill missions to various states in 
the world.29 Kuwait would exchange ambassadors with Saudi Arabia, the UAR, the 
Lebanon, the United States and Britain. There were two reasons for this increase in 
diplomatic representation. The first was to build up the political security of Kuwait by 
gaining international diplomatic support and recognition. This policy mirrors that 
suggested for weak powers by Robert Keohane.30'fhe second was to expound the 
viewpoint of Kuwait to the international community in order to contend with the 
propaganda war being waged by Baghdad against Kuwait. The increase in diplomatic 
representation in Kuwait was to lead to a decrease in the influence of Britain, because 
the foreign infonnation, advice and pressure exerted on Sheikh Abdullah would no 
longer be dominated by Britain. This was recognised and accepted by the British 
government. This new proactive diplomacy of Sheikh Abdullah included the sending of 
diplomatic envoys to various parts of the world to promote the independence of 
Kuwait and gain support for the entry of Kuwait into the United Nations. These 
goodwill missions were organised to cover Asia, Africa, the Western Hemisphere, 
Western Europe and if possible the Soviet Union.31 
The events of June and July 1961 had indicated to the government of Kuwait 
the international environment that they now faced. The changed relationship between 
Kuwait and Britain, made by the Exchange of Letters in June 1961, meant that Kuwait 
could no longer be sheltered by the British from the wider world. Although the patron-
client relationship remained in place, Anglo-Kuwaiti relations were becoming more 
diffuse and divergent over certain issues. As members of the Arab League the Kuwaiti 
government were now following the Arab line on many issues. Characteristically for 
one of the conservative Sheikhly regimes, when inter-Arab questions arose that split 
the Arab world, the Kuwaiti government attempted to steer a neutral course. For 
29 PRO: FO 3711 156828: Kuwait to Foreign Office, August 22, 1961, 1.00p.m.: Rothnie. 
30 Keohane, "Lilliputians", p. 295; See pp. 132-142 of this thesis. 
31 PRO: FO 3711156828: Kuwait to Foreign Office, August 22, 1961, l.OOp.m.: Rothnie. 
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instance, over the events in Algeria, Sheikh Abdullah, although distressed by the news, 
was detennined to adopt a neutral position and not be drawn into a 'Kings Club'. In a 
damage limitation exercise Sheikh Abdullah wrote a brotherly letter to King Saud 
reiterating the long historical ties between their two families and the two states. Yet he 
gave no indication to Saud to suggest that Kuwait would take sides with Saudi Arabia 
against Nasser over the issue.32 
At the end of 1961 Sheikh Sabah, the Foreign Minister of Kuwait, announced 
at a press conference that Kuwait was to adopt a policy of non-alignment. The 
Minister also proclaimed that his government had decided to set up a Kuwaiti 
Development Fund for the economic development of Arab countries. Over the issue of 
the seizure of Kuwaiti ships and assets by Iraq, the Minister called for moves to be 
made by the Arab League.33 
In February 1962 rumours swept Baghdad that Syria had put forward a number 
of proposals to settle the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. These, it was alleged, included: 
That Kuwait, while maintaining a kind ofJndependence, should become a 
form of Arab Federal Territory; that it should be the seat of the Arab League 
Secretariat and that it should become a Development Bank for the Arab World. 
A fourth proposal, of which we have had only one report, was that the Ruler of 
Kuwait should drop the title of Emir and revert to that of Sheikh.34 
This Syrian move was viewed with disdain by the Kuwaitis and the suggestions 
were clearly rejected by them as they continued to pursue membership of the UN. 
The Kuwaiti government attempted to persuade the Soviet government 
through a number of channels to waive its veto in the Security Council, with Soviet 
representation in Kuwait offered as the incentive. The Foreign Office advised Sheikh 
Abdullah not to barter with the Soviet Union on this issue because of its usual tactic of 
continually raising the bargaining price. The problem facing the Kuwaiti government 
32 PRO: FO 3711 162893: Kuwait to Foreign Office, August 27, 1962: Richmond to Walmsley. 
33 PRO: FO 3711 162887: Kuwait-UAR relations: Cairo to Foreign Office, December 28, 1961. 
34 PRO: FO 3711 162898: Baghdad to Foreign Office, February 21, 1962: Robey to Figg. 
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was when to put in another membership application to the UN. The danger was that 
the issue could tum into another Cold War issue with little prospect of resolution 
On June 8, 1962, Sheikh Sabah aI-Ahmad, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister, made 
a comprehensive statement of Kuwaiti foreign policy in the Kuwaiti National 
Assembly. This policy statement focused on Arab affairs. Whether the motivation for 
Kuwait's position on Arab unity was based on the usual Arab platitudes or from an 
actual commitment to the process, the Foreign Minister was clear in his government's 
support for the concept. The pan-Arabist position of the Kuwaiti government was 
manifested by five general aims and two specific policies.35 
The general aims were first, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other 
Arab states and neutrality over disputes between and of the Arab states, and second, 
commitment to and belief in the Arab League as a vehicle for the development of a 
common united Arab family. Third came the support and backing for the complete 
liberation of the Arab homeland, fourth, the use of economic resources to strengthen 
the Arab states, in particular the Gulf states, Yemen and Algeria, and fifth, the 
strengthening of Arab diplomatic relations.36 
The two specific policies related to Palestine and the Oman. On Palestine, the 
Foreign Minister committed Kuwait to the Arab League resolutions on the 'usurped 
homeland', to give full assistance to the refugees through UNRWA, and to support the 
enforcement of the boycott of Israel. Over Oman, the Foreign Minister signalled the 
departure from supporting Britain by backing the Arab League position. 
The other important element in the Foreign Minister's statement was the 
commitment of Kuwait to a position of non-alignment in the Cold War and the wish 
expressed on behalf of the Kuwaiti government to co-operate fully with the non-
aligned states of Africa and Asia. From this position the Kuwaiti government was able 
to engage in widespread lobbying of the non-aligned group of states in the hope of 
persuading the Soviet Union that it had nothing to gain from vetoing an application 
35 PRO: FO 3711162812: Kuwait to Foreign Office, January 12, 1963: Errock to Smel1grove. 
36 Jill Crystal gives a good analysis of Kuwait's Foreign Policy in: Crystal, Kuwait, Ch. 6. 
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supported by "most of the Arab States the principal 'anti-colonialist' delegations and 
some Africans, such as Somalia, Congo (Leopoldville) and Tanganyika."37Plans were 
set to apply for admission to the UN on September 15, 1962 with the UAR agreeing to 
act on behalf of Kuwait. 38 
Predictably, the British government was advised by its Embassy in Moscow 
that the Soviet Union was unlikely to remove the veto. The Embassy suggested that 
the Soviet Union was supporting Iraq on this issue as a quid pro quo for the support of 
Iraq over its Berlin policy. The UAR Ambassador to Moscow agreed with this 
assessment. 39 
The UAR refused to sponsor the Kuwaiti cause unless there was some clear 
indication that the Soviet Union was about to lift its veto. 4°Interestingly, on September 
28 the Soviet Foreign Minister, Gromyko, expressed to the United States Secretary of 
State, Dean Rusk, that the Soviet Union was "reviewing the question of Kuwait's 
membership and was somewhat embarrassed to be caught between Egypt and Iraq on 
this question."41The Americans asked for this information to be kept confidential and 
not passed on to the Kuwaitis. The advice from the Foreign Office was therefore that 
Kuwait should be encouraged to keep up its bid for membership. Characteristically 
Gromyko, in a discussion with the UAR Foreign Minister, said that Soviet policy had 
not changed and that they would continue to block the application of Kuwait to the 
UN. Tactical considerations in the United Nations as well as the fact that the Arab 
nation was split over many issues, including the Yemen, meant that a concerted 
campaign in the UN on behalf of Kuwait could not be mounted. The decision taken at 
this point was to wait for a later date before reapplying. 
Later in October 1962 Sheikh Abdullah wrote a letter to Khrushchev outlining 
the independence of Kuwait and its development of democratic institutions. He called 
37 PRO: FO 3711162896: Kuwait to Foreign Office, August 20, 1962: Errock to Given. 
38 PRO: FO 3711 162896: Kuwait to Foreign Office, August 28, 1962: Richmond. 
39 PRO: FO 3711 162896: Moscow to Foreign Office, September 12, 1962: Smith to Walmsley. 
40 PRO: FO 3711 162896: Kuwait to Foreign Office, October 3, 1962: Richmond. 
41 PRO: FO 3711162896: Foreign Office to Kuwait, October 4, 1962. 
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on Khrushchev to reconsider Soviet policy on Kuwait especially now that all the Arab 
States except one (Iraq), and seventy other states of the United Nations had extended 
recognition to Kuwait. 42Despite this move, the Soviet Union in the short term 
continued its stance towards Kuwait. 
Although Sheikh Abdullah believed by August 1962 that the potential for an 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had considerably diminished, he was quick to voice his 
appreciation and stress the importance that he attached to the relationship of Kuwait 
with Britain. He credited the success of his Arab policies to the backbone of support 
that he could rely on from Britain.43 
6.5 Patron-client relations: Britain and Kuwait. 
The position of Britain in the Gulf and its relationship with Kuwait had 
developed and changed considerably in the five years since the revolution in Iraq in 
1958. Although a few lingering traces of British imperialism remained in the Gulf, the 
attitudes of policy makers in London was that British interests were with independent 
sovereign states in the region and not semi-colonial quasi-states. Despite this 
viewpoint, the British were still seen by many people in the Gulf as a quasi-colonial 
power with special political interests in the region, as indeed they still were. This 
attitude, so generally held by the Middle East states, would be difficult to dispel or 
change. Even though Britain was pursuing a policy of non-intervention in inter-Arab 
disputes it was still seen as pro-monarchist and anti-republican. The existence of Israel 
was a constant reminder to the Arabs of British imperialism. It was also one of the 
main dangers to the general Middle East position of Britain. In a report on Middle East 
policy in 1963 it was stated that: 
It may seem unfair that the onus of responsibility for Israel should fall so 
heavily on us ..•. Israel is in a sense a lasting proof of the continuity of British 
imperialism. The Balfour Declaration, the fact that Palestine was under British 
administration and even the Tripartite Declaration all point ominously in our 
42 PRO: FO 3711 162896: Kuwait to Foreign Office, November 1, 1962: Richmond. 
43 PRO: FO 3711 162893, "Kuwait to Foreign Office, August 27,1962: Richmond to Walmsley. 
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direction. To some extent feeling on this subject have run so high for so long that 
they are today in normal circumstances atrophied ...• The one thing more than 
any other within the limits of probability which would destroy any hope of a nice 
cosy long term political relationship with the Arab States and bring us back 
starkly to political realities would be if, as a result of some collapse in Jordan 
Israel went into the West Bank and we acquiesced in it without vigorou~ 
protest.44 
The independence of Kuwait at the beginning of 1962 was supported politically 
by the Arab League and militarily by the British government. Both pillars were vital to 
the continued independence of Kuwait, but the ultimate guarantee of the independence 
of Kuwait remained British forces stationed in Bahrain, Aden and Cyprus. Yet, Kuwait 
could not rely exclusively on military support from Britain for its independence 
because this would require the stationing of a large number of British troops in the 
state to be effective and guaranteed. Such an outcome would have made a mockery of 
its independence. Conversely, Kuwait could not rely solely upon the Arab League for 
its security. Although the Arab League Defence Force was the nominal force in 
Kuwait, its importance was political and symbolic rather than military. The unstable 
position of many states in the Middle East also made alliances unreliable and 
unpredictable. 
The British government continued to support the security policy of Sheikh 
Abdullah. The Foreign Office was also realistic about the varying diplomatic stance 
that the Kuwaiti government had to take at different times and with different 
audiences. Richmond wrote: 
The Schizophrenia of Kuwait opinion on the two props of their 
independence and their tendency to trim their views to suit their audience have 
received striking illustration during the Christmas flurry over the Iraqi threat to 
Kuwait. In Kuwait, Brigadier Mubarak talked to the Commander of the British 
Liaison team of his intention to fire on the Arab League Security Force if they 
withdrew in the face of an Iraqi attack, and the Amir told me of trust in God and 
the British. In Cairo, the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister expressed his confidence in 
the Ability of the Arab League Security Force to defend Kuwait's independence, 
and the Kuwaiti Ambassador denied his country's intention to seek British 
assistance. 45 
44 PRO: FO 3711170165: Report on Middle East policy, March 12, 1963. 
45 PRO: FO 3711162893: Kuwait to Foreign Office, January 11, 1962: Richmond. 
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The courting, by Kuwait, of widespread Arab support for its continued 
independence was actively endorsed by the British government. The Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development was a device to try and engender this Arab political 
support. This could only be achieved if British military support was kept very much in 
the background. The scare over another possible Iraqi invasion in late December 1961 
and the subsequent military preparations of the British forces in the region continued to 
undennine the credibility of the Kuwaiti government as a secure independent state. The 
support of the majority of the Arab States for the independence of Kuwait was not a 
straightforward matter and therefore the Kuwaitis had to be sensitive to Arab opinion. 
6.6 Short summary of events up until 1971 
On October 4, 1963 recognition had been given to the independence of Kuwait 
by Iraq and to the boundary delimitation introduced by the 1932 exchange of letters. 
This recognition by Iraq reduced the threat environment for Kuwait and allowed for 
further Regulation of the British-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. The British were 
becoming just one of many foreign governments that the Kuwait government would 
consult with. The document signed between the two states was made public. 
(1) The Republic of Iraq recognized the independence and complete 
sovereignty of the state of Kuwait and its boundaries as specified in the letter of 
the Prime Minister of Iraq dated 21.07.1932 and which was accepted by the ruler 
of Kuwait in his letter dated 10.08.1932 
(2) The two Governments shall work towards reinforcing the fraternal 
relations subsisting between the two sister countries, inspired by their national 
duty, common interest and aspiration to a complete Arab Unity. 
(3) The two Governments shall work towards establishing cultural, 
commercial and economic co-operation between the two countries and the 
exchange of technical information. 
In order to realize all the foregoing objectives, they shall immediately establish 
diplomatic relations between them at the level of ambassadors.46 
46 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, pp. 110-111. 
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In the introductory paragraph of the 'Agreed Minutes' the Kuwaiti government 
agreed to "work for the termination ... of the Agreement concluded with the United 
Kingdom (19/06/1961). "47This was an important concession by the Kuwaiti 
government to Iraq and gave notice to the British-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. 
On January 1 0, 1964, the Kuwaiti government registered the agreement with the 
United Nations. 
Renewed attempts were made by the Kuwaiti government in the mid 1960s to 
fully demarcate the border with Iraq, following the success of the demarcation of the 
Neutral Zone on July 7, 1965, with Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Abdullah visited Baghdad to 
discuss the coastal strip south of Umm Qasr and the islands of Warba and Bubiyan. He 
suggested a possible Joint Boundary Committee with the task of demarcating the 
border. Sheikh Abdullah, who had played such a crucial and vital role in the 
development of Kuwait as a nation and a state, fell ill and died in November 1965. He 
was succeeded by Crown Prince Sheikh Sabah aI-Salim al-Sabah on November 24, 
1965. The new ruler nominated Sheikh Jaber aI-Ahmad as Crown Prince and prime 
minister, and worked closely with him and his own son, Sheikh Saad Abdullah al-
Salam. These three men along with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Sabah al-
Ahmad al-Sabah, became a strong cohesive unit in the implementation of strong 
rule.48Sheikh Sabah continued in the policy of his late half brother Sheikh Abdullah 
over demarcation of the border. A Joint Boundary Commission was duly set-up. 
However little progress was made because although it seemed that Kuwait was 
prepared to be flexible over the leasing of Warba this did not go far enough for Iraq. 
The Iraqi government still demanded the control of land south of Umm Qasr and the 
use of both Bubiyan and Warba. The Commission was eventually disbanded when it 
was clear that the two sides had reached an insurmountable impasse. 
The British government was no longer in a position to influence or exert 
pressure on Iraq and therefore could not contribute much to the border issues. The 
47 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, p. 111. 
48 Marwan Iskandar, The Cloud Over Kuwait (New York: Vantage Press, 1991), pp. 38-39. 
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Kuwaiti government was now having to reach a resolution of the border issues with 
little help from any patron. What remained from the patron was the guarantee of 
assistance if requested by the client. The removal of this guarantee would be the end of 
the relationship. 
British policy for the Gulf in the late 1960s was mishandled by the Wilson 
government. In 1966 when notice was given of British troop withdrawal from Aden, 
announcement was made that forces stationed in the Gulf would be increased. Policy 
was to retain British bases indefinitely and to strengthen the 
garrisons. 49Correspondingly, in November 1967 the Minister of State in the Foreign 
Office, Goronwy Roberts, was despatched to reassure the rulers of the Gulf states that 
Britain was not contemplating withdrawal from the region. Roberts publicly and 
privately assured the rulers that Britain would stay in the Gulf as long as its presence 
was needed to keep peace and stability. 
While British support was being reiterated in the upper Gulf, the last British 
troops were taken out of the Aden Colony on November 29, 1967. Aden had become 
a heavy burden on the British government. Since 1964 the bulk of British troops had 
been deployed in the Radfan mountains suppressing an insurrection. Rather than 
bolstering British security interests in the area (which the Aden base had been very 
much designed to do) the military presence in Aden had undennined British influence 
and strength in the Gulf. The lesson of Aden unfortunately influenced British policy 
towards the rest of the Gulf. 
A further financial crisis in Britain prompted a reversal of the policy outlined by 
Roberts. In a bid to cut expenditure the decision was taken to retreat East of Suez. The 
savings in the Gulf came to £12 million per year. Compared to the value of British oil 
investments and profits made in the Gulf region this was a paltry sum. Kelly rightly 
condemns the Wilson Cabinet over this decision. 
49 Maclean, British Foreign Policy, p. 183. 
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Here, it is clear, was no searching and far-reaching analysis of British 
foreign, imperial and defence policies, with all their grave implications and 
perilous imponderables, but an unseemly squabble among ministries of the 
Crown for private advantage, factional ascendancy and ideological or financial 
priority. Every consideration, it would seem, was subordinated to the narrow 
interests of party and doctrine ... 5o 
Roberts was sent to make the announcement of British withdrawal set for the 
end of 1971. It caused differing reactions throughout the world. In the United States 
the decision was cause for concern in the Senate and the State Department. The fear 
was that the British withdrawal would cause a power vacuum that would unsettle the 
balance of power in the region. 51 It was also felt that the United States did not have the 
men or resources to fill this vacuum with so much of the American military machine 
tied down in South East Asia. 
In May 1968 in response to the British announcement of its intention to leave 
the Gulf the Kuwaiti government gave notice of the termination of the Exchange of 
Letters of June 19, 1961. An exchange of notes was made on May 13, 1968, between 
the Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs and the British Ambassador to Kuwait. Two 
months later on July 30, 1968 a coup d'etat in Bagh9ad reinstated Ba'thist rule. Over 
the next few months relations between Iraq and Iran began to deteriorate as both states 
attempted to reposition themselves in the Gulf following the announcement of British 
withdrawal. The threat of war with Iran prompted the new Ba'thist government in 
Baghdad to request the Kuwaiti government to allow Iraqi forces to be deployed in 
and around Umm Qasr. The Kuwaiti Minister of Defence and the interior tacitly 
acquiesced to what was in effect a fait accompli.52That he had no option but to do so 
was clear proof if any were needed of the almost total eclipse of British power. 
The Kuwaiti government's response to British withdrawal was to try and 
substitute the United States for Britain as its guarantor of independence against Iraq. 
Sheikh Sabah met President-elect Nixon a month before his inauguration on December 
50 J. B. Kelly, Arabia. the Gulf and the West (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 51. 
51 James Noyes, The Clouded Lens, p. 15. 
52 Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq, p. 114. 
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17, 1968. Henry Kissenger, then Nixon's nominee as National Security adviser wrote 
that: 
I assulned that the Arab-Israeli conflict would be at the forefront of the 
Amir's concern and prepared an erudite memorandum on the subject. 
Unfortunately, the Amir wanted, above all, to learn what plans the new 
Administration had for the Persian Gulf after the United Kingdom vacated the 
area, as it had announced it would do in 1971. What were America's intentions 
if, for example, Iraq attacked Kuwait? .. [Nixon] replied that he would have to 
study the matter, but that, of course, we were interested in the territorial 
integrity of all states in the area; what tactical measures we would adopt would 
of course depend on circumstances. The Amir seemed content with this delphic 
utterance.53 
Kuwait now as a member of the United Nations and the Arab League had a 
certain amount of support from the international community and from International 
Organisations for its continued independence. The Kuwaiti government began to use 
its huge wealth to foster and guard this position. Rentier politics was to be the Kuwaiti 
government's replacement for international clientelism. This consisted of using large 
funds to buy support from neighbours in the Gulf and the Levant region. Low interest 
-
loans were made to most of the non-oil producing Arab states of the region by Kuwait. 
The election in Britain in 1970 brought in the new Conservative Heath 
government. Heath explored the possibility of reversing the Labour governments 
decision to withdraw from the area. He sent Sir William Luce to the Gulf to report 
back on whether such a reversal could be possible. He recommended that it was not. 
This was accepted and Luce was appointed to negotiate the end of treaties by the end 
of 1971. The British-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship had lasted from 1899 to 1971. 
The withdrawal of British forces from East of Suez brought the end to this long 
standing relationship. Kuwait's security had been reliant on the 'borrowing of power' 
from outside the region, through its clientelist relationship with Britain. This 
relationship had now come to a close and the Kuwaiti government now had to look 
towards a myriad of international organisations and bilateral state relations to cement 
53 Henry Kissenger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1979), p. 51. 
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its weak power position. The period 1964-1971 witnessed the withdrawal of Britain 
from the Gulf and the end of the British-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship. With this 
withdrawal came an end to an era of tranquillity and relative secnrity for the Gulf. 
The other Gulf states that were given notice of the end of their treaty 
relationships with Britain - Bahrain, Qatar and the emirates of the Tnlcial Coast - were 
less enthusiastic than Kuwait to leave British protection for full independence. Many 
outstanding issues with their lager neighbours had yet to be resolved. The most 
important of these between Bahrain and Iran was solved in 1969 when the Shah agreed 
to allow the sovereignty of Bahrain to be decided by a referendum of the population. 
Held under the auspices of the UN the people opted for independence. Qatar followed 
suit and also opted for independence. 
The seven Sheikhdoms of the Tnlcial Coast on the prompting of the British 
government joined together to form the federation of the United Arab Emirates. This 
was made possible after a compromise was reached between Sharjah and Iran over the 
islands of Abu Musa, \vhich was effectively partitioned. The Buraimi dispute between 
Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia, despite the effot1s of Sir William Luce, was not resolved 
at this time. However, agreement was reached a few years later on August 21, 1974, 
on this issue. The oil \vealth of Abu Dhabi provided enough of an incentive to the other 
less wealthy Tnlcial States to overcome their minor differences. Sheikh Zaid became 
President of the Federation which was formally inaugurated on December 2. 1971. 
6.7 Conclusion 
By the beginning of the 1970s Kuwait had developed into a city state. The 
money derived from oil had allowed the al-Sabah nl1ing family to create a new Kuwait. 
The long standing Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship \vas now at an end. The 
Kuwaiti government no'v sought safety in a multitude of relations developed from 
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becoming fully integrated into international society, by way of the United Nations and 
through the exchange of Embassies and Ambassadors. The reduction in Kuwait's 
threat environment due to the partial recognition of Kuwait by Iraq, its membership of 
various international organisations including the United Nations and membership of the 
Arab League, allowed the Kuwaiti government to take this course. 
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Chapter 7: Final Perspectives 
7.1 The British perspective 
The anachronistic British position in the Gulf was a left over of an 'imperial age' 
when as one of its Indian civil servants put it the "Gulf states were a special preserve of 
HMG whose policy towards them rested on a kind of Monroe Doctrine."lTherefore, 
Anglo-Kuwaiti relations between 1957 and 1963 provide the material for not only an 
excellent case study of patron-client relations in flux, but also a study of part of the end 
of Britain's imperial legacy. 
The declining power position of Britain in the Gulf in the later 1950s and 1960s 
also demonstrates the main argument of the thesis, that declining patrons seek 
economic objectives from their clients as distinct from strategic advantage, ideological 
alignment or alliance support. Paul Kennedy argues that a great power can fall and 
decline because of military over-extension.2In such circumstances commitments 
outstrip resources. In the case of Britain a major challenge of the last years of Empire 
was how to match commitments to resources while also using its remaining influence 
over colonial, post-colonial and client states to prop up a weak financial position. The 
changing realities of Britain's power position produced a need to redefme and change 
attitudes and policies. This need was readily apparent in British policy in the Gulf. 
British policy was dominated by four major characteristics. First came an 
inherent imperial attitude of the Foreign Office towards the region; second, the 
dominance of short term ad-hoc solutions over long-term planning, which remained 
1 PRO: FO 3711 19977: Rendel's record of conversation with Persian Ambassador. 
2 Kennedy, Rise and Fall. 
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weak and vague. The third characteristic was the fonnal and legal nature of the 
relationships built up in the region by way of patron-client relationships. Fourth came 
the tendency of policy to be reactive rather than proactive. 
Political power in the long term comes from a strong economIC base. 
Governments with weak economic and financial circumstances may therefore att~mpt 
to improve their economic standing through their relations with other states. There is a 
rich secondary literature on British colonial and imperial decline, one of the most 
influential voices being that of John Gallagher.3He contends that both domestic and 
international pressures should be joined together to understand the pressures on British 
relations to change its colonial system. Gallagher also argues that the Second World 
War had led to a revival of Britain's system of formal rule and that the trend which had 
been seen during the inter-war period, of formal rule giving way to mere influence, had 
been temporarily reversed. Britain's relations with Kuwait confIrm this analysis. The 
British government had attempted to strengthen its position in, and its control of, the 
Sheikhdom throughout the 1950s. This was attempted by trying to dominate Kuwait 
formally through the Embassy and informally through KOC and other British 
companies. The Suez fiasco and the Iraqi revolution brought ruin to this position and 
the relationship moved back to its traditional role of influence and military support 
'over the horizon'. 
The loss of imperial will that Gallagher also mentions is certainly relevant to British 
relations with Kuwait. 
Was it really worth the country's while to maintain a world system at all? 
What was the need of this world? If there was not to be a British presence east of 
Suez, then there was precious little point in holding bastions and staging posts, 
3 John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire, the Ford Lectures and other 
Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
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whether in the Mediterranean and the Middle East or in the Indian Ocean. If 
there was no necessity for imperialism then there was no reason for holding the 
vestiges of empire. This is not so much an end game as a refusal to play the game 
any longer. 4 
The pressing financial problems for the British government ensured that any 
new overseas policies would be dominated by the need for economy. The reduction in 
British power also ensured that the British government actively sought diplomatic 
support for any of its actions. The objective remained the preservation of the British 
position, politically, strategically and economically in the region. But, cosmetic 
changes in relations with the Sheikhdoms did not change the substance of British 
policy in the region, and could only disguise Britain's weakened position. During 
periods of tension and crisis the British government reverted where appropriate and 
possible to military intervention. Problematically, there remained considerable 
problems with the use of the military option in the Gulf. One of the underlying themes 
that runs throughout the thesis was that within British defence strategy in the Gulf, the 
problems of the air barrier and the strategic projection of force hampered and shaped 
policy.5Por example British policy in Oman was strongly influenced by the need to 
have RAP bases at Masirah and overflight rights.6 
There had been a failure to devise any long term British strategy for the Gulf. 
What remained in this period was a rather ad hoc oscillation between immediate urgent 
requirements and wider British policy concerns. The result of this rather vague and 
fluid approach was the impression of anachronistic drift. That Britain was able to retain 
its position in the Gulf for so long despite this lack of a coherent long term strategy 
4 Gallagher, The Decline, p. 152. 
5 See pp. 113-114 of this thesis. 
6 Timpe, "British Foreign Policy", p. 319. 
was due to the reciprocal relationships that it enjoyed with many of the Sheikhdoms in 
the Gulf and the grudging acceptance of the larger Gulf powers that Britain was 
preferred as a balancer than another either external power or an internal regional 
power rival. Credit must also be given to the attachment of the British policy elites to 
the idea of Britain retaining a role in the region and to the support extended to the 
Macmillan government by the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. In retrospect 
it was clear that Britain's position in the Gulf after Suez was in a slow move towards 
terminal decline. 
The Suez disaster accelerated many long term changes to British policy in the 
Middle East. In the short term the reaction in Whitehall to the crisis was to 'batten 
down the hatches'. The reason for this was the inability of the policy elites to adapt 
either politically or psychologically to the new realities. The revolution in Iraq in 1958 
had more of an effect on British policy and relations in the Gulf, than the events of 
Suez'? 
British representation in the Gulf was made up of personnel from the old India 
Office, the Sudan Political Service and the Foreign Office. Each had different traditions 
and training. This, combined with the institutional problems in Britain's policy-making 
bodies, which included the number of different agencies with an interest in overseas 
policy, meant that the Foreign Office was unable to devise a coherent long term 
policy.8Despite their conservatism towards policy in the Gulf the Foreign Office could 
act very pragmatically. This was due much to the influential personality of Sir William 
Luce and his important tenure as Political Resident in the Gulf and Governor of Aden 
during the fmal throes of Britain's presence there. There were clearly some talented 
7 Timpe, "British Foreign Policy", p. 321. 
8 See p. 12 of this thesis. 
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British personnel in the region at this time, but their influence on policy had been 
changed by developments of communications which had made their role, as Balfour-
Paul put it, that of articulate postman.9The changed international environment also 
ensured that policy problems could not be compartmentalised but had to be seen as a 
whole. In essence their role was one of implementation rather than devising policy. 
The Prime Minister was also a strong supporter of the continued British policy 
in the Gulf and towards Kuwait, but this was due to the economic importance of the 
Gulf to Britain, and not because of any commitment to the old imperial role. Macmillan 
wanted Britain to retain a strong international position, but he was aware that fmancial 
constraints on the British economy would limit the extent of this stand.IO'fhe 
temporary maintenance of this international position owed a great deal to the 'Special 
Relationship' with the United States, and one of the underlying themes throughout this 
thesis is the importance of this relationship to the success of Britain's Gulf policy. John 
Darwin writes that "the recognition of the necessity-of progressing towards colonial 
self government coexisted with an equal determination to preserve British world 
power. "11 
Macmillan was insistent that British foreign policy should also be seen as 
progressive and modem. In February 1960 in a speech to the South African 
Parliament, in Cape Town, Macmillan spoke of "the winds of change . . . blowing 
through this continent."I2This speech publicised the new position of the Cabinet on the 
9 Balfour-Paul, The End of Empire, p. 153. 
10 See p. 13 of this thesis. . 
11 John Darwin, The End of the British Empire, the Historical Debate (Oxford: BasIl Blackwell Ltd., 
1991), p. 114. . 
12 P. J. Madgewick, D Steeds and L. J. Williams, Britain Since 1945 (London: Hutchmson, 1982) p. 
286. 
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Empire and Britain's colonial role. 13Jt was now clear that, as Keith Middlemas writes: 
"Evolution of a modem colonial policy in which independence became not a remote 
destiny but an immediate virtue."14There was no single reason either for this decision 
or for the general break-up of the British imperial system which followed from it. 
There was rather a myriad of reasons that included Britain's economic weakness, world 
opinion and domestic re-election concerns. Britain's position in the Gulf did not really 
reflect the rate of change in the other parts of Britain's imperial network. This was for 
three important reasons. First, the massive importance of Gulf oil and fmancial profits 
of the British oil companies to Britain. Second, that the position that Britain had in the 
Gulf in the late 1950s was one that the British government was attempting to achieve 
for its general imperial commitments. Third, the need for secure and plentiful oil for 
Western Europe was not just an economic but a strategic necessity. Massive amounts 
would have been needed for a tank and air campaign against the Warsaw pact. 
The new British policy was an attempt to remove the burdens or imperialism 
(increasing diplomatic, political and economic cost) without losing the influence built-
up over many years. In essence this was imperialism on the cheap. The relationship that 
Britain had with many of the Gulf states was a sort of model for this. Britain had 
hegemonic influence over much of the external policy and behaviour of the 
Sheikhdoms, but without having the difficulties of having to rule them domestically. 
This policy failed because the financial weakness of Britain undermined its power. 
There was also perhaps a subconscious decision taken by many of the policy makers in 
London that a world system for Britain was no longer worth the cost. 
13 R.F Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981. An Introductory Survey (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1985), p. 227. 
14 Keith Middlemas, Power, Competition and the State: Volume 1: Britain in Search of Balance, 
1940-1961 (California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986) p.285. 
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The British expected to remain the predominant external influence in 
many of their former colonies and preserve the special international status that 
imperial power had brought them in the past. That it was not possible to have 
their cake and eat it, to give up imperial burdens but still enjoy imperial perks, 
came as an unwelcome surprise. 15 
Significantly, the Wilson government's fmal decision to withdraw from East of Suez in 
1968 was prompted by a run on the pound rather than political or strategic 
considerations. 
The changing Anglo-Kuwaiti relations in this period were a microcosm of 
wider British relations with its crumbling colonial and imperial empire. The Macmillan 
government had correctly realised that the health of the British economy now lay with 
a closer attachment to Europe rather than to the old colonial system. Both as 
Chancellor and as Prime Minister, Macmillan had sought financial cuts from the 
colonial system. He had introduced a cost-benefit review of the colonial position early 
on in his premiership.16The considerable savings _made to government overseas 
expenditure had come through cuts in military expenditure and the retreat from empire. 
The weakness of the country's economic position and the pressure on sterling had 
accelerated this process. 17The imperial game was up, and by the start of the 1960s the 
question was not whether but rather how and when British withdrawal should take 
place. 
15 Darwin, The End of the British Empire, p. 114. 
16 Balfour-Paul, The end of Empire, p. 138. 
17 Maurice W. Kirby, The Decline of British Economic Power Since 1970 (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1981) p. 118; Susan Strange, Sterling and British Policy: A Political Study of an International 
Currency in Decline (London: Oxford University Press for RIIA, 1971). 
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7.2 The Kuwaiti perspective 
Kuwaiti insecurity is derived from its internal weakness and its external 
vulnerability. As a small, very rich, but politically and military weak state, Kuwait is 
fully exposed to the general problems of the anarchic international system. The 
problems of geography also define Kuwaiti security problems. Proximity to Iraq, a 
powerful regional neighbour, has been the crux of Kuwait's external security concerns 
for much of the last forty years. The desire for survival led the al-Sabah ruling family to 
develop a client-patron relationship with Britain. This mutually beneficial relationship 
facilitated the survival not only of the state but of the regime. Clientelism allowed the 
al-Sabah family to balance its inherent problem of internal autonomy and external 
security delicately. The fundamental objective of Sheikh Abdullah was security. 
Kuwait's national security was indivisible from regime (or the ruling al-Sabah family's) 
security. Security was perceived in both the political and military contexts, and 
therefore there remained an inherent tension in the client bond, because it provided 
military security but political insecurity. 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship changed in the later 1950s and early 1960s to a 
position in which Kuwait was ready to replace clientelism with rentier politics and oil-
dollar diplomacy. This new policy was shown by the events of August 1990 to be 
unable to guarantee the security of Kuwait. Since the Second Gulf War there has been 
a move back by both Kuwaiti and the other member of the GCC towards stronger 
bilateral relations with Western powers. These new bonds have similarities with 
clientelism. But, the new security of these states by contrast with the clientelist 
relationships enjoyed with Britain from the beginning of the twentieth century to the 
end of the 1960s, had been supported and nuanced by membership of a myriad of 
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political and security organisations including the GCC, the Arab League and the United 
Nations. The Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client relationship safeguarded Kuwait during the 
security crisis of 1961. Such a relationship in 1990 might have deterred or repulsed 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. 
The 1961 crisis although having many structural similarities to the crisis of 
1990 also had differences. In the wider context of the Middle East the Kuwaiti crisis of 
1961 was also de-stabilised by the thrust of pan-Arabism and the tensions of the Arab 
cold war. In the Nasser era Arab interstate relations were shaped by border disputes 
between a number of the Arab states. Iraq's claims to Kuwait were part of a pattern of 
border and territorial disputes in this period which included, the Saudi Arabia and 
Oman civil war in the 1950s, Syrian and Egyptian policy towards Jordan in the 1950s, 
Syrian involvement in Lebanon in 1958, Egyptian interference in Iraq in 1959, the 
Moroccan-Algerian conflict of 1965, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia's intervention in the 
Yemeni civil war from 1962 to 1967. The weakness of Arab co-operation and the lack 
of a regional institution for the resolution of conflicts was amply demonstrated in the 
Iraqi-Kuwaiti case. The Arab League could only offer a token force in the defence of 
Kuwait, its importance being more political than military. It had clearly failed to 
resolve a crisis between two of its members. 
Iraq's bid for Kuwait was part of the Qassim regime's desire for hegemony in 
the Gulf. It was predictable that Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt would seek to oppose 
such a move. As Ibrahim writes: ''When Abdul-Karim Qassim advanced the Iraqi claim 
to Kuwait, even Egyptian President Gamal Abdul-Nasser, the symbol of Arab 
nationalism, had sided with the British in defence of Kuwait. "18 
18 Ibrahim, The Gulf Crisis, pp. 15-16. 
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7.3 Theory 
Throughout this dissertation relations between Kuwait and Britain in the late 
1950s and early 1960s have been characterised as a client-patron relationship. The 
dyadic asymmetrical bond between the two states underwent fundamental changes in 
this period that the clientelistic model can help to explain in a much more specific way 
than the more general structural realist or neoliberal institutionalist approaches of 
recent years. l 9The client-patron model also acts as a theoretical framework for specific 
and general themes that dominated and shaped the relationship. The most important of 
these was the structural insecurity of the small weak client, Kuwait, and the declining 
power of the patron, Britain. These two themes shaped the relationship, but the 
dynamics and tensions of the international system must be added to create a coherent 
picture of the clientelistic bond. 
The Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship was useful as a case study for this model 
because it highlighted the various changing aspects possible in such a dyadic patron-
client relationship. According to international patron-client theory the reciprocal 
exchange of resources between the patron and the client takes the form of the patron 
giving security and or economic largesse to the client in return for some combination 
of ideological alignment, strategic advantage and alliance support. 20ln the Anglo-
Kuwaiti case during the period 1899-1945 this was certainly true, with Britain making 
economic and security transfers to Kuwait and the al-Sabah ruling family giving their 
patron strategic advantage and alliance support in return. This case study also points to 
some unique features that differentiate it from many other patron-client relationships. 
19 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the 
Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St.Martin' s, 1995) provides a survey of their rival schools that is 
both recent and comprehensive. 
20 See pp. 17-25 of this thesis. 
262 
These included the financial wealth of the client and therefore its economic 
independence of the patron, and the level of secrecy inherent in the relationship even 
during crisis periods 
In the post-war period, and especially after the crisis in Iran between 1951-
1953, the exchange of resources changed as the client began to give the patron 
economic largesse in the fonn of cheap oil and sterling investments in return for the 
continued guarantee of military security. The Anglo-Kuwaiti patron-client bond 
entered its most vital stage during the later 1950s and early 1960s, when the 
relationship dominated and shaped Britain's Gulf policy. Oil and the sterling 
investments of the Gulf rulers also helped shape British policy in this region, as did the 
growth of Arab nationalism and the intrinsic tensions in the Arab world between 
modernism and traditionalism. Oil imports into Britain came predominantly from this 
area, with an average of fifty percent coming from Kuwait and eighty to ninety percent 
from the Gulf as a whole. This thesis contends that Kuwait became the most important 
bilateral relationship for Britain in the region following the Suez debacle in 1956 and 
the revolution in Iraq in 1958. 
The increasing importance of the client to the patron ensured that this 
relationship became more balanced and less asymmetrical as Kuwait's wealth increased. 
Accordingly, and in line with the model of patron-client relations, the relationship went 
through a period of adjustment and eventual decline or regulation as both the patron 
and the client respectively became, unable to carry out and no longer in need of the 
bond. Shoemaker and Spanier contend, and this is borne out in the Anglo-Kuwaiti 
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case, that the more the patron values the dyadic bond the weaker the patronal control 
of that bond becomes.21 
Patron-client relations existed between Britain and Kuwait between 1899 and 
1971. The period 1957-1963 witnessed the sea change that took place in the 
relationship. This time frame is also important because it demonstrated the various 
different degrees of possible change in a patron-client relationship, with Regulation, 
Maintenance, Accommodation and Reinforcement of the bond all being 
experienced at different moments.22With the end of clientelism, Kuwait sought to 
replace the British security relationship with a form of rentier politics financed by its 
huge oil wealth, under the umbrella of a myriad of security relations with the Arab 
League, the United Nations and eventually the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
Ku wait managed to play this survival game for nearly twenty years after the British 
withdrawal from the Gulf. Catastrophically, the invasion of Iraqi troops on August 2, 
1990, demonstrated the failure of this security policy. The Kuwaiti government then 
began a reversion back to an old style client-patron relationship with a coalition of the 
West under the leadership of the United States. The security guarantees offered by the 
United States and to a lesser extent Britain, backed up by parts of the Arab League, in 
many ways were a re-run of the guarantees of the 1950s and 1960s and especially of 
1961. The major difference was the reversal of the United States and Britain in 
importance in the security relationship with Kuwait. In 1961 the guarantee was 
overwhelmingly that of Britain but politically supported by the United States (the 
Kennedy administration also offered military support to the British in its operation in 
1961). In the Second Gulf War of 1990-1991 the United States was the major player 
21 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, Chapter 2. 
22 See p. 25 of this thesis. 
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but with important political and military support from Britain. During periods when 
Kuwait's threat environment increased the patron-client relationship strengthened and 
drew closer. This was characterised by Accommodation or Reinforcement of the 
relationship. During periods when the external threat receded the patron-client 
relationship was characterised instead by Regulation and Maintenance. 
The threat environment for Kuwait was dominated by the danger of 
annexation, first by Saudi Arabia, and later by Iraq. This insecurity dominated and 
crafted the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship. The general view of the problems for Kuwait 
with Iraq and Saudi Arabia could be viewed at from two different perspectives. The 
frrst perspective was that this was just one of the many parts of the Arab disunity 
problem. As Sir William Luce elegantly wrote: "It is the tragedy of the Arab world 
that, in spite of all the effort and talk of the past 20 years, Arab Unity is not only as far 
away as ever but the Arabs are more deeply divided today than at any time since their 
liberation from Turkish rule. "23The second perspective was that this confrontation was 
a function of both the growth in number and the disparity in power of states in the 
twentieth-century international system. 
The foreign policy strategies of weak powers are shaped by their desire to 
break out of the constraints of the region and 'borrow power' from beyond the 
immediate regional security complex. The relative position of a weak power may then 
be improved. Yet despite the 'borrowed power' - which in any case may be matched by 
that of other external patrons - weak power is still bound by the structures of the 
regional system. This has clearly been true for Kuwait, and the problems of the 
23 Luce, "Britain in the Persian GuIC', p. 277. 
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regional sub-system continue to dominate Kuwaiti policy in the 1990s just as they did 
in the 1950s and 1960s. 
It is important for the understanding of the patron-client model that it is viewed 
in the context of the wider regional or global power structures. Cantori and Spiegal 
convincingly argue that: "The Arab subsystem is itself intrinsically a part of, and reliant 
upon, a more dominant international system."24Links with the broader strategic 
environment provide a greater understanding of the dynamics within the patron-client 
bond. For example, it is contended by Shoemaker and Spanier that: 
Smaller states, then gain a value to each superpower based not only upon 
their intrinsic worth but also upon their ability to confer a competitive 
advantage on one of the superpowers. These smaller states become scarce 
resources that are available to the highest superpower bidder ... it is critical to 
view seemingly irrational and irresponsible superpower interest in and 
concessions to, a smaller state in the context of this superpower bilateral 
com petition.25 
Why was Britain still playing these games in the Gulf in the 1950s and 1960s? 
Compared, for instance, with Britain's retreat from its security commitments to Turkey 
and Greece in 1947, the end of its commitments in the Gulf took place at a very 
sedentary rate. This poses the question of why Britain was able to succeed in 
maintaining such a strong position in the Gulf for so long. The patron-client theory 
offers some insight to this, suggesting that the success was substantially due to the 
reciprocal strength of the long-established relationships between Britain and a number 
of client states in the Gulf, notably Kuwait. One is reminded of Schumpeter's 
complaint that Marxists, by concentrating on current material conditions and class 
24 Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegal, The International Politics of Regions (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 187. 
25 Shoemaker and Spanier, Patron-Client, p. 13. 
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relations, missed the continuing power of atavistic elements in society such as 
aristocracies to sway the state.26 
Another reason for the maintenance of Britain's position in the region was its 
success at playing the balance of power game. In the Gulf the broader strategic 
environment could be characterised as a balance of power system of Iraq, Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. During its long period of dominance in the Gulf Britain acted as the 
natural balancer and external hegemonic power, keeping each of these states in check 
by pursuing a policy of supporting the smaller states in the area and in turn either 
bolstering or checking the three larger powers. Within this regional sub-system there is 
therefore another inherent tension between states aspiring for independence, which 
helped secure the success of the balancing process, and states seeking predominance or 
regional hegemony. This tension is observed to be part of the dynamics of regional 
state relations. "Most of the states in each region are concerned with balancing; several 
are perceived as seeking regional predominance. "27 
Another characteristic of this sub-region is the number of weak powers within 
it. 28W eak powers are compelled to seek relationships with stronger powers in order to 
survive as independent actors. The diplomatic strategies employed characteristically 
have as their underlying aim the cultivation of external assistance.29Thus "regional 
states appeal to outside states and organisations for military, financial, and diplomatic 
support on the basis of ideology, strategic interests, and patron-client exchanges. "30 
26 Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (Philadelphia: Orion, 1991). 
27 Wriggins, Dynamics, p. 9. 
28 Cantori and Spiegal define a sub-system as "proximate and interacting states which have some 
common ethnic, lingustic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is 
sometimes increased by actions and attitudes of states external to the system." Cantori and Spiegal, 
The International, pp. 186-187. 
29 See pp. 119-120 of this thesis. 
30 Terrence P. Lyons, "The Hom of Africa Regional Politics: A Hobbesian World", in Wriggins, 
Dynamics, p. 183. 
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Despite national sovereignty and independence states are often characterised by 
marked security interdependencies. This is especially true of weak powers. Students of 
International Relations have long been aware of this. It was a central feature of the 
postwar international order envisaged by E. H. Carr that, given current military 
technology and economic interdependence, weak powers would survive only as 
members of large multinational "groups of several formally sovereign states [in which] 
the effective (but not necessarily the nominal) authority is exercised from a single 
centre. "31 The leaders of these states desire autonomy and independence but are in a 
constant struggle to match the two often competing aims. As Terrence Lyons clearly 
argues: 
To the region's hard-pressed states, these outside powers were a source of 
support - and threat. Patrons from far ofT provided the sinews of statehood, in 
some instance permitting governments to survive longer than they might 
otherwise. The more the regional states were internally fragile and surrounded 
by hostile neighbours, the easier it was for outsiders to become supporting 
patrons.32 
In the case of Kuwait, the client-patron relationship that it had with Britain was 
a cause of social and political stagnation within Kuwait but was also the vital 
component in its survival as a state. Military assistance to the client from the patron is 
usually a quid pro quo for either a strategic, political or diplomatic exchange from the 
client to the patron. This was partly the case with the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship, but 
with the distinction that the client reciprocated with almost exclusively economic 
goods to the patron. 
The intervention of British troops into Kuwaiti in July 1961 highlighted a 
number of problems inherent within this military commitment. First, the British force 
31 E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis (2nd ed. London: Macmillan, 1946) p. 231. 
32 Lyons, "The Hom", in Wriggins, Dynamics, p. 189. 
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had to appear credible and appropriate to the needs of the situation. This entailed a 
quick strong response to the deteriorating security environment. Second, the military 
response had to be compatible with and appropriate to the political and diplomatic 
environment experienced. The British security guarantee for Kuwait unfortunately was 
an ambiguous security because it both shored up and undermined the al-Sabah 
regime's legitimacy. Third, the formalised nature of the military commitment from 
Britain to Kuwait acted to increase the regional political differences. The very presence 
of British military forces enabled the Gulf Sheikhs to continue to ignore the regional 
political differences, and thus the withdrawal of the British in 1971 from the Gulf 
forced them to address the systemic problems of the region. 
Analysis of the system structure also highlights problems for the states in the 
region. Systemic logic forms boundaries within which only a limited number of policy 
choices can be made by the state. The differences between the system constraints and 
the scope of policy choice provide an intrinsic tension for those devising foreign policy. 
These restrictions can act to produce policy norms that limit innovation. Often 
particular developments will produce predictable policy choices and responses. 
Typical situations of insecurity often evoke foreseeable policy responses; 
many actions produce likely if not always exactly predictable reactions. As Waltz 
argues, individual leaders may change, but the states their successors manage 
often react in much the same ways. There are consistent patterns that help one 
foresee the range of probable choices.33 
Members of regimes do not always act inaccord with these systemic pressures. 
The perceptions, values and goals defined by them have a large bearing on policy 
choice. Problematically, domestic political constraints or pressures can lead to 
33 W Howard Wriggins, "The Dynamics of Regional Politics: An Orientation", in Wriggins, 
Dynamics, p. 8. 
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decisions that do not fit in with the expected outcome as predicted from a structural 
model of behaviour. Governments can, and do, act unpredictably. 
Four conclusions can be drawn from the Iraqi-Kuwait disputes of 1958 -1963 
and 1990-1991 that fit into a number of general patterns of interstate conflict in the 
Gulf. First, there is an important relationship between the domestic and foreign policy 
positions of the states. As Robert Litwak writes: 
In any study of Third World security questions, it is accepted as almost 
axiomatic that the factors governing the activations of inter-state conflict are 
largely reflections of internal weaknesses. Indeed regimes are prone to utilize 
external threats as a means of distracting public attention from the more 
immediate problems of national integration and development.34 
The weakness of Kuwait has made it a potential target for Iraqi aggression 
while the internal fmancial and ethnic problems in Iraq had important bearings on its 
external policy. 
Second, threats and disputes between states are shaped by the type and nature 
of the regimes in question. Revolutionary changes in government can filter through 
into important changes in external policy. This was clearly the case in Iraq in July 1958 
which led to the eventual claims on Kuwait and in Iran between 1979 and 1980 which 
resulted in the First Gulf War between Iraq and Iran, and Iranian claims to Bahrain. 
Third, stemming from the type of regimes, tension can be caused by the 
fundamental differences between regimes. Regimes of similar ideological and religious 
persuasion are more likely to be able to resolve their conflicts and disputes. The 
similarity of regimes in the lower Gulf (conservative monarchical tribal based 
Sheikhdoms) has been part of the reason for the limitation of conflict between them. 
The difference in power and outlook, goals and ideology of the Qassim and the al-
34 Chubin, Security in the Gulf,p. 96. 
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Sabah regImes was an important factor in their dispute. The difference between 
Nasserism and the Gulf Sheikhs outlook was also a potential threat that did not always 
materialise. Nasserist advocacy of republicanism, Arab nationalism, Arab socialism and 
non-alignment demanded a careful diplomatic response by the Sheikhdoms and Iran.35 
Fourth, the Iraqi-Kuwait conflict also shows how inter-Arab disputes have 
developed from traditional sources of conflict over issues such as water, tribal grazing 
rights and smuggling to new sources of conflict over land, strategic territorial areas 
and continental shelf disputes (linked with the oil issue). From the formation of Iraq up 
until the revolution in 1958 the issues of tension between Iraq and Kuwait had been 
predominantly concerned with water, gun smuggling, the al-Sabah date farms and 
tribal jurisdiction. After the revolution in July 1958 tensions moved to the more 
contentious area of territorial dispute that had been a simmering problem between the 
two states since the time of King Ghazi's claims to Kuwait in 1939. 
The changing pattern of Iraqi-Kuwaiti, Anglo-Kuwaiti and Anglo-Iraqi 
relations was also a function of the changing social and economic nature of the three 
states. The discovery of oil was both a boon and a burden to the Gulf Sheikhdoms. It 
increased their worth to external patrons but also to regional powers. The economic 
development deriving from the oil broke down the traditional social framework of 
tribal society. The need for large foreign labour in the Sheikhdoms combined with the 
breakdown of traditional society in these small states led to an increase in domestic 
insecurity . 
Kuwait's problem has been that it is a weak power wishing to survive in a 
hostile regional environment. It had needed to borrow power from outside the system 
35 Ghassemi, "United States-Iranian Relationships, 1953-1978", p. 270. 
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in order to survive. The states that it could most readily make a clientelisic bond have 
been the states of the West. Unfortunately, these relationships were seen as 
problematic because of the West's position on the Arab-Israeli question. The 
developing peace process between Israel and most of the Arab states will have 
important ramifications for future Kuwaiti security and the Iraqi-Kuwaiti dispute. To 
conclude, it is clear that as Terrence Lyons writes "complex, intertwined and enduring 
disputes are rooted firmly in the nature of the states in the region and their 
contradictory security needs and aspirations. "36 
Finally the patron-client theory, as with any theory, when applied to actual 
reality has many disparities. Although the international patron-client model is a useful 
tool, that is all it is. Policy decisions cannot be fed into a simple two dimensional 
matrix constituted by the variables of threat, economic well-being, and the level of 
political interaction. In the Anglo-Kuwaiti case the threat environment matrix (Table 
1.3) worked well. Table 1.2 was not so successful in the Anglo-Kuwait case because 
of the inherent fmancial strength of the client (unusual in patron-client relationships). 
Although as the asymmetry between the patron and the client closed fmancially, the 
relationship did move towards policies characterised as Regulation and 
Accommodation. The main argument that declining patrons seek economic advantage 
from their clients also does not fit neatly with reality. That any state could pursue such 
a clear cut hierarchical objective without deviations to other policy considerations 
would be remarkable. In the case of Anglo-Kuwaiti relations, despite the objective 
importance of financial considerations, policy makers in London retained notions of 
power status and Cold War roles that continued to shape policy. 
36 Lyons, "The Hom", in Wriggins, Dynamics, p. 197. 
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